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 SEMINAR ON BAIL
I. INTRODUCTORY: THE REASONS FOR THE SEMINAR
For some years problems raised by the system of bail as applied in the
various criminal jurisdictions in New South Wales had attracted occasional
criticism from various people concerned with the law enforcement process, and
this from two main aspects. Firstly, it was suspected that in some cases citizens
were being unnecessarily deprived of their liberty before having been convicted
of an offence, and secondly, there was increasing evidence that the system was
being used by professional criminals as a means of prolonging their criminal
activities and in some cases of evading criminal justice altogether. There was also
some uncertainty about the nature of the legal principles applied in the grant or
refusal of bail in the various jurisdictions.
There was, however, a feeling amongst knowledgeable people concerned
with these problems that long delay in the total criminal process between arrest
and final disposition was tacitly accepted as a relevant and important factor by
magistrates and judges in dealing with applications for bail, and that a
comprehensive investigation into the element of delay now found in all criminal
jurisdictions in New South Wales, together with the reasons therefor, should be
given priority over an inquiry into the problems of bail. However, further
investigation showed that the complexity of this inquiry, involving so many
facets and requiring lengthy research, would preclude the possibility of speedy
reform, while it was realised that substantial immediate improvements might be
possible in the bail system irrespective of any acceleration in the criminal
process.
The identification of the problems to be dealt with in planning the seminar
was undertaken by a Working Committee which included Judge Levine, a
District Court Judge with long experience as a Chairman of Quarter Sessions,
Messrs M. F. Farquhar and W. J. Lewer, Stipendiary Magistrates and Visiting
Justices to the Metropolitan Remand Prison, Mr N. S. Day, Assistant Direc
tor of
the Department of Corrective Services, and Detective-Sergeant F. Krahe of the
N.S.W. Police Department. From the Sydney University Law School th
e
members were Professor K. O. Shatwell, Mr R. P. Roulston, Mr P. G.Ward and
Mr P. G. McGonigal, with Mrs B. Shatwell as Convening Secretary.
It was realised that the problems of bail arose both at different levels and
at different stages in the criminal process:
1. In the case of offences punishable on sununary conviction,
(a) between first appearance before the magistrate after charge
pending final decision by the magistrate, and
(b) for the period between conviction by the magistrate and
appeal to Quarter Sessions.
2. For offences within the jurisdiction of Courts of Quarter Sessions.
(a) for the period after charge until committal or dismissal by the
magistrate,
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(b) in the period between committal and disposition of the case in
Quarter Sessions, and
(c) in the period between conviction at Quarter Sessions and
appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal.
3. For the few serious crimes usually tried in the criminal jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court,
(a) between ﬁrst appearance before a magistrate and committal for
trial,
(b) between committal and trial, and
(c) after conviction pending appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal.
In addition, an unsuccessful applicant for bail in any of the above situations 'is
entitled to make successive applications for bail to any judge of the
Supreme Court.
Against this background, the first problem with which the seminar might
usefully deal became clear, namely, the elucidation of the legal principles applied
and the practice at various levels in the criminal courts, i.e. in the Magistrates’
Courts, in Courts of Quarter Sessions, and by Judges of the Supreme Court. At
the same time it was hoped to determine whether there was substantial
agreement in terms of general'principle and practice as between judges of equal
status.
\
It was also obviously necessary to collect information about bail law and
practice in overseas jurisdictions, to examine any substantial research materials,
and to assess the relevance of overseas materials to New South Wales problems.
A list of the principal materials so examined appears as an appendix to this
report.
From the outset it was clear that the modern dilemma of the criminal law,
namely the balancing of the protection of the community with the need-to
safeguard individual rights, arose in an acute form here as elsewhere, and that the
problems arise in the context of two extremes: (a) in the case of defendants
under special disabilities such 8 poverty, ignorance or lack of mental capacity,
and (b) in the case of professional criminals who may have very considerable
resources available to enable them to evade criminal justice. It was therefore
important to form some idea of the seriousness of the problem, including the
number of defendants involved at either extreme. Steps were accordingly taken
to look into this question by an examination of the population of the
Metropolitan Remand Prison and Remand Centre to see whether it appeared
that any persons were being, through special disabilities, unnecessarily detained
in custody, while evidence as to the nature of the problem at the other extreme
was provided by Detective-Sergeant Krahe from his thirty years service as a ‘
detective and his position in recent years as Detective-in-charge of a large squad
especially charged with the control of heavy crime. '
 
 Introduction 3
 
It was decided to devote two evening sessions of four hours each to these .
problems, and these sessions took place on November 14th and 27th, 1969.
"Discussion was stimulated by papers directed to the following topics:
1. Selected materials dealing with overseas practice and research into ‘ '-
the problems of bail. ‘
2. (a) A general survey of the legal principles governing the granting
of bail in New South Wales, and
(b) the practice in dealing with bail applications in the Supreme
Court of .N.S.W., Courts of Quarter Sessions, and Magistrates’
Courts.
3. ' A survey of offenders currently within the ambit of the New South
Wales bail system.
4. Police and community problems relating to bail.
5. Bail for persons on parole.
6. A defence lawyer’s view of the problems of bail.
It was hoped that discussion of these matters might lead to a better
understanding of the problems and some specific recommendations for reform,
and some proposals are set out at the end of this summary.
In all, 108 members participated in the seminar, all drawn from persons
professionally interested in the problems of bail from the various aspects of law
enforcement, and hence with substantial experience of the problems within their
'speciﬁc areas of interest.
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II. SOME POINTS HIGHLIGHTED IN THE PAPERS AND IN DISCUSSION
1. The relevance of overseas experience.
While there was general agreement on the value of overseas material as a
means of stimulatinginsights into local problems, some doubts were felt as to its
strict relevance to New South Wales conditions subject to two qualifications: (a)
the application of the Manhattan Bail Scheme rating to selected local gr
oups of
offenders produced some extremely interesting results and suggested that
the
adoption of such a rating system might be of assistance to the courts in dea
ling
with bail applications; and (b) while the number of bail applications in wh
ich
there is any great conflict is at present not great in this State, the
rapidly
increasing population will be accompanied by an increase in crim
inal
prosecutions, and with the criminal courts already overloaded some reassessment
of the situation will be necessary in the light of overseas experience.
Some researches in England, USA. and Canada suggest that an accused is
more likely to be convicted when he has been held in custody pending trial than
when released on ball, but no parallel study has been done in New South
Wales.
Reference was made to a Victorian study* by K. L. Milte which
seemed to
indicate that in the sample examined custody did not affect the findin
g of guilt
or innocence to any degree but that it did affect the length of senten
ce in that
those who had been in custody received longer sentences than matched
cases of
persons released on bail. As Mr Farquhar pointed out. however, there may
be
qualitative differences which are not apparent in such studies, and the findings
may reflect no more than a consistency in the courts in selecting the peopl
e who
ought to be refused bail in that these were in the main the people wh
o later
attracted prison sentences.
2. The legal principles and practice relating to the granting of ba
il in New
South Wales.
The legal principles clearly appear as the legal solution of the dilemma
arising from the conflict between private and social interests: on the one hand
the need to protect the individual against unnecessary loss of liberty and on
the
other the need to protect the processes of criminal justice against absc
onding
offenders, loss of evidence and intimidation of witnesses, and to protect
society
against further damage to life, limb and property. The Chief Justice, stressing
in
his opening address the need for a fresh and realistic attempt to find a balan
ce
between the rights of the individual and the safety of the community, pos
ed the
question as to whether existing legal principles were adequate to answer pres
ent
day problems. Some of the matters which came under notice in this conte
xt
were as follows:
(a) The relative importance of the criteria governing the grant or refusal
0f bail.
The factors relevant to a bail application were set out by Mr Justice
McClemens as: the nature of the crime and likelihood of conviction, and
the
*Australian & N.Z. Journal of Criminology (1968) 1,4.
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likelihood of the accused absconding, or tampering with witnesses, or
committing further offences while on bail. The uncertainties and differences of
opinion as to the relative importance of these criteria are indicated in Mr
Roulston’s paper and these were reflected in the discussion. However, the Chief
Justice suggested that the essential question went rather to the magnitude of the
risks involved in each case and that it may be that a more scientific approach to
bail is needed.
(bl The enforcement ofconditions
The problem of enforcing conditions annexed to a recognisance of bail led
to a suggestion that a person on bail might be subjected to Probation or Parole
supervision, while Mr Justice McClemens proposed that sureties should be
sureties not only for the actual appearance of the defendant but also for his
good behaviour while on remand, and that breach of conditions should be made
a separate and substantive offence, with police powers of arrest for breach.
(c) The acceptance and relief of sureties.
There was some uncertainty as to the principles underlying the acceptance
of sureties, and the large number of applications for relief suggested a need to
ensure that the surety clearly understood the nature of the responsibility he was
undertaking. There was a lack of guidance to the court on such applications
since it was not clear whether forfeiture was to be regarded as reimbursement of
the cost of rearrest of the absconder or as a penalty imposed on the surety for
failure to produce his principal, and hence whether the actual cost of rearrest or
the question of hardship to the surety were matters properly to be taken into
consideration. It was thought that this may require a legislative restatement of
the basis on which a surety is accepted and a revision of administrative
procedures and directives for dealing with the relief of sureties.
(dl The amount ofbail.
The discussion showed some lack of uniformity in the criteria used for
‘ determining the amount of bail and it was thought that these might be made
more explicit. Detective-Sergeant Krahe drew attention to the fact that What was
considered to be “substantial” bail was often very unrealistic in the particular
case, especially in the case of the professional criminal, who frequently had
access to very large funds and would not be deterred from absconding by what
to the ordinary citizen may appear very substantial bail.
(e) Delay in the criminal process.
The problem of delay in the criminal process as an important factor
complicating the whole question of bail was emphasised by many speakers.
Some of the delays were said to be attributable to defendants, in that they are
sometimes careless about the exercise of their rights, sometimes ignorant of their
right to have their cases set down for hearing, and sometimes anxious to delay
coming to trial for as long as possible. It was also suggested (though immediately
controverted) that since conditions at the Metropolitan Remand Centre were
much better than those for convicted prisoners some offenders prefer to spend a
considerable time on remand and have this taken into account when they are
 Summary
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sentenced. The question as to whether this might lead to frivolous appeals was
also raised, but there was thought to be little likelihood of this occurring. It was
generally agreed that the present delays are thoroughly undesirable and that for
a variety of sound penological reasons going far beyond the problems of bail it
was essential that punishment, if any, should follow as soon as is reasonably
possible after arrest and charge. While some suggestions were made for possible
improvements, such as more clerical assistance for the police in the preparation
of briefs, the general feeling was that the causes of delay involved inquiry into a
complex of factors beyond the scope of the present seminar.
3. A survey of offenders within the ambit of the New South Wales bail
system.
A survey of offenders currently within the ambit of the New South Wales
bail system was carried out partly by an examination conducted by Mr Noel Day
and Mr Paul Ward of persons in detention at the Metropolitan Remand Prison
and Remand Centre, supplemented by information supplied by Judge Levine as
a Chairman of Quarter Sessions and by Mr Lewer and Mr Farquhar as Visiting
Justices to the State Penitentiary. In addition, Mr Ward and Miss Susan
Armstrong applied the screening technique of the Manhattan Bail Scheme to the
51 absconders from bail in New South Wales in 1968, matching these where
possible with offenders who were granted bail and appeared for trial and to a
similar group retained in custody. These inquiries were supplemented by the
criminal case histories supplied by Detective-Sergeant Krahe relating to the
misuse of the bail system by professional criminals.
This survey indicated that in the majority of cases existing procedures
seem to operate satisfactorily, but that problems arise in the context of the two
extremes of defendants under special disabilities and those who are professional
criminals. In respect of the former, Mr Farquhar thought that the situation was
adequately covered by the weekly attendance of Visiting Justices at the St
ate
Penitentiary, and that persons held in custody were well aware that they could
have any matters brought to the attention of the Visiting Justice, who would
then pass the case to the Public Solicitor for appropriate action. Miss
Armstrong’s paper, however, seemed to indicate that at least a proportion of
those held in custody on remand could be released without risk and that it might-
be worth considering releasing on his own recognisance an accused who cannot
raise bail or sureties when these have been granted. Mr Ward’s study showed that
among such people there is a higher proportion than expected of persons born
outside Australia, and this suggests that among those who may be considered as
being under special disabilities in respect of bail applications are recent
immigrants and persons without near relatives in the State.
At the other extreme, Detective-Sergeant Krahe’s evidence showed that a
considerable number of professional criminals use the bail period for “earning”
money for payment of counsel’s fees, for the support of dependants while in
prison, and for building up a nest-egg against their release. Professor Shatwell,
basing his remarks on a long observation of the activities of such criminals,
expressed the opinion that a large proportion of major crimes against property,
many of them involving serious acts of violence, were committed by criminals
who were already on bail on serious charges. Mr McGeechan, the Director of
Corrective Services, estimated that between 20 to 40 per cent of the prison
population consisted of hard-core professional criminals.
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There was general agreement that these problems were serious ones in the
case of either extreme, and that it is equally wrong for society to contemplatethe possibility of the detention of even a small number of individuals as a resultof ignorance, lack of mental capacity or lack of relatives in the State and torelease on bail individuals who, on reasonable grounds, appear to constitute a
serious threat to life, limb or property.
4. Police and community problems relating to bail.
Detective-Sergeant Krahe’s evidence, emphasising the urgent need to
protect the community against the misuse of the bail system by professional
criminals, indicated that the mischief to the community included not only
further depredations on society during the bail period, but that their ability to
avail themselves of large financial resources frequently enabled them to
abscond either interstate or overseas, thus raising all the difficulties, financial
and otherwise, involved in the search for fugitive offenders, the loss of relevant
evidence through lapse of time, and the fact that in the’meantime a number of
them continue their criminal activities in other States and in the United
Kingdom.
Here attention is drawn to the study by Mr Ward and Miss Armstrong of
the 51 absconders from bail in 1968, and to the fact that the rating system
applied appeared to give greater accuracy in identifying those likely to abscond
if released on bail. Cases involving professional criminals are among the more
difficult ones in bail applications. It appeared from the discussion that there was
not always sufficient evidence before the court and also it was not clear what
weight was given in the different jurisdictions to police opposition to bail.
5. Bail for persons on parole.
The special problems arising in the context of applications for bail by
persons on parole as this arises in New South Wales since the introduction of the
present parole system in 1966 were dealt with in the paper submitted by Judge
Levine. The fact that an applicant for bail is a parolee is an important and
relevant matter which should be brought to‘ the attention of the court, and he
pointed out that this is not always done. He thought also that the Parole Officer
concerned should be present in court for the hearing, since he is the person who
can best assess the risks involved in releasing the accused on bail.
6. A defence lawyer’s view in bail applications.
The defence lawyers, as might be expected, rightly stressed the importance
of protecting persons still prima facie presumed to be innocent from deprivation
of liberty before a finding of guilt was established. The importance of bail in
facilitating the preparation of the defence was emphasised as a factor to be taken
into account in the hearing of bail applications. A further practical point raised
was the need for the provision of better facilities for counsel to interview
persons detained in custody.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
There was a considerable measure of agreement that these problems were
such as to require the adoption of new procedures, since some bail applications
clearly require more time for examination and more information than the
present system permits, while the criminal process, already seriously delayed, is
likely to become more so with the expanding population and consequent
increasing load on the criminal courts. Two proposals for new procedures were
put forward, and also a number of suggestions for reforms within the existing
system. These are summarised below.
1. Establishment of a bail tribunal.
A detailed proposal for the establishment of a Bail Tribunal to deal with
all applications for bail was submitted by Mr McGonigal and appears in the
appendix to this report. It was generally felt, however, that the present system
was operating satisfactorily in the majority of cases, and that a tribunal was
needed only to review cases by way of appeal, that is, that applications should in
the first instance be made in the ordinary way, leaving it open for either
prosecution or defence to have the case referred to the tribunal when dissatisﬁed
with the decision. It was suggested that the tribunal should be assisted by
Probation or Parole Officers, who would submit reports on cases about to be
considered and be responsible for reporting breaches of conditions of release.
Such a tribunal, in substance operating in an appellate capacity on the motion of
either prosecution or defence, would not only relieve the present crowded court
calendars and ensure greater uniformity in decisions concerning bail, but might
also be expected to resolve many of the uncertainties revealed at the seminar,
such as the relative importance of the criteria for determining the grant or
refusal of bail, the principles underlying the acceptance and relief of sureties, the
weighting to be given to police evidence relating to the professional criminal, etc.
On the other hand, the burden of work on a tribunal of this kind would not be
too great, since the cases at either extreme requiring consideration are
comparatively few.
2. A preliminary rating for bail.
A rating system for bail such as that employed in the Manhattan Bail
Scheme, based on objective facts relating to prior. record, family ties,
employment record, residence, etc., was proposed as a further innovation. It was
thought that this would be of assistance to the court on ﬁrst appearance of the
defendant by giving a more accurate screening of likely absconders and also of
persons who might safely be released but who may be under special disabilities
in attempting to find sureties or bail. Such a rating, based on information from
the accused and with such verification as is readily available, would give a
preliminary assessment of suitability for release, leaving to be considered in the
exercise of the discretion of the court such other matters as the likelihood of
tampering with witnesses, of commission of other offences while on bail, etc.
3. The criteria governing the grant or refusal of bail.
That the relative importance and legal status of the criteria governing the
grant or refusal of bail be clariﬁed and made more explicit, possibly by statute.
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4. sureties.
(a)
(b)
(C)
That the Justices Act should be amended to permit the dispensing
with sureties in cases of committal for trial, with release on the
defendant’s own recognisance or the lodging of a cash depositin lieu
of surety.‘
That sureties should be sureties not only for appearance in court but
also for the good behaviour of the accused while on bail.
That the procedures and directions for accepting sureties should be
revised, possibly by legislation, and that the principles upon which
forfeiture is based should be restated.
5. Conditions annexed to a recognisance of bail.
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
That the Justices Act should be amended to provide for the
annexing of conditions to a recognisance of bail.
That in selected cases persons released on bail should be-subject to
supervision by Probation or Parole Ofﬁcers, and that these should be
responsible for reporting breaches of conditions.
That breach of conditions should be made a separate and substantive
offence, with police powers of arrest.
That the power of arrest should be extended to the situation where
police or surety suspect, on reasonable grounds, that the defendant
is about to abscond.
6. Estreat bail.
That estreat bail monies should be made available for the extradition of
absconders from bail, instead of being paid into Consolidated Revenue as at
. present.
7. Review of persons held in detention.
That there should be more frequent review of persons held in detention
awaiting trial, and that the reviewing authority should have power to release on
bail or recognisance.
8. Bail applications.
(a)
(b)
That the power to close the court in s.32 of the Justices Act be
extended to include bail hearings when prejudice is likely to arise by
way of sensational publicity.
That where the applicant is a parolee the court should be informed
of this and the Parole Ofﬁcer should be present in court to give
evidence on the applicant’s suitability for release.
 Summary 11
(c) That consideration be given to the granting of legal aid in bail
applications where requested.
9. Interviewing facilities.
That the facilities for counsel to interview persons held in custody should
be improved, and that consideration should be given to the desirability of a
Remand Centre in the city.
10. Research.
That further research should be undertaken on —
(a) Delays in the criminal process.
(b) . The number and seriousness of crimes committed by persons on bail.
(c) Persons held in custody through inability to raise sureties or bail.
 
 OPENING ADDRESS BY THE HON. SIR LESLIE HERRON, K.B.E., C.M.G.
CHIEF]USTICE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Before declaring this seminar open I must express the thanks of all present
to the Institute of Criminology in the Law School of the University of Sydney
for arranging this seminar. A reference to the Institute carries with it at once a
reminder of the debt that we owe to the.Dean of the Faculty of Law,.Professor
Shatwell, and to his hard working wife and secretary Mrs Elizabeth Shatwell.
These seminars would not be possible without the unflagging zeal of Mr R. P.
Roulston and Mr P. C. Ward, and in the present case, Miss Susan Armstrong.
These three in particular have laboured mightily to arrange the papers and to
provide material for discussion.
Later a suitable vote of thanks will be tendered to those reading papers,
but we remember them in advance in this vote of thanks.
I myself believe that bail is one of the most important aspects of criminal
procedure that we are faced with today, and we have to ask ourselves, I think,
two questions: ﬁrstly, are the old principles adequate to answer present day
problems? And secondly, and Ifeel this is a corollary of the first, do not list
congestion and delay in hearings in bringing suspects to trial warrant us taking a
fresh look at the problems of bail? Who will not be convinced that out of the
papers shortly to be read there will emerge one incontrovertable decision,
namely, that a more sophisticated and a more scientific approach is required of
us all in this day and age? Is it not possible to preserve a balance between .the
interests of the community, as seen in the police and Crown viewpoints, and
those of the accused, as seen in the scientific and academic approach of Mr Ward
and Miss Susan Armstrong and of that of the advocate Mr Howard Purnell?
The primary approach, of course, is not obscure. It is that bail is a
substitute for custody. The ﬁrst consideration, to my mind, is whether the
accused is likely .to take advantage of his freedom and abscond. Well, the figure
of 51 out of 4,000 does not suggest that many are so minded, and indeed‘some
of these are not really absconders in the strict sense — they just don’t seem to
get around to turning up on the appointed day. '
The next question is: is the offender likely to abuse his freedom by (a)
trying to interfere with witnesses for the prosecution, or (b) committing further
crimes such as housebreaking? In R. v. Phillips in 32 Criminal Appeal Reports,
page 47, Mr Justice Atkinson, who spoke for the Court of Criminal Appeal-
(which included Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice), said “inznineteen cases
out of twenty it is a mistake to grant bail to housebreakers”. There was in that
case, he thought, a likelihood of the offence being repeated when,the applicant
had a bad record. And do we feel that other crimes are likely to becommitted
on the basis of — if caughtpone more offence will not appreciably add to the
sentence?
l4 Chairman’s Opening Address
But are we not well aware of all these qualifications? The question is, how
real are our fears? Do we not know that there is a desire to find money to brief
counsel and to provide for families? What of the unstable, and those not fit to be
at large? We have been reminded in the older cases that the gravity of the crime
standing alone is a reason for refusing bail, but is not the word “gravity” merely
a portmanteau word embracing these other considerations that I have
mentioned, for obviously the prospect of a heavy sentence adds to a man’s
decision to abscond, or to interfere with witnesses. But has it any other
relevance? The papers shortly to be read require, I believe, the balancing of these
objective legal considerations with subjective elements of hardship to the
individual, and here, to my mind, this congestion is a most vital question. Delay
in trials is inevitable today. Is three, months, for instance, too long to wait in
custody? It is a live question, particularly in the Supreme Court.
And what of these peripheral considerations — a man with a sick mother, a
pregnant girlfriend, the desire to marry, the desire to earn money to support his
family — what of those matters? Supposing that a man is facing gaol for the first
time, and what about a. complicated defence? And after the depositions of
witnesses have been taken, how real is this fear of interference with the
prosecution’s witnesses? Mark you, I do except from my question attacks on a
wife, for instance, and assults on a man’s own children, or cases in which an
accomplice has turned Queen’s evidence. Those must be put into a special
category of attempts.
In olden times, trials followed fast upon the offence. A man committed a
crime and he was on his way to the gallows within measurable time from then,
and even in England today the Quarter Sessions cases come on within three
months of committal. But here delays are growing. In one case an accused was in
the remand yard for almost twelve months. And I sat in the Court of Criminal
Appeal today and dealt with an appeal of a man who was charged with an assault
on 14th February 1968 and his case came before the Court of Quarter Sessions
on 29th September 1969. Of course, I know that there are reasons given for
these things but they are not always very satisfying — to people who are not
associated with the law, at any rate. In England the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
Section 6, is still in force — nominally, at any rate — and this provides for a
discharge of any prisoner on the sittings next after the one for which he is
committed. In other words, one adjournment only, and not two, will be
recognised.
However, as I say, I am posing the problem, and not providing the answers.
But even recognising as I do the validity of all these principles which I have
myself stated in the ‘law reports, recognising the validity of these considerations
in general terms, are we who administer the law not bound to give the closest
attention to (a) a more scientific approach to bail, and (b) a fresh and realistic
attempt to find a balance between the rights of the individual and the safety of
the community. '
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It is in the hope that we will obtain an objective answer to these questions
that I now declare this seminar open. I thank you for your attendance, and I will
merely leave you with an apt quotation of one author who said:
“To refuse release without the most' anxious consideration is to
stand with John against Magna Carta and with the Stuarts against the
Commonwealt
Well, those are very provocative words, and I do hope that the seminar we are
about to conduct will provide answers satisfactory to us all.
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PRINCIPLES OF BAIL
R. P. Rouls'ton "'
“Bail is a security in the form of a bond required in respect of the
release ofan accused person, and conditioned for his appearance at a
specified time and place to answer the charge. If the terms ofa bail
require a surety or sureties, the defendant is placed in custody of
such sureﬁes, who, at common law, could re-seize him” '
The right to bail is as old 'as the law of England itself and it is, as Lord
Devlin has remarked2 “indeed curious that fundamental questions concerning it
have never been settled. The system so far has worked satisfactorily without
providing any occasion for their resolution”.
This rather cOmplacent view as to the satisfactory working of the system is
not today reﬂected in the growing concern among those involved in the
administration of the bail system. The principles upon which bail should be
granted or refused have been re-examined by the courts and the relative
importance of traditional criteria have been questioned. There is also evidence of
practical concern for the effect upon an accused of a refusal to grant bail as well
as concern as to the possibly harmful effects of the injudicious granting of bail.
In the United States the Vera Foundation’s participation in the Manhattan
Bail Project in the courts of New York City pioneered a new approach to the
problem of bail. This paved the way for remedial action against bail abuses
elsewhere and similar bail projects have been started in communities throughout
the United States.3
In England initial examination of the question was undertaken by the
Home Office Research Unit’s study in 1960,“ and further steps have been taken
by “Justice”, the British Section of the International Commission of Jurists, by
arranging a conference on “Bail and Remands in Custody” in November 1965
and by setting up a working party. 5
In New South Wales students in the Faculty of Law of the University of
Sydney have originated a pilot study into the granting of bail in courts of Petty
Sessions this year. At the request of many interested in the criminal process the
Institute of Criminology, University of Sydney, has organised this seminar in the
hope and expectation that it 'will encourage the search for ways to diminish
unnecessary remands in custody without impairing the effectiveness of the state
law enforcement efforts.
’* LL.M. (Tas.), LLB. (Syd), Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law
1. Archbold 24th Ed; para; 201 p. 76
2. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England p. 71
3 See “National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice;
Proceedings and Interim Report” (Washington DC. 1965)
4. Time Spent Awaiting Trial London 1960 '
5 See New Law Journal, December 9th, 1965, p. 195 and
June 16,1966, p. 954
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAIL
Bail originated in medieval England as an alternative to holding untried
prisoners in custody. Inadequate and disease ridden jails and lock-ups and
inordinate delays in trials by travelling justices made the development of some
workable alternative to holding accused persons in pre-trial custody a necessity.
There are at least two other principal theories attributing the origin of
present bail procedures to the early days of the common law. One, the ancient
Anglo-Saxon practice of hostageship whereby one person was held hostage until
a promise was fulﬁlled by another. The other traces bail to the ancient practice
of “Weregeld” — an assurance to the creditor by a third party that the debt
would be paid.
The system that developed was to invest the sheriffs with a wide and
ill-deﬁned discretion to release a prisoner on his own promise, or that of an
acceptable third person, that he would appear for trial. The third party surety
was personally responsible for the appearance of the accused. If the accused
escaped the third party surety was originally required to surrender himself; thus
in effect bail was the bailment or delivery of the accused to jailors of his'own
choosing who had custodial power over him. Later the sureties were permitted
to forfeit promised sums of money instead of themselves if- the accused failed to
appear.
The ﬁrst statutory regulation of the granting of bail in England was-by the
Statute of Westminster 1275.“ This was designed to remedy the irresponsible
abuse which has been made by the sheriffs of their discretion to grant bail. The
Statute regulated the discretionary bail power of sheriffs by specifying which
offences were bailable and which were not. It lists a series of thirteen types of
cases in which persons should not be bailed and a shorter list of specific
situations and offences in which bail should not be refused.
These two lists were clearly based on three considerations, namely (1)
seriousness of the offence, e.g. hOmicide, arson, treason;a(2) the likelihood of the
accused’s guilt, e.g.' “furtum manifestum”, thieves “openly defamed and
known”, and (3) the “outlawed” status of the offender e.g. banished,
excommunicated or escapees.
Almost certainly these three factors are ultimately derived from the single
consideration of the accused’s likelihood of appearing for his trial. Nevertheless
it is not without interest that the first statutory regulation of bail procedures did
not, in terms, proceed on the basis of one single principle upon which all
decisions about bail should be based and in the centuries that followed this
enactment emphasis in the reported cases continually ﬂuctuated from one to the
other.
For over the next five centuries the Statute of Westminster determined
what offences should be bailable or not. Until 1826 no basic changes were made
in the principles upon which bail should be granted or withheld. The intervening
statutes, in the main, made changes in the procedure whereby bail was granted in
efforts to eliminate administrative abuses.
6. 3 Edw. 153. 15
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The next important enactment was the statute of 1826,7 which placed
emphasis on the principle that bail should rarely be granted in cases where there
was a strong likelihood of conviction and that bail should be granted where the-
prospect of conviction was small. By amendment some nine years later-8 all
previous criteria were subordinated to the single criterion of the risk that the
accused will not appear to take his trial. This statute appears not to have been
adopted in New South Wales. Perhaps not surprisingly if one reflectson the
conditions of the colony of New South Wales in 1835.
The modern origin of the present magisterial discretion in granting bail
rests on the Indictable Offences Act 1848-9 which in effect provided that the
committing magistrate may in his discretion admit to bail a person charged with
any felony, or with any dozen assorted misdemeanours. In other crimes bail
could not be refused. The cardinal principle upon which this discretion should
be exercised was speciﬁed:
“Such justice of the peace may, in his discretion, admit such person
to bail upon his procuring and producing such surety or surelies as,
in the opinion of such justice, will be sufﬁcient to ensure the
appearance of such accused person at the time and place when and
where he is to be tried for such offence”.
This statute is substantially reproduced in sections 34 & 45 of the Justices
Act (NSW.) 1902. It is more surprising that the Bail Act 1898'°which modiﬁed
the absolute requirement as to sureties, and in general gave the magistrates
unfettered discretion to admit to bail even on his own recognisance any person
whom they have reason to believe will submit to take his trial,was not adopted
in New South Wales. It would be of considerable advantage to magistrates in this
State if legislation of similar effect, even at this late stage, were enacted.
THE CRITERIA FOR GRANTING BAIL
1. NON-APPEARANCE AT TRIAL
An examination of the authorities and the statutes show that the most
consistently followed and enunciated consideration when dealing with the
question of whether bail should be refused is that the object of bail is to secure
by a pecuniary penalty the appearance of the prisoner at his trial. This
consideration has been frequently and emphatically re-stated over at least the
last one hundred years.
In R. v. Seaife‘” Coleridge J. said:
“I conceive that the principle on which persons are committed to
prison by magistrates, previous to trial, is for the purpose of ensuring
the certainty of their appearing to take trial. It seems to me that the
same principle is to be acted on in an application for bailingaperson
 
7 Geo. IV C. 64;adopted in N.S.W. by 9 Geo. W No. l
5&6WillIVc. 33 s. 3
11 & 12 Vict. c. 42 s. 23 adopted in N.S.W. by 14 Vic. No. 43 .
10. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 7
1021. (1841) 10 L.J.M.C. 144; 9 Dow1553
9
9
°
.
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committed to take his trial, and it is not a question of the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner. It is on that count alone that it becomes
important to see whether the offence is serious, whether the
evidence is strong, and whether the punishment for the offence is
heavy”“
In R. v. R0se'2 Lord Russell C. J. expressed a similar view:
“It cannot be too strongly impressed upon the magistracy 0f the
country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the
requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the
prisoner at trial. ”
Recently in two New South Wales decisions similar views were expressed:
“The object of bail is to ensure and secure the attendance of the
accused at his trial and it recognises that the liberty of the subject
should only be restricted in such way as will achieve this result '3 ”
- and ‘
“But it is, I think, important to keep in mind that the grant or
refusal of bail is determined fundamentally on the probability or
otherwise of the applicant appearing at Court as and when required
and not on his supposed guilt or innocence” ‘4
Although the sentiment in this passage has been echoed in countless other
decisions the courts, over the years, have found it necessary to articulate and
elaborate a number of other considerations which it is proper to take into
consideration. What has been described as “the prima facie right to bail” may be
displaced by a variety of other considerations. To these I will now turn.
2. SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENCE
This has been established as an important matter to be taken into
consideration when assessingthe likelihood that an accused will appear to take
his trial.
In charges of murder the relationship between the seriousness of the
offence and the granting of bail come into the sharpest focus. It is abundantly
clear that it would be most unusual to grant bail to a person against whom there
has been shown a prima facie case of murder. For example in R. v. Barroner and
Allain" Erle, J ., giving the decision of the court said:
“Thus then ,it appears that the crime charged is of the highest
magnitude, the punishment of it assigned by law of the extreme
severity and the evidence of guilt a confession; under such
circumstances the court is bound to presume that no amount of bail
11. See also Coleridge J. in R. v. Barronet and Allain
(1852) Dears. C.C. 51;R. v. Robinson (1854) 23 L.J.Q.
B. 286
12 (1898) 18 Cox CC. 717
13 lsaacs J. in R. v.Appleby and anor (1965—66)
83 W.N. (N.S.W.) pt. 1 P. 300 at p. 301
14 O’Brien J. in R. v. Mahoney & Smith (1967) 2 N.S,W,R. at p, 154
15. (1852) Dears C.C. 51
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would secure the presence of the accused at the trial should they be
liberated”.
It is-questionable however whether, even in cases of murder, an accused
should, in no circumstances, be admitted to bail or in even such cases that the
seriousness of an offence should stand as an absolute principle in its own right.
In R. v. Cable‘6 , Herron J., granted bail to a person charged with murder who
had been remanded in custody until the coronial enquiry which was to take
place a month after the alleged offence, His Honour saying:
“In this case, hOWever, there is nothing before me except the bare
fact that the accused is charged with murder, and it seems to me
that, unless I have some evidence before me to show that he is likely,
to abscond or fail to answer his bail by the time the coronial enquiry
comes on, it. is wrong in principle that he should be held for such a
length of time. I cannot be taken as saying for one momentthat an
application for bail on a charge of murder must be granted upon
being made. Farfrom it”
3. PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION
The strength of the Crown’s case and the apparent probability of
conviction is a matter —— particularly if allied with other matters —— which will
make the granting of bail more difficult than a case where the evidence appears
weak and conviction appears improbable.‘7
The presumption of innocence or the principle that a man is presumed to
be innocent until he is proved guilty would seem to operate rather weakly where
the court, on a bail application, is making an assessment of the probability of
conviction. This may be inevitable as the court is certainly entitled to consider
the nature of the evidence which the Crown proposes to call to rebut the
presumption of innocence and may be faced with real difficulty in adequately
assessing the strengths of the defence, which, indeed, at this stage, may not have
been revealed at all. See for example R. v. Ladd ”° where it was regretted that
in the circumstances of that case
“The court is not able at this stage of the matter to assess an
examination of the depositions before the magistrate what are the
probabilities as to conviction ofthe crimes charged or what defences
the accused persons may have and what are the probabilities of their
success on those defences”.
4. SEVERITY OFPUNISHMENT
This consideration is inextricably inter-related to the two matters I have
just mentioned above as well as to the relevance of the accused’s previous
antecedents and convictions discussed below.
 
16. (1946) 63 W.N. (N.S.W.) P267
17. R. v. Montgomery (1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 233
R. v. Clancy (1958) - 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 142
17a. (1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 431, p. 433
[—
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If it appears that the offence charged is one of some gravity, the evidence
against the accused looks overwhelming and he has an extensive criminal record
there are obviously strong inducements for him to flee if granted bail. It
becomes increasingly unlikely that, if granted bail, he will appear to stand his
trial, and the refusal of bail would usually be justified on what, it was submitted
earlier, is the basic reason for refusing bail. '
The materiality of this consideration, along with others, has frequently
been adverted to and two examples will here sufﬁce. In R. v.Montgomery‘a it
was said:
“The subject charges are very serious involving heavy penalties. The
evidence, apart from the alleged admissions of guilt, is very strong
against him — in fact, he was caught red-handed. He has every
reason to fear a conviction and, ifconvicted, a long sentence. 1n the
circumstances it seems to me that the applicant has every incentive
to abscond ifgranted bail ”.
And in R. v. Clancy‘”
“The offence with which he is charged is a very serious one and it
carries a_maximurn penalty of ten years’ penal servitude. The
evidence against the applicant also is very strong and in my opinion
it is very likely that he will be convicted of it. In view of these facts
and the fact that there are other serious charges pending against him,
it seems to me that the applicant has every reason to abscond should
he be given the opportunity
 
5. PREVIOUS RECORD AND LIKELIHOOD OF COMMITTING
FURTHER OFFENCES ‘
“ In contemporary times it would appear that the most important factor
justifying the refusal of bail is a combination of previous criminal record and the
consequent likelihood that he will commit further offences if released on bail.
This seems to have become deeply entrenched in the practice of granting bail in
both England and New South Wales although its standing in other jurisdictions is
less certain.‘9
‘ It is generally recognised that a sizable minority of crimes — particularly
cases of dishonesty — are committed by persons who are currently on bail and it
is also recognised that persons with a long criminal history — again particularly
crimes of dishonesty — will very probably commit further crimes if they are
released on bail.
This was recognised in RV. Phillips ’°
“Some crimes are not at all likely to be repeated pending trial and in
those cases there may be no objection to bail; but some are, and
18. (1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 233, p. 234
18a (1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) l42,p. 143
19. See e.g. R. v.AIexander (1956) V.L.R. 451;
R. v. Harrison (1950) V.L.R. 20
20. (1947) 32 Cr. App. R. pp. 47—48
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housebreaking particularly is a crime which will very probably be
repeatedgif a prisoner is released on bail, especially in the case of a
man who has a‘record of housebreaking such as the applicant has”.
And in R. v. Armstrong"- it was said:
“It is clear that it is the duty of the justices to inquire into the
antecedents of the man who is applying to them for bail, and if they
find he has a bad record — particuhrly, a record which suggests that
he is likely to commit similar offences while on bail — that is a
matter which they must consider before granting bail”.
The remarks of Goddard, LC]. in HM. Postmaster-General v.
Whitehouse ’2 have frequently been cited with approval in New South Wales e.g.
R. v.Pascoe" R. v. Prentice 2‘ R. v. Clancy ‘5
“As we have pointed out in cases in the Court of criminal Appeal,
bail ought to be sparingly‘granted in cases where prisoners have long
records of conviction, since it very often results when such a person
obtains bail, he commits offences while on bail, sometimes telling
the court afterwards that he committed them. so as to get. money to
enable him to be represented at Quarter Sessions, in other cases
saying that he had to make some provision for his wife and children
while he was in prison ” 2‘
Similar sentiments were put colorfully and forcefully by Isaacs, J. in two
recent cases, R. v. Appleby & Anor,’7 ,and R. v. Young"
In the former he said:
“Save in very special circumstances persons committedfor trial who
during such committals commit serious offences against the
community cannot hope to be liberated (on bail once these latter
offences have been prima facie established and there has been a
committal in respect of them. Magistrates are only doing their duty
towards the community in stamping out crime and the opportunities for
further crime by refusing bail in those circumstances.”
And in the latter case it was said:
“But it is timely, to sound a note of warning. I have already dealt
with bail applications by persons who betweencommittal by
(1951) 2 All E.R. 219
(1952) 35 Cr. App. R.8, p. 11
(1961) 78 W.N. (N.S.W.) 59
(1957) 74 W.N. (N.S.W.) 440
(1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 142
See footnote 22 ibid
(1965-66) 83 W.N. (N.S.W.) 300 p. 302
(1965—66) 83 W.N. (N.S.W.) 391 p. 395
 24 Principles of Bail
 
magistrates and the hearing at Quarter Sessions commit like
offences. . . Let it not be thought that people can at early stages,
that is, in between remands before magistrates, commit like offences
with impunity, that is, safe and secure in the knowledge that they
can nevertheless get bail on such new charges and still retain their
bail on the pending charges.
Let it be clearly understood that the honeymoon is on the way out
and their conduct is likely to be viewed as a calculated risk and such
conduct is likely to imperil their liberty, and may well lead to refusal
and revocation of bail”
Judge Cross in R. v. Wakeﬁeld 2" considered this matter one “of very great
importance” and said:
”Accused persons have in fact claimed at Quarter Sessions that they
committed these crimes to raise money for legal , representation.
Others were no doubt inﬂuenced by the “rule” in R. v. Lovell 3°
which was said to prohibit more than one accumulative sentence. As
a result, crimes were frequently committed by persons on bail
without fear ofany proportionate penalty. But, whatever the causes,
judges of the Court are confronted time and again with the situation
where offences — often a multiplicity of them — are committed by
persons ata time when they were currently on bail”.
Without minimising the seriousness of the incidence of crimes committed
by persons on bail the recognition of the principle that it is entirely proper and
defensible to refuse bail and remand a person in custody on the basis that he
'may commit further offences if he be released on bail raises important questions
of'both practical implementation and of principle.
Two practical considerations that need to be carefully considered are,
ﬁrstly: the available criminal statistics provide no adequate or safe guide to the
number of persons who do commit crimes while on bail or the number and types
of crimes they commit. Secondly there has not yet been developed any
reasonably satisfactory predictive device for determining which prisoners are, in
fact, certainly or very likely, going to commit further offences and which are
not. It cannot be certain that the criteria upon which the police make their
assessments are the same as those which guide the court. Indeed it is improbable
that they would be.
The Court, no doubt, would know, in general terms, that a person who has
been shown to have marked criminal tendencies will be more likely to commit
further crimes. The evidence as to recidivism, such as it is, shows that the
probability of reconviction becomes steadily greater with each new conviction.
The Court, in the light of this, is likely to be guided by the length of the record
and the seriousness of the offence.
The police, on the other hand, may place greater emphasis on information
in their possession, but not then available to the Court and the desirability of
29. (1969) W.N. (N.S.W.) 325, p. 332
30. (1939) 56 W.N. (N.S.W.) 75
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having the defendant out of the way, but nevertheless readily available, while
they complete their enquiries without the risk of interference with witnesses and
the hampering of their investigation.
They are also likely to be more acutely conscious of the fact that if further
offences are committed the onerous burdens of investigation, apprehension and
bringing back to court will fall squarely on their shoulders.
There is also a serious objection in principle to remanding a person in
custody on the ground that he may commit other offences if released on bail.
The right of a person, not yet convicted, to his liberty is a most important
consideration. What Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson" described as “one
of the pillars of liberty” was that “in English law every imprisonment is prima
facie unlawful and that it is for the person directing imprisonment to justify his
act”. The objection was expressed by Denning, L. J. in Everett v. Ribbands‘2 as
being that:
“I 1‘ would be contrary to all principle for a man to be punished not
for what he has already done but for what he may thereafter do ”.
This view is accepted in the United States where judges are not authorised
to refuse pre-trial bail as a device for the protection of society from possible new
crimes by the accused. Justice Jackson justified the attitude in Williamson v.
United States ’3 in these terms:
“Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but
unconsummated offences is so unprecedented in this country and so
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to
' resort to it even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement
convictionof such offences as those of which defendants stand
convicte
Whilst recognising that the possibility of the commission of further
offences, interfering with witnesses and other matters hampering police
investigation is one of the most difficult factors to deal with of all those that
arise on the question of bail, it is manifestly undesirable that the principle of
“salus populi suprema lex” be too readily invoked or that it be elevated into
an independent principle on its own justifying the refusal of bail and to that
extent obscuring the fundamental principle that the object of bail is to secure
attendance of the accused at his trial and that the very existence of the device of
bail recognises that the liberty of the subject should only be restricted in such
way as will achieve this result.
6. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
FREE TO PREPARE HIS DEFENCE
One of the most interesting recent developments in the principles and
practices relating to bail has' been the assertion that the most important
consideration in bail applications is that in the public interest, it is most
desirable that the accused should be allowed his freedom so that his case may be
prepared in the best possible circumstances.
31. (1941)3All E.R. 338
32. (1952) 1 All E.R. 823
33. 184 Fed. 2nd 280
24407—2
26 Principles of Bail
This view has been most fully developed by Judge Cross sitting as
Chairman of Quarter Sessions in R. v. Wakefield 3‘1-and because of its relative
novelty warrants quoting at some length:
34.
“In considering whether bail should be granted it seems to me that
the most important consideration is the public interestin the right
of any person to have his case presented in the fairest possible
circumstances. In criminal cases the accused is entitled to equal.—
less and no more — consideration to that given to the Gown. The
Crown law officers with the sizable, if not unlimited resources, of
the Attorney~General’s Department, are able to prepare the
prosecution with thoroughness and at leisure, and generally, without
finding themselves under great difficulties in the interviewing of
witnesses, the obtaining offurther evidence or the like. ,
Prima facie it is desirable that the preparation of the defence be
alloWed to take place in circumstances of approximate parity With
those in which the prosecution is prepared There are obvious
forensic advantages in the accused’s legal adviser interviewing the
accused. And because it is desirable that the legal adviser have as
many interviews with the accused as he considers beneficial to the
accused, as he considers beneficial to the conduct of the accused’s
case, it is desirable that his legal adviser have ready access to the
accused, i. e. that the accused be readily available for such interviews.
It can be seen therefore, that the proper conduct of the accused’s
. case involves the proper presentation of it, which in turn involves the
ready accessibility of the accused to his legal adviser which can best
be achieved if the accused is at liberty and cannot be best achieved if
the accused is confined at the State Penitentiary at Malabar. And
though privacy of interview between a conﬁnee and his legal adviser
is had as of course at the State Penitentiary the institutional
atmosphere may have an inhibiting effect, on the conﬁnee both in
the preparatory marshalling of his thoughts for such interview and in
the interview itself.
So that prima facie a person accused of a crime should be allowed
his liberty before the hearing in order that the preparation of his
case be as full and thorough and unfettered as possible. This applies
not only where the accused has been committedfor trial but also
where the accused has been: committed for sentence only or has
otherwise indicated his intention of pleading guilty. For the proper
conduct of pleas of guilty often requires a tactical deftness and a
delicacy of questioning that certainly renders desirable the
unfettered access to the accused by his advocate in the days and
weeks before the hearing. In my view this first consideration, i..,e
the desirability of the accused being allowed his freedom so that his
case may be prepared in the best possible circumstances, is the most
important consideration on bail applications ”.
(1969) W.N. (N.S.W.) 325, p. 326—7
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This statement of principle merits close consideration'not only because of
its refreshing novelty, not only because it has been a previously neglected factor
but also because of the explicit and tacit assumptions underlying it.
To say that it is novel, is perhaps to overstate the position. It is a factor
that has from time to time been mentioned in the cases usually in the context of
whether the defence to be raised is simple or complex in that preparation of a
complicated defence, even with the.aid of experienced solicitors,may be very
difficult if the accused man can be seen only in prison.
In the past little consideration was paid to the case of apparently
straightforward defences or intentions to plead guilty. Indeed in theleading case _
of R. v. Watson” the court' after considering the three main tests as to the
probability of the accused appearing at his trial, i.e., the nature of the crime
charged, the probability of conviction and the severity of punishment, went on
to list eight other circumstances that may be said to be relevant in appropriate
cases but were not matters to outweigh the general rules enunciated. The eighth
and last of these was:
“the fact. that the accused might be prejudiced in the preparation of
the defence might also have some weight, but the case would need to
be an exceptional one”.
From last to first is quite a formidable leap and it remains-to be seen to
what extent Judge Cross’ propositions will ﬁnd general acceptance. They are
supported to some extent by the opinion expressed by Sholl J. in R. v. Light“
that he was not prepared to subscribe to the view expressed in R. v. Watson as to
the relative unimportance of the accused’s liberty to prepare his defence,and in
Tasmania Light has been preferred to Watson ’7 .
It is submitted that it is beyond question, asa matter of policy in the field
of criminal justice, that the accused should, as far as possible be placed in a
position of parity with the prosecution in the preparation of his defence. But it
must also be recognised that many accused persons have, in fact, no legal
representation at any stage of the proceedings. If the public interest demands
that it is the right of every person to have his case presented in the fairest
possible circumstances much remains to be done to make this right a reality.
To even move effectively in'this direction there would need to be a major
expansion of legal aid at both trial and pre-trial levels. Until the resources
available to the accused in all cases approximate those of the Attorney General’s
Department the argument that the liberty of the accused to prepare his defence
is the primary consideration in bail applications, does, in the many cases of
unrepresented defendants, lose some of its weight.
Judge Cross was clearly correct when he observed that the same principles
apply to a person who has been committed for sentence only, as apply to a
person who has been committed for trial. Although bail will only be granted in
most exceptional cases where a person has pleaded guilty before a court of
35. (1947) 64 W.N. (N.S.W.) 100
36. (1954) V.L.R. 152
37. R. v. Fisher (1964) Tas. R. (NC) 7
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competent jurisdiction and been remanded before it for sentence, the position
under S.51A of the Justices Act 1902 is in no way comparable.
That section was designed to expedite the hearing of pleas and ease an
administrative burden and in such cases
“The same principles should be followed as apply where an enquiry
has been held, a prima facie case has been made out, and the accused
has been committed for trial. The section was not intended to affect
the position of an accused person in any manner prejudicial to
him ”33
7. DELAY IN COURT HEARING
The question of how long the accused may be kept in custody waiting for
trial is another factor that is generally regarded as of importance. This largely
depends on the degree of hardship in the individual cases.
If the period is substantial the grounds for refusing bail must be strong:
“If it is a long period, particularly if it appears to be an unreasonably
long period, that might furnish a very good ground for the granting
of bail ” 1°
Here the accused’s previous record may also be of some relevance in
considering the hardship that custody may inﬂict. Confinement in prison may
impose lesser hardship upon a person. who has suffered previous periods of
imprisonment than on a man who has not.
Another consideration of some importance is whether delay has been
occasioned by the accused or his legal advisers, or whether through no fault of
the accused'or his legal advisers the refusal of bail will result in the lengthy
detention of the accused.‘0 ‘
Other, and more difficult considerations may arise in cases before
magistrates where they may have to decide questions of bail before a prima facie
case is made out. Although the period that is allowed for remands for the
purpose of further presentation of evidence is subject to statutory control the
question remains: how long should a person be kept in custody without even a
prima facie case being made out against him?
Lord Devlin made the following interesting observation on the question:
u
. until a prima facie case is made out against the accused to the
satisfaction of the magistrate, he is being detained simply because
38. ManningJ. R. v.PaIIister (unreported) Supreme
Court of N.S.W. 25th August, 1959
39. , Walsh J. in R. v. Pett 10th October, 1957 noted
75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 434. See also R. v. Cable (1946)
63 W.N. (N.S.W.) 267;R. v. Ladd (1958) 75 W.N.
(N.S.W.) 431
40. See R. v. Wakefield (1969) W.N. (N.S.W.) 325 pp. 331—32
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the police believe him to be guilty; a magistrate who remands after
formal evidence of arrest is holding him in custody simply because
the police say he is guilty and for no better reason. T0 the extent to
which this is done, and it is quite frequently done, can it not be said
that people in England are detained merely on police suspicion. That
could be said if there were any substantial number of cases in which
the police subsequently failed to obtain a committal. But there is
not. No doubt if there were? magistrates would be more cautious
about exercising their power of remand on formal evidence, and the
defence would object to such adjournments much more frequently
than it does. . .’""-
CONCLUSION
I have presented what appear to me to be the main factors which
determine the exercise of the discretion to grant or refuse bail. These
considerations are not exhaustive. I rather doubt whether it would be either
possible or desirable to do so. Among the factors I have omitted would be the
prisoner’s economic position, the state of his family, his employment record, his
state of health and the fact that the prosecution have not opposed the
application.
However I hope I have said enough to indicategthat there is considerable
uncertainty and difference of view as to the relative importance of the various
relevant criteria and considerable doubt as to which of these criteria can
properly be regarded as principles in their own right justifying refusal of bail. It
-is important that their legal status be clarified and made much more explicit so
as to minimise doubts as to the validity-of the basis upon which any particular
bail application is refused.
a
41. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England p..78
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BAIL STATISTICS
P. C. Ward*
No official statistics seem to be available concerning the granting or
withholding of bail in New South Wales. Accordingly, to provide this seminar
with some idea of the numbers involved each year the Institute of Criminology,
with the assistance of the Department of Corrective Services and the Clerk of the
Peace and the Commonwealth Statistician, hasmade a survey of some aspects of
this problem. Two main groups of subjects were studied:
(a) All unconvicted prisoners (218) held in custody at Long Bay on a
certain day; and
(b) Fifty-one (51) persons who absconded from bail in 1968.
These two groups providel an insight into the two main aspects of the
problem'of bail. The fifty-one absconders represent failures in the purpose for
which bail is designed, namely, to ensure that the accused will appear for trial.
Those prisoners held in Long Bay pose us with the more difficult problems of
whether the detention is in the best interests of society in all cases or whether
some detainees might safely be released by allowing a lesser amount of bail. This
sort of question depends so much on the combination of factors in an individual
case that it would be vain to expect statistics to do more than provide a few
. rough guidelines by which to test decisions in particular cases‘.
THE UNCONVICTED PRISONERS.
Approximately two-thirds of the population of the Metropolitan Remand
Centre appears to consist ofunconvicted prisoners, the remaindertconsisting of
appellants and convicted prisoners being held for trial for another offence. .
Luckily, the files of all prisoners in the Remand Centre .had been taken out for
checking in the quarterly Gaol Delivery. Before replacing the files, therefore,
they were checked, and where an unconvicted prisoner was found he was
included in the study. The following information was generally available for each
prisoner.
Date of birth.
Place of birth.
Address of nearest relative.
Marital status.
Name of magistrate or judge before whom prisoner appeared.
Type of offence (principal).
Date of committal.
Amount of bail if granted.
Number of extra charges.
10. Whether previously in a juvenile court or institution.
11. Whether previously imprisoned.
12. Type of warrant (i.e., from Magistrates’ Court for trial or for
sentence in higher court.)
§°
.°
°.
\‘
?‘
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Altogether two hundred and eighteen (218) unconvicted prisoners were
found of whom one hundred and three (103) had not been granted bail. Failure
to receive bail falls into three categories: some ask for bail and have it refused,
some do not ask for bail and the question does not appear to be raised, some do
not ask but the magistrate specifically notes that bail should be refused if asked
for. Unfortunately these differences were not noticed until most records had
been processed and it was not possible to include this factor in the study.
The offences for which the prisoners were being held covered a wide range,
as will be seen from an examination of Table 1. Only in the offences of murder
(and attempts), rape (and attempts) and carnal knowledge are the prisoners
predominantly held without the option of bail. This may be because these
offences are regarded as so serious that the magistrate is reluctant to risk the
possibility of a second offence of like nature occurring if the prisoner is released.
Unconvicted prisoners may be held either while the preliminary hearing is
proceeding before the magistrate, or when prima facie case has been established
and they have been committed for trial, or when a plea of guilty has been
entered and they are proceeding to sentence. When a person is charged with
more than one offence he can fall into more than one of the categories outlined
above. Table 2 shows the number of prisoners who had been granted bail of a
given amount. It can be readily seen that the proportion granted bail from the
magistrates’ court is higher than the proportion granted bail after a prima facie
case is established. On the other hand, there is no- real difference in this
proportion between those remanded for sentence and those remanded for trial.
The amount of bail set varies widely, with a tendency for cases going to
trial to have bail set at a slightly higher level. It is possible that the cases
going to trial consist of offences for which the accused faces a more serious
penalty and the judge therefore sets bail at a slightly higher level to act as a
greater deterrent to abscondjng.
Table 3 shows the length of time spent on remand for each prisoner. In
four cases it was not possible to assess just when in the proceedings the person
had been placed on remand. The average (mean) time spent on remand was 32.5
days. Those granted bail spent slightly longer periods in gaol on average than
those not granted ball (29 vs. 36 days). These averages will, of course,
overestimate the average time spent in prison on remand, because the population
seen on a particular day will have more persons who stay for a longer period and
few who are released after one or two days.
While, generally speaking, it was apparent that only those cases in which
substantial bail was ﬁxed appeared to be held for any great length of time, there
were four cases in which people were confined for over 50 days when the
amount of ball was less than $200. One person had spent over 150 days in prison
on bail of less than $200. This may indicate that at least sometimes an accused
may be held for a long period because he had not been able to raise a relatively
small amount of bail. Although this seems to be rare it would be worthwhile to
consider possible ways of bringing such cases to automatic consideration.
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There were fifty-three (53) men born outside of Australia in this sample.
This is significantly higher than the proportion of such people coming before the
Higher Courts in‘New South Wales in 1968. As would be expected, a higher
proportion of the foreign-born had no relatives in New South Wales than the
Australian-born. This probably limits the availability of sureties to this class of
person, and would be the reason for the higher proportion. The problems
presented by groups such as this will be considered further after considering the
survey of those who absconded from bail in 1968.
THE ABSCONDERS
During 1968 fifty-one (51) persons absconded from bail. With the
permission of the Clerk of the Peace, the Commonwealth Statistician made
available the data which had been recorded about the absconders, and this
information is tabulated in Table 4.
'As might be expected, the information shows that the absconder is
generally a more experienced criminal than the average accused. Although
one-quarter of persons dealt with in the Higher Courts in 1968 had no
convictions, all but five (5) of the ﬁfty-one (51) absconders had at least one
previous conviction. This result is significant at the .01 level. Table 5 compares
the percentage of absconders who had received a given form of sentence with the
proportion in the population of persons before the Higher Courts.
It can be seen that absconders have a higher chance of having previously
been placed in prison, in a juvenile institution, or on a bond without supervision.
The fact that actual breaches of bond or probation seem to occur no more often
than expected may be simply the result of this group being less liable to be
granted bail because of the suspicion that they have breached the trust of the
court.
Comparison of the absconders with the persons held in prison indicates
that the latter group appears to have totally different characteristics. For
example, only 45.5% of the latter claim to have been in prison previously,
compared with 66.7% of absconders, while 21.1% admit being in an institution
for juveniles, compared with 37.3% ofabsconders. These figures are based on the
prisoner’s own report compared with data of prior record supplied by the police
in the case of the absconders. The comparisons must therefore be treated with
caution. Assuming these differences could be substantiated by checking against
police ﬁles, it would indicate that those in prison do not appear to. be a group
who would a priori be considered as particularly prone to become absconders.
SUMMARY
A random sample of 400 accused before the Higher Courts in 1968
indicates that (when allowance is made for sampling error and missing data)
52.5% i 4% of cases are held in prison pending trial or sentence. In round
figures, this represents about 2,000 men spending an average of 5—6 weeks in
prison.
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Of those held in prison approximately 48% will have had bail refused.
The prison group appears to be more like the average cases coming before
the Higher Courts than the absconder group when previous records are
considered.
A few prisoners spend a considerable time in prison although the amount}
of bail set is small, which may be due to inability to ﬁnd sureties.
A higher proportion than expected of persons born outside Australia is
observable in the prison sample, but not among the absconders. This ﬁnding
strongly implies that such people may require special consideration when bail is
being granted. Cases where the accused, although Australian born, is without
near relatives in New South Wales may also be included in the group for special
consideration.
A report by Miss Susan Armstrong, Research Assistant in the Institute of
Criminology, is attached, and presents one method of testing whether it is
worthwhile releasing on his own recognizance an accused who cannot raise bail
or sureties when these are granted. This method is based on the tested
Manhatten Bail Project.-
It is respectfully urged that magistrates and judges seriously consider the
implications of Miss Armstrong’s paper. The evidence seems to indicate that at
least a proportion of those in prison could berreleased without great risk of
absconding. The cost of even an hour’s checking by a court ofﬁcer (or probation
ofﬁcer?) would be far less than five weeks’ board and lodging provided by the
Government. -
There are, of course, other considerations in granting bail than risk of
absconding. One frequently cited is the risk of further offences being committed
while the accused is on bail. In the 400 cases taken as a random sample, in only
two cases out of the 183 released on bail could we discover evidence of a crime
being committed in this period. This may be simply due to inadequacies in the
recordswhich we examined and it is hoped that the police will co-operate in
trying to make a more realistic estimate of the size of this risk. ‘
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TABLE 1
Number ofoffenders held on remand for different types ofoffence.
 
 
Offence No. at Persons Before Number Not
7/4/69 Higher Court Granted Bail
in 1968
AGAINST THE PERSON
Murder 15 38 it 14
Attempted murder 6 3* 4
Assault and rob 28 93 10
Assault bodily harm 18 104 7
Assault common &c. 3 66 1
SEXUAL
Rape & attempts 7 80 6
Carnal knowledge 5 232 4
Indecent assault — female 2 117 1
Indecent assault — male 3 74 2
Buggery & attempts l 17 0
AGAINST PROPERTY
Break, enter & steal 66 1,257 31
Embezzlement 2 104 1
False pretences 5 72 4
Forgery 2 34 0
GoOds in possession 9 10 4
larceny of vehicle 16 447 5
larceny in dwelling 4 1
Larceny (other) 13 172 1
Larceny by fraud 1 0
Receiving 3 158 1
OTHER
Drive under inﬂuence 1 —** 0
Vagrancy ' l —** 1
Drugs 3 6 2
Customs 2 1 2
‘ Breach of bond 1 —** 0
Unlicensed pistol 1 1
Total 218 — 103
 
ti
3*
*1
 
includes malicious wounding with intent to murder.
not available (probably usually dealt with summarily).
includes 21 cases of manslaughter (probably originating as murder charges).
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TABLE 2
Amount of'Bail when granted
Bail Statistics
      
 
 
. , Committed Committed .
Dollars Magistrlates for for Both Tnal Total
eanng Trial Sentence & Sentence
20 3 — 1 1 5
20-49 — — 1 1 2
50-99 2 —- 1 -- .3
100-199 6 7 7 — 20
200-299 8 6 7 — 21
300-499 9 5 11 — 25
500-999 10 9 S - '24
1000-1999 2 6 ,1 1 10
2000 + 2 2 _ 1 S
Bail not
granted 23 39 40 1 103
TABLE 3
Time spent on Bail
. Committed Committed .
. Magistrates' Both Trial
Days Hearing for for & Sentence Total
Trial Sentence
10 11 16 17 2 46
10-19 21. 114 15 _ 50
20L29 10 16 9 3 . 38
30739 7 3 11 — 21
.40—49 6 6 6 — 18
50-74 6 10 11 — 27
75-99 1 3 1 — 5
100-149 - 4 3 _ 7
150-199 — 2 _. .. -2
Not avail—
éble 3 — l — 4
Total 65 74 74 5 218     
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TABLE 4
Characteristics of51 Absconders from Bail
AGE
18—20 .............. 6
21—23 .............. 12
24—26 ............... 7
27—29 .............. 10
30—39 .............. 10
40—49 .............. 5
50—59 .............. 1
60+ ................ —
BIRTHPLACE
Australia ............. 40
Elsewhere ............. 10
Unknown ............. '1 '
JUVENILE RECORD
Institution ............ 19
No ................ 32
PREVIOUS IMPRISONMENTS
Yes ................ 3'4
No ................ 1 7
PREVIOUS BOND
Yes ............... 35**
No ................ l 6
BOND AT TIME OF OFFENCE
Yes ................ 9
No ................ 42
PROBATION WITHIN 5 YEARS
Yes ................ 3
No ................ 48
PROBATION AT TIME
Yes ................ 1
No ................ 50
MARITAL STATUS
Single ............... 22
Married .............. 17
Widowed ............. l
Divorced.............l
Permanently separated ...... 5
De Facto ............. 4
Unknown .............. 1
PREVIOUS CONVICTION
Children’s Court (1) ....... 2
Indictment (2) .......... '0
Summarily (3) .......... 173
None ............... '5
1, 2 & 3 .............. 1’3
1 & 2 .............. ’ . 4
1 & 3 ............... 5
2 & 3 ............... 9‘
Unknown ............ - . 0
SIMILAR OFFENCE (Previous
conviction for)
Yes ................ 27
No ................ 24
CASE LISTED FOR HEARING
1966 ............... '1
1967 ............... 13
1968 ............... 37
COURT
Central Criminal ......... 2
8.0.8................ 37
C.Q.S. .............. 12
Country Supreme Court ..... '0
** Includes bonds from Magistrates’ Courts.
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TABLE 5
Comparison ofAbsconders with Persons before
Higher Courts 1968
Per cent receiving given sentence
HIGHER LEVEL OF
 
ABSCONDERS COURT SIGNIFICANCE
Sentence n = 51 N = 4116
Juvenile institution 37.3% 23.4% .05
Adult prison I 66.7% 36.1% .01
Bond 68.6% 45.7% .01
On bond when , ‘
Offence committed 17.7% 15.2% n.s.
Adult Probation in
previous ﬁve years 5.9% 7.4% n.s.
Adult Probation when
Offence committed 2.0% 5.0% { n.s.
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AN APPLICATION OF THE MANHATTAN BAIL SYSTEM
TO OFFENDERS IN NEW SOUTH WALES
Susan Armstrong *
“The problemin this area is to pin down with sufﬁcient particularity
allegations that are often necessarily imprecise. 31f one tries to lay
down precise criteria for what would be acceptable evidence
justifying refusal of bail one may create a regime that is
insufficiently ﬂexible. If, on the other hand, one gives the
magistrates 'a- wide discretion it is difﬁcult to ensure that their bail
decisions are founded on adequate evidenceff (Michael Zander, _1967_
~ Criminal LawReview.) '
The Manhattan Bail Scheme was pioneered in New York by the Vera
Foundation, the New York University and the Institute of Judicial
Administration, as an attempt to devise a basically objective test which might
guide' the application of discretion. Verified information concerning the
defendant’s relationship to the community is scored according to predetermined
values, with a certain number of points qualifying for a recommendation that he
.be released on his own recognizance.
If the defendant gives his written consent, he is interviewed (generally for
. about ten minutes) before appearing in court, and verification by telephone
is
made. Release is recommended where the accused has an address in the area and
a total of five points from the following categories:
I. PRIOR RECORD
 
 
Interview Verification
2 2 ' No convictions.
1 1 One misdemeanor conviction.
0 0 Two misdemeanor convictions or one felony conviction.
—1 .—1 Three or more misdemeanor convictions or two or more felon
y
convictions. '
II. FAMILY TIES
3 3 Lives with family AND has weekly contact with other famil
y
members.
2 2 , - Lives with family OR has weekly contact with family.
1 1 Lives with non-family person. ’
III. EMPLOYMENT
Present job one year or more.
Present job 4 months OR present and prior job 6 months.
Current job 0R receiving unemployment compensation or welfare,
0R supported by family or savings. '
H
N
W
H
N
D
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IV. RESIDENCE (In area; not on and off.)
3 3 Present residence one year or more.
2 2 Present residence 6 months OR present and prior one year.
1 1 Present residence 4 months OR present and prior 6 months.
V. TIME IN AREA
1 1 Ten years or more.
VI. DISCRETION 1 1 Pregnancy, old age, poor health, or attending school.
 
TOTAL INTERVIEW POINTS
R* NR*
TOTAL VERIFIED POINTS
R NR ’
* R = Recommended;
NR = Not recommended.
The Vera Project established that certain screening procedures will identify
those who may safely be released on their own recognizance pending trial. Of
3,505 persons released on recommendation during the three year trial study,
only 1.6% failed to reappear (as compared with a 3% absconding rate under the
previous system). During the first experimental period the defendants who
achieved a pass rating on the test were divided at random into two groups, with
recommendations of release being made for one and withheld from the other. It
was found that when the courts were provided with veriﬁed information, four
times as many defendants were released (60% as against 14%).
New York courts have never considered as relevant to bail determination
certain subjective criteria which are important in New South Wales, such as the
pOssibility of further Offences, Of tampering with witnesses, orof interference
with. police inquiries. The difficulty of incorporating these standards into an
Objective test might be met by considering a pass rating on the Manhattan test as
raising a presumption Of suitability for release which could be rebutted'by
sufficient evidence on any of such other issues.
In an attempt to discover whether a Manhattan-type test would be
successful under New South Walesconditions, the 51 defendants who absconded
whilst on bail for matters pending in Quarter Sessions during 1968 were
considered. They were matched where possible with a similar group of Offenders
who were granted bail and reappeared for trial and another group who were
retained in custody (with these last it was not possible to differentiate between
those who were refused bail and those unable to raise the amount required).  
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Matching was carried out on the basis of dates ofbirth (no more than ﬁve years’
difference), offences (type, and no more than twelve months apart), and
whether the hearing was before City or Country Quarter Sessions.
Because of problems in obtaining accurate information from records kept
with a view to detailed inquiries of this type, and in ﬁnding offenders who
matched on all the above criteria, it was possible to compare only fifteen city
and six country absconders both with similar individuals kept in gaol and
released successfully on bail. The following results were obtained:
 
SYDNEY QUARTER SESSIONS COUNTRY QUARTER SESSIONS
Total Pass Fail Total Pass Fail
Absconded 15 1 14 Absconded 6 1 5
On Bail 15 15 0 On Bail 6 6 0
In Custody 15 5 10 In Custody
6 1 5       
The results on Sydney cases give a X2 value of 27.4, which is significant at
the 0.1% level of significance (i.e. there is less than one chance in a thousand of
obtaining such results by chance). A X2 test was not possible on the country
group because of insufﬁcient numbers.
The following results were obtained from those defendants where it was
possible to match an absconder with a counterpart either in gaol or on successful
bail:
 
SYDNEY QUARTERSESSIONS COUNTRY QUARTER SESSIONS
Total Pass Fail Total Pass Fail
Absconded 31 6 25 (Absconded 8 2 6
On Bail 33 30 3 On Bail 10 1
0 0
In Custody 22 7 15 In Custody 12
2 10       
The results obtained indicate that the Manhattan Bail test is a relatively
accurate screening device for identifying those likely to abscond if released
pending trial.‘(The results obtained for those defendants kept in custody are
unhelpful because it is unknown whether they were in fact granted bail).
The Manhattan Bail System seems worthy of consideration for
introduction in New South Wales, at least in the case of those defendants who
are unable to raise the bail required. It would result in a considerable saving of
time to the police (in three precincts the New York Deputy Commissioner of
Police estimated it as “substantially over 4,000 hours”), and would make
available to the court verified, objective information as to the reliability of the
defendant. A recent study carried out by Community Legal Aid Services in
which law students attended hearings at Central Petty Sessions in order to
determine, inter alia, the criteria used in bail determination, indicated that such
information would be of considerable assistance to the court. A preliminary
report on 119 cases showed that in only four (4) cases were the Manhattan
criteria relating to occupation, family and residence discussed before the court in
determination or refusal of bail.
 
 PRACTICE REFLECTING THE LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Hon. Mr Justice J. H. McClemens *
Basic to the practice of the Supreme Court in granting or refusing bail is
the ancient jurisdiction which it possesses, for as Stephen says in his “History of
the Criminal Law” Vol. 1, Ch.VII, p.243: “The power of the superior courts to
bail in all cases whatever, even high-treason, has no history. I do not know,
indeed, that it has ever been disputed or modiﬁed.” The Sections of the Justices
Act, 1902 as amended, which deal with bail in no way cut down‘the powers of
the Supreme Court. They confirm it. In particular, Section 44 emphasises the
extent of the jurisdiction. It' provides: *‘No person charged with treason shall be
admitted to bail by any Justice, or except by order of the Supreme Court, or, in
vacation, of a Judge thereof.”
Justices have wide powers by Section 45 of the Justices Act to grant bail
in any case of felony (except treason) or misdemeanour. They have equally wide
powers to discharge on recognizance during an adjournment of proceedings
before them. (Section 34 and Section 69).'None of these Sections affect in any
way the powers of the Supreme Court to grant bail.
One starts, therefore, to examine the practice in the Supreme Court with
the proposition that there is a discretionary power inherent in it to grant bail
even if it has been refused by the Magistrate or in the Court of Quarter Sessions
and even if it has been refused by another Judge. The dismissal of a bail
application does not prevent an application even on the same material (a fortiori
on different material) to another Judge. The applicant can go from Judge to
Judge in the hope that he may get a more favourable reception by someone else.
(R. v. Higgs, ‘79 W.N. 335). ‘
In R. v. Pascoe, 78 W.N. 59, on April 12, 1960, the applicant was refused
bail on a charge of stealing three mail bags and £1,735 in money, but on a later
application on 22nd July 1960 another Judge of the Supreme Court granted
bail. .
The lack of history of bail is reﬂected in the lack of written practice as to
the exercise of the jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. In fact until fairly recently
there was a paucity of reported decisions as to the principles. »
In the absence of statutory provision the power to grant bail in the
inherent jurisdiction ceases on conviction (Blyth v. Appeal. Committee of
Lancaster, . 1944 1 All Eng. L.R.’ S87) even though leave to appeal has been
granted (R. v. McLeod, 7. W.N. 9'1). Fullagar J. in R. v. Cooper, 1961 A.L.R.
584, granted bail on a Criminal Appeal to the High Court but this decision is not
germane to the Supreme Court’s power or practice. The practice of the Supreme
Court, therefore, has to be approached on the basis that it is to be exercised in
respect of unconvicted persons except for the cases provided for by Sections 18
and 22 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 and Section 120 of the Justice's Act.
 
*New South Wales Supreme Court
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The proper way to approach the Supreme Court on a bail application is by
summons supported by Afﬁdavits setting out the facts. It was said in R. v.
Pascoe, 78 W.N. 59, that the Affidavit should be carefully prepared and accurate
and should not be based on information obtained from Counsel for the accused
because at best this is hearsay in the second degree.
However, the Court has permitted informal applications by unrepresented
prisoners based only on a written request forwarded by them from the gaol and
has required notice to be given of this to the Crown Solicitor so that he can
appear through one of his officers or by Counsel to represent the Crown. The
Court has power in all cases to hear viva voce evidence and often does so. In the
case of the unrepresented prisoner it has no alternative but to do so.
Evidence is admissible which is material upon the basic test that has to be
applied, namely, the probability, if bailed, of the prisoner appearing to take his
trial. (R. v. Frazer, l3 N.S.W. LR. 130). In applying this test the Court will
consider the nature of the crime, the evidence against the prisoner, the severity
of the punishment which may be imposed, the character of the prisoner and the
probability of him tampering with Crown witnesses. As Mansfield CI. of
Queensland said: “Courts have for well nigh 100 years determined the question
with reference to well deﬁned principles”. (R. v. Lythgoe, 1950 Q.S.R. 5).
Perhaps the more modern authorities suggest, and commonsense and
justice would suggest,that these grounds are too narrow. They are in my view far
too narrow on one hand in the case of the person likely to commit other
offences if released on bail and to the person likely to be dangerous to others,
and on the other in relation to persons not likely to abscond or tamper with
witnesses or commit other offences but who cannot ﬁnd the bail it may bethought they are too narrow.
What evidence then is admissible on an application for bail?
1. Anything that goes to the nature of the crime charged and the probability
of conviction.
It is because of the last that the safest test to apply is, if the prisoner has
been committed for trial, for the Judge to read the depositions and these
should be tendered. It is the absence of the depositions that has led Courts
to limit the granting of bail in remand cases. But the depositions are not
the only source.
2. Anything that goes to the likelihood of the person concerned absconding.
Because of this bail is rarely granted in murder cases. The severity of
possible punishment is taken greatly into account in all cases. Evidence is
often presented by the Police Officers conducting the investigation to the
effect that in their opinion the applicant is likely to abscond. Jacobs 1. in
R. v. Pascoe, 78 W.N. 59, said: “I do not consider I can act on the
expression in the witness box by a witness of his opinion on the precise
matter which I have to determine as one of the grounds upon which the
granting of bail is opposed.”
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But Ferguson J. in R. v. Montgomery, 75 W.N. 233, took into account the
evidence of a detective that the applicant never had a lawful occupation
and had no family ties.
I think that the evidence of the Police Ofﬁcers ought to be received but
acted on with caution unless supported by some positive evidence of a
long record or other abscondings or of an expressed intention or some
admission from which an intention might be implied. 'Lythgoe’s case
(supra) deals with some considerations on which evidence would certainly
be admissible because they go to establishing what type of a man the
prisoner is as indicating whether he would be likely to abscond. '
These would be —
(l) the prisoner’s property;
(2) ' the state of his family;
(3) his character and antecedents;
(4) the state of his health;
(5) the state of his business.
It is said that this last ought to be acted on rarely but itmay well be an
important factor. '
3. Anything that goes to the probability of tampering with Crown witnesses.
According to Mansfield 0]. this is seldom proved by direct evidence and
its prospect must be directly referable to the nature of the crime charged.
(Lythgoe, supra).
On analysis this might seem to state the proposition too narrowly. The
type of man the applicant is, his criminal record and his associates, the fact
that he is a professional criminal and many other factors must be material
if one is really going to see that on the one hand the people who ought to
get bail are not kept in gaol before their guilt is established and on the
other hand that criminals are not going to interfere with criminal justice
by interfering with, terrorising or corrupting witnesses. (See R. v. Prentice,
74 W.N. 440, H. M. Postmaster-General v. Whitehouse, 1951, 1 KB. 673
at 676). '
4. Anything that goes to the likelihood of further offences on bail.
This has received some attention in recent cases (Appleby, 83 W.N. Pt.l
p.300, Young, 83 W.N. Pt. 1 p.391, Pascoe,78 W.N. 79). Again from the
point of view of practice this presents evidentiary problems. The fact that
a person on bail has been charged with other offences may justify the
inference that he will if released commit even more. That men have
committed crimes on bail to provide for their defence is far from
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unknown. It is of course impossible to even outline the many situations
that may be met in practice reﬂecting the evidentiary problem in the
Supreme Court. Obviously some amount of hearsay is proper to determine
a question such as this. The opinion of the Police in charge of the
investigation may well be material but as a matter of practice the evidence
as to (i) record, (ii) other offences on bail, (iii) abscondings from bail, (iv)
nature of the offence, and (v) the type of associates the applicant has,
represent. the things to which the Court would turn its attention.
Now, of course, the effect of the material before the Court will differ at various
times of the judicial process and I propose to set out the various stages at which
the Supreme Court might grant bail.
1. After arrest and before remand.
That the power exists here cannot, I think, be controverted. On arrest it is
the duty of the arresting police as soon as practicable to take the arrested
person before a Magistrate. Of course Police have powers of bail under
Section 153 of the Justices Act, 1902 in appropriate cases. But so far as
the Supreme Court is concerned it seems impossible to imagine a
circumstance where time itself would permit bail to be obtained before the
person was brought before a Magistrate. Theoretically a wrongful detainer
without being before a Magistrate could exist.
After remand and before committal for trial.
Again, that the power exists here is incontrovertible in spite of the power
given to Justices by Sections 34(1)(c) and 69(1)(b) of the Justices Act to
which I earlier referred. In R. v. Ladd & Murphy, 75 W.N. 431 Sugerman
J. stated that “though the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and power
to grant bail in remand cases the power is one which should be carefully
and sparingly exercised.” Walsh J. in' R. v. Pitt noted ibid 434 said there
was considerable authority for the proposition that as a general rule the
Court does not interfere pending the period of remand though of course
every case has to be considered on its merits and lengthy delay, especially
if unreasonable, might furnish a very good ground for granting bail.
The query raised in R. v. Smith, 19 W.N. 58, as to whether the Judge has
power to grant bail on a remand is unsound.
It is put in Ladd’s case that the unwillingness of the Courts to grant bail toa person on remand who has been refused bail by the Magistrate is based
on the fact that there is no evidence at that stage on which the Court can
form an opinion relevant to the various grounds involved. There" are no
depositions to examine so that the probability of a conviction cannot be
considered nor what are the defences available. Usually a remand is, or
ought to be, short but in cases where it is likely to be long bail should be
granted in the proper case. In R. v. Peacock, 17 A.L.R. 452 (a Victoriancasewhich later became the authority on circumstantial evidence) bail wasgranted on a murder charge where the accused person was remandedbecause the Police desired to make further investigations and inquiries.
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In R. v. Cable, 63 W.N. 267, bail was granted in a murder case to a
person
who had been arrested on 3rd October and was remanded till t
he 24th
! _ October; The ground on which the grant of bail was put'was, inter al
ia, the
delay in holding a citizen so long pending a magisterial enquiry.
3. The next period is after committal and before Trial.
This is the most common situation.
Here again the powers of the Supreme Court are in addition to the powers
given by Section 45(1) of the Justices Act which gives the Committing
Magistrate discretion in certain cases and the duty in others to grant bail.
If the Magistrate fails to grant bail or refuses it under Section 45(1)(B)
obviously the applicant has his right to go to the Supreme Court. Likew
ise
if heunder Section 45(1)(A) refuses bail as punishment or pressure (R. v.
Greenham, 1940 V.L.R. 236).
In general, applications to the Supreme Court are made at the stage where
the Magistrate, exercising his discretion has refused bail on committal. This
happens not infrequently in charges of murder where the general rule is
that bail is not granted. (R. v. Ryan, 78 W.N. 585, R. v. Lythgoe, 1
950
Q.S.R. 45, R. v. Higgs, .79 W.N. 335, R. v. Strong, 52 W.N. 179, R. v.
Borsboon, 4 W.N. l4). ' ,
It is not often that Magistrates give bail in murder. Of course appl
ications
for bail after committal include many other types of case. S
ometimes a
bail is fixed that the applicant is unable to obtain. It is
asserted in
Halsbury, 3rd Edn. ‘Vol. 10 p.376, that a Judge has
no inherent
jurisdiction to reduce the amount of bail that Justices in the exer
cise of
their statutory powers have fixed. Adam J. of the Victoria
n Supreme
Court disapproved this in R. v. Barrett, 1959 V.R. 459 and held, righ
tlyI
think, that the power exists. It has certainly been exercised in New Sout
h
Wales for many years and never questioned.
Where a Magistrate refuses bail in any case the application to
the Supreme
Court is in no sense an appeal from him. It is a separate and indep
endent
request to exercise an inherent power and as a matter of law an
d practice
is exercised without reference 'to material other than that be
fore the
Judge.
This is the period at which the strength of the Crown case is known,
the
probability of conviction can be assessed and the date of trial should be
ascertainable. Delay of course in the latter is a material considerati
on.
In R. v. Watson, 64 W.N.. 100 at 103, Herron J., as he then was, attem
pted
to lay down a general rule as to the granting of bail by the Sup
reme Court
where the accused has been committed for trial on a charg
e of serious
felony. He thought the more usual course was to refuse it and then
went
on to say: “The liberty of the subject must, of course,be kept s
teadily in
mind, but I see nothing inconsistent with this in retaining in cus
tody for a
{—
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reasonable period a person against whom there has been found by a
magistrate, after proper inquiry, a prima facie case of serious crime for
which he is ordered to take his trial. As against this, the interests of the
community must equally be protected by proper detention and
punishment of criminals, and this will not in my view be best served by
freeing such persons on bail in serious cases, except in the presence of
exceptional circumstances.” That case contains a valuable analysis of the
earlier cases.
After plea of guilty in committal proceedings under Section 51A of the
Justices Act.
By subsection (2) of that Section power is given to the Justices to grant
bail as on an ordinary committal for Trial. It would appear that, prima
facie, a person has the same rights to bail under Section 51A(2) as he has '
under Section 45, but the question arises as to what is the proper practice
where it is refused.
Collins J. in the case of a young man with a bad record who had pleaded
guilty to car stealing and breaking entering and stealing refused bail,
notwithstanding a submission that where the case is not of a capital nature
prima facie bail should be granted, on the ground that special-
circumstances should be shown why a man should'be admitted to bail
where he has a record and is the type of man this applicant had shown
himself to be. (R. v. Davis, 76 W.N. 263).
It would seem that the Court ought to take into account the ordinary
considerations plus the plea of guilty.
V ‘ During the adjournment of a Trial.
Though the Court of Trial has power to release accused persons during an
adjournment there is a further power of bail in the Supreme Court of
which R. v. Greenham, 1940 V.L.R., is an example where Mann CJ.
granted bail to a person during the course of his trial'at the General
Sessions where the Chairman had refused it. The law of Victoria, it is
submitted, is the same as here.
After an abortive Trial.
Though I can find no authority for the proposition it appears clear on
principle that if bail was refused or excessive bail was requested between
the first and second trials the Supreme Court could intervene.
Where a warrant is issued following an ex ofﬁcio indictment.
This is a very rare circumstance but the power to bail exists.
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8. Pending an Appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act.
A Judge of the Supreme Court may admit to bail a person, who having
been convicted, has appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal but this
power is rarely exercised. (Criminal Appeal Act Section 18(2) and 22.)
In' R. v.‘ Patmoy, 62 W.N. l, Maxwell J. held that bail will only bergranted
under Section 18(2) in exceptional circumstances.
R. v. Southgate, 78 W.N. 44, was a case in which bail was granted pending
an appeal. Here the circumstances included age (77 years),bad health, good
antecedents and the intervention of a long vacation.
It might be pointed out that Section 18(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act
nowhere mentions “exceptional circumstances” which amount to a
judicial gloss on the section based on the view that “the guilt of the
accused has been established by the verdict of a Jury in what must be
taken until the contrary be shown to be a trial properly conducted
without error of law.” (Southgate supra).
In addition to the categories above referred to there may be some
extremely rare cases, e.g. those arising under Section 120 and Section
153A of the Justices Act, in which the Supreme Court has power to grant
bail, but these would be of no practical significance and hence I do not
propose to analyse them: '
  
BAIL AT QUARTER SESSIONS — A CROWN
PROSECUTOR’S VIEWPOINT
J. K. FORD“
A disquisition on bail at Quarter Sessions requires, at least, the
consideration of the following matters:
(a) The powers of the court in respect of bail;
(b) The principles which guide the court in determining a bail
application;
(c) The procedure of the‘ court in determining such applications; and
(d) The practical functioning of the court.
In this paper I shall attempt to develop the subject matter of items (a), (c) '
and (d) but not item (b). The principles referred to in item (b) are elaborately
discussed in the law reports and summarised in the practice books. They apply in
whatever court a bail application is made and will be the subject of comment in
other papers. It will be convenient to consider items (0) and (d) together and I
propose to do so in the second part of this paper.
PART I. THE POWERS OF THE COURTS OF QUARTER
SESSIONS TO ADMIT ACCUSED PERSONS TO BAIL
In order to place this subject in perspective it is necessary to have regard to
the powers exerciseable by courts other than Quarter Sessions after a person has
been committed for trial to Quarter Sessions.
Persons committed for trial at Quarter Sessions by a magistrate are
directed to a named court (e.g. Sydney Quarter Sessions) for a specified session
or sitting of the court (e.g. commencing on the lst of October,1969) or to such
other court to be holden at such place and time as the Attorney General may
direct. Under the Justices Act, 3.46 the committing magistrate (except in the
case of treason) retains the power of admitting to bail any person committed for
trial who has been committed to prison; such power may be exercised at any
time before the ﬁrst sitting of the Court at which such person is to be tried or
before the day to which such sitting is adjourned. Magistrates other than the
committing magistrate are limited in their exercise of the power to indictable
misdemeanours except the one mentioned in 5.45 (l) (A).
If bail has been refused by the Magistrate an application may be made to a
judge of the Supreme Court who may admit the applicant to bail. The judge of
the Supreme Court who hears the application does so -in the exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction received from the courts of Kings Bench in England.
Formerly there was some doubt as to whether the “Superior” courts in
England and the Supreme Court in N.S.W. had jurisdiction to admit to bail
persons on remand before the magistrate (i.e. before committal for trial). See R.
v. Smith, (1902) 19 W.N. (N.S.W.) 58.
*LL.M., Crown Prosecutor
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“It now appears to be clear that there is an inherent jurisdiction in the
High Court (England) to admit to bail any person awaiting trial on a criminal
charge including persons under remand”. Annual Practice II at 3161 (1965). In
N.S.W. it has been held in a series of cases that the Supreme Court has power to
grant bail in remand cases but that the power should be exercised sparingly. R. v.
Petr (1957) 75 W.N. 434; R. v. Ladd (1958) 85 W.N. 431; R. v.Pascoe (1960)
78 W.N. 59, 481.
In England, ex parte Speculand (1946) KB. 48 has been cited as authority
for the proposition that “a judge of the High Court has no inherent jurisdiction
to reduce the amount of bail where the justices in the exercise of their statutory
powers have ﬁxed bail in a specified sum”. Halsbury, edn. 3 at p.376; Archbold
edn. 36 par. 208. In England, in cases where there iscomplaint of excessive bail
imposed by a magistrate, it is (or was) thought to be necessary to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Queen’s Bench Division by writ of habeas corpus.
Archbold (supra).
[n Victoria, Adam J. (R. v. Barrett (1959) V.L.R. 458) held that ex. p.
Speculand (supra) is no authority for the proposition cited above from Halsbury
and Archbold but is limited to cases where the applicant for bail is a person in
execution under a sentence (ibid at pp. 458-9). In Barrett (supra) an application
was made “to reduce bail already ﬁxed by a justice”. His Honour stated that the
application “is conveniently described as an application to reduce bail .. . but
the truth is that this is in the nature of an application de novo to admit the
accused to bail at some lesser amount . . .” Cp. Reg. v. Wakefield (1969) 89 W.N.
(pt. 1) 325 where His Honour Judge Cross has observed that “what are
characteristically called applications for the reduction of bail are, in fact,
applications for bail. . .”
In R. v. Barrett (supra) Adam J. continued: “The real question is whether
the undoubted jurisdiction of this court to admit to bail a person committed for
trial. . . has been ousted by the justices having already admitted him to bail in
exercise of the discretionary power conferred by 8.33 of the Justices Act”. His
Honour eventually concluded that the Supreme Court of Victoria had
jurisdiction in such cases and that “the practice seems to have been long
accepted that applications for bail in cases such as this may be made by simple
application to a judge for bail” (ibid p. 461) without the necessity for a writ of
habeas corpus.
I have taken some pains to illustrate above how, in courts having
undoubted jurisdiction to admit to bail persons awaiting trial, questions have
arisen as to the limits of that jurisdiction. I have done so in order to bring into
relief and pose the question: What jurisdiction, if any, do the courts of Quarter
Sessions have to admit to bail persons awaiting trial in those Courts? At Sydney
Quarter Sessions the courts frequently entertain applications for bail by persons
awaiting trial. Such applications include cases in which bail has been refused by
the committing magistrate; in some instances the applicant has declined to seek
bail from the magistrate. Other applications for bail are in the form of a request
to reduce the amount of bail fixed by the magistrate (See Reg. v. Wakeﬁeld
above) and/or to dispense with sureties. (The Justices Act S. 45 does not
empower the committing magistrate to admit to bail except with a surety or
sureties).
Such applications are frequently made before a date for trial is ﬁxed and
sometimes even before a bill has been found.
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It seems, therefore, that the courts of Quarter Sessions, in respect of the
offences lying within their jurisdiction (Crimes Act, S. 568), exercise
concurrently with the Supreme Court, the power to admit to bail persons who
have been committed for and are awaiting trial at Quarter Sessions. 1 have not
been able to discover any explicit authority to justify the exercise of such power
at Quarter Sessions. The only Sections of the Crimes Act which are concerned
with bail i.e. SS.365 (4)(c), 369, are very limited in scope. Under S. 365 (4)(c)
“the court may make such order as to admitting the accused to bail. . . as the
court thinks fit. . .” “where an order of the court is made under this section for
a separate trial (of any count or counts in the indictment) or for the
postponement of the trial”. The postponement of the trial referred to, is one
considered to be expedient as a consequence of the exercise of any power,ofthe
court under this Act to amend an indictment or to order a separate trial of a
count . . .(S. 365 (3)). The Crimes Act, S. 369, provides that “in all cases where
the trial is postopned the court may respite the recognizance of the. . .accused
. . .” These sections of the Crimes Act, it seems, are no justiﬁcation for the
exercise of a general power to admit to bail before trial. The learned editors of
Hamilton and Addison edn. 6 (1956) make no reference to such a general power
exercisable at Quarter Sessions. (See the references to pp. 346, 680 in the Index
to Hamilton and Addison p. 759 under the heading — “bail, power to grant”).
Mr K. J. McKimm in his recent work Criminal Law and Procedure (1968) at p.
146 states the existence of a power in Quarter Sessions to admit to bail after
refusal by a magistrate but he does not indicate the source of that power.
It may be thought that the general statement in Archbold edn. 36 par. 213
— “The court of trial has the power of granting bail . . .” (appearing under the
heading — “Bail by the court of trial”) may serve as a basis for the power
exercised at Quarter Sessions. Courts of Quarter Sessions (ibid par. 248) are
amongst the courts listed under the general heading “Court of Trial” (ibid p.
84). But why is there no express treatment in Archbold of the power (if any) in
Quarter Sessions to admit to bail? Reference is made (in Archbold) to specific
powers of Quarter Sessions to admit to bail, but these are statutory powers e.g.
Criminal Justice Act, 1948 5.37 (1) (h) set out on p. 79 and 5.37 (10) on p. 77.
Is a power to admit to bail a necessary incident of the constitution of a
court of trial? “. . .everything which is incidental to the main purpose of a
power is contained within the grant itself...” (Le Mesurier’s case (1929) 42
C.L.R. 481 at p. 497). Even so, is there any necessity for the existence of a
power at Quarter Sessions to admit to bail pending trial, whilst there is clear and
abundant power in the Supreme Court to do so?
The case of R. v. Greenham (1940) V.L.R. 236 is one in which Mann C .1.
clearly recognized the existence of a discretionary power in the court of General
Sessions in Victoria to grant or refuse bail on remanding an accused person for
trial. It seems that the power so recognized was not an express statutory power.
But that was a case in which the crown sought to sustain the exercise of the
power by the trial judge.
The practical necessity for a court of trial such as Quarter Sessions to have
some power of admitting to bail is seen where the exigencies of the case require
admission to bail overnight during the course of a trial,e.g. to permit the accused
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to confer with his counsel in respect of complex evidence. The power to grant
bail in such cases is assumed at Quarter Sessions. It is a power which is rarely
exercised or sought to be exercised by counsel for the accused. When such bail is
granted conditions are usually imposed,e.g. as to time of arrival at and departure
from court, in order to minimise the possibility of the accused making contact
with members of the jury in the vicinity of the court. Once the evidence at the
trial has concluded it is thought that the necessity for bail overnight would
rarely arise.
The precise limits of the jurisdiction assumed at Quarter Sessions to grant
or refuse bail are not clear. For example, does a Chairman of Quarter Sessions
have a discretion to refuse bail in respect of indictable misdemeanours? The
Justices Act, s.45 .(1) (B) provides that when any person is committed for trial
the committing magistrate SHALL admit him to bail if charged with any
indictable misdemeanour other than those mentioned in s.45 (1) (A). It appears
that the magistrate has no discretion to refuse bail in e.g. a case of conspiracy.
Does the Chairman of Quarter Sessions have a discretion where the committing
magistrate has none? The English authorities as to bail on misdemeanours e.g.
Rex v. Phillips (1922) 27 Cox C.C. 332, appear not to be directly applicable,
because in England “the examining justices may in all cases-except treason admit
the accused to bail . . L” Halsbury edn. 3'Vol. 10 par. 677. In Phillips (supra) the
court was concerned, inter alia, with the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848, under
5.16 of which justices dealing with an application for bail in a case ‘of
misdemeanour had a discretion to grant bail or refuse it (per Lord Hewart C.J.
ibid at p. 333). Under the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) every magistrate had a
discretion to admit a prisoner to bail who had been charged with a
misdemeanour (per Darling J. ibid at p. 336). The main reason advanced by Lord
Hewart for rejecting the argument that “misdemeanour is always bailable as of
right” in the Quee ’5 Bench Division, was that the justices had a discretion as to
bail in such matte s. (ibid at pp. 333—4). However, it may well be that the
inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be no more affected by the
legislative denial of a discretion to magistrates in respect of the misdemeanours
in 5.45 (1) (B) of the Justices Act, than it was by the legislative creation of a
magisterial discretion under $.45 (l) (A) of the Act? Reg. v. Spilsbury (1898) 2
QB. 615 esp. at p. 620. But what is the position at Quarter Sessions? Could a
Chairman of Quarter Sessions refuse bail in defiance of the legislative intention
that alleged misdemeanants should be admitted to bail?
Finally, does there exist at Quarter Sessions any power to revoke bail? In
Victoria the legislature has seen ﬁt to confer on the Judges of the Supreme
Court in that State the power to revoke bail. Crimes Act s.362.
PART II. PROCEDURE ON AN APPLICATION
FOR BAIL AND RELATED MATTERS
There is very little formality about an application for bail at Quarter
Sessions. There is no initiating document filed, such as a summons to show cause
ortnotice of motion. The evidence is tendered viva voce and in documentary
form rather than an affidavit. Most bail applications are made by-persons who,  
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for the time being at least, have no counsel to represent them. Such persons
ordinarily make a request in writing for the application to be listed, stating their
reasons why the application should be granted. Legal practitioners who wish to
apply for bail on behalf of their clients simply arrange the listing with the list
clerk. Bail applications are listed as matters of urgency, so much so that
occasionally a Crown Prosecutor will be instructed when as yet a bill has not
been found or even considered in respect of the alleged offence(s). If there is
sufficient time to consider the case against the accused and it is a proper case in
which to do so, the Crown Prosecutor ﬁnds a bill (assuming that a “No bill”
application has not been received); or at least he forms a view of the strength or
otherwise of the Crown case. As bail applications are usually listed as one of a
number of “short” matters to be heard if and when the trial of the day can be
conveniently interrupted, the opportunity for a conference with the police
ofﬁcer in the (bail) case,twill often be limited. It is highly desirable that the
Crown Brief should contain a note of any special features known to the police
ofﬁcer which could inﬂuence the outcome of the application and which do not
appear in the depositions, “antecedents” and criminal history (if any) of the
applicant, or other documents ordinarily placed in the Court ﬁle. It would be
better if the Crown Prosecutor were not constrained — as he sometimes is by the
lack of previous communication with the police officer — to defer the decision
whether or not to oppose the application until the police ofﬁcer has given or is
giving evidence. Some judges, perhaps being aware of the difficulties of
communication just mentioned, and not being bound in any event by the
decision of the Crown NOT to oppose the application, proceed to inform
themselves by consulting the relevant information in the court file and by
hearing the evidence of the police ofﬁcer. Other judges prefer to follow a
method of enquiry which is more like an adversary proceeding. There is no
uniform or standard procedure. One way or another the relevant features emerge
in a contested application — the nature and number of charges against the
accused, the strength or otherwise of the Crown case, the lengthof time the
accused has been in custody, whether he has a criminal record and, if so,
whether he has previously absconded from bail, the earliest date on which the
trial may proceed and so on. The practical effect oftentimes of a bail
application is to ensure for the unsuccessful applicant an early trial. Whenever
the trial is delayed, e.g. because the Crown proposes to arraign the accused
jointly with other persons. who have not yet been committed for trial, it is not
uncommon for bail to be granted upon terms tailored precisely to the ﬁnancial
and other circumstances of the accused. For example if the accused is unable to
find a surety for the amount previously stipulated by the magistrate or judge —
his remaining in custody is usually clear evidence of the fact — the amount may
be reduced to that which the surety is able to secure. In some instances the court
will dispense with sureties, at the same time imposing a condition that the
accused report to the police station nearest his residence at regular intervals.
From time to time, however, persons stand trial who have been in custody
for an inordinate period. Some of such individuals effectively imprison
themselves, for example by changing their plea atQuarter Sessions after being
committed for sentence, by procuring the postponement(s) of the trial when
listed before a judge who is thought to be unsympathetic, and by neglecting to
make or review an application for bail. Some individuals are known to prefer to
remain in the remand section of the penitentiary on the assumption that the
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sentence, if and when imposed, will commence from the time when they were
taken into custody. But regrettably there are cases which cannot be explained in
the manner illustrated above. The fact that there are persons who through no '
fault of theirs remain in prison for inordinate periods awaiting trial or sentence
indicates the necessity for more frequent gaol deliveries or other appropriate
measures, designed to protect those who through ignorance,incapacity or official
oversight remain unnecessarily in custody without trial.
Mr Redapple of Counsel, Crown Prosecutor, who very kindly agreed to
read this paper, makes the following observations:
“Two considerations which may interest you, have been in my mind for
some time.
One is, whether some method other than the present one of adducing oral
evidence (e.g. affidavit evidence) should be adopted.
However, I think that the short answer to this (not necessarily the only
one) is in all the circumstances as they exist at present, such .as volume of
business, facilities etc., the present procedure is the only practicable one.
I believe that all prosecutors appreciate that a responsibility rests on them
to put reliable and full information before the Court on questions of bail
especially. in those frequent cases where the accused is at that stage
unrepresented and may well remain so, if not at the trial, at least until shortly
before it.
In practice however the prosecutor of the day has often little opportunity
to investigate fully the consideration applicable to the individual case.
The relevant information must primarily and of necessity come from the
police. In my view what is needed is a practical procedure for obtaining this
information earlier in cases where it is likely to be needed.
Such a procedure might be to require the officer in charge of the case
against any accused who is committed to Quarter Sessions for trial, bail being
either refused by the magistrate or fixed in such a sum as the accused is unlikely
to be able to obtain, to send to the Clerkrof the Peace immediately a full report
on the matters relevant to bail in the particular case, including of course the
accused’s criminal history. In many cases the usual antecedent report would be
sufficient if available in time.
This procedure, if accepted, would of course need inter-departmental
liaison.”
 
  
BAIL AND KINDRED MATTERS IN PE'ITY SESSIONS
W. J. LEWER *
The problems involved in the granting. and refusing of bail arise primarily
in the Court of Petty Sessions. Generally speaking, they are the daily concern
many times a day of all magistrates performing general duty. Justices of the
Peace have been concerned with the bringing of accused persons to justice at
least since the Justices of the Peace Act, 34 Edwd. 3', c.1 (1361). My friend, Mr
Roulston, has the charge of writing on the law and history of bail. Not having
had the privilege of reading his paper before this time of writing, I must assume
in his favour that he has dealt with those matters which tempt my attention.
Sufﬁce to say that by 1554, l and 2 Philip and Mary c.13 had established that
prisoners arrested for felony should not be let to bail or mainprize except by
two justices in open sessions.
The Indictable Offences Act and the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1848
which were adopted in N.S.W. by an Act of the Governor and Legislative
Council (No. 43 of 1850) are the direct ancestor legislation of our present
Statute, the Justices Act, 1902—1968.
For our purposes the Act. deals with three situations — it is hardly
necessary, in this context, to consider such matters as conditional release after
being taken on a Quarter Sessions bench warrant, or release pending the various
kinds of appeal with which the Act deals. The three situations are, first: whether
or not bail after committal for trial; second: how a person charged with an
indictable offence is to be dealt with pending and during the examination of
witnesses; and, third: how persons arrested for summary offences are to be dealt
with until the hearings are completed.
Concerning the ﬁrst,‘section 44 provides that no person charged with
treason shall be admitted to bail except by order of the Supreme Court, or in
vacation, a Judge thereof. Section 45 confers upon the committing justices a
discretion whether they shall grant bail in cases of felony, assaults with intent to
commit felony and attempted felonies. As well there is a discretion in charges of
concealing the birth of a child, wilful or indecent exposure of,the person, riot,
assault in pursuance of a conspiracy to raise wages, assault upon a police ofﬁcer
in the execution of his duty or upon a person acting in his aid and neglect or'
breach of duty as a constable. In all other indictable misdemeanours the justices
shall frxbail. This must be sufficient in the opinion of the justices, to secure
appearance at the trial.
(Here, perhaps, is a pretty point relating to offences under Commonwealth
Law which provides for indictable offences and summary offences in
contradistinction to felony and misdemeanour. See also section 68 of the
Judiciary Act, 1903)..
Section 42 provides that after committal for trial the justices shall either
commit him to prison or admit him to bail. This section when read with section
*LL.M., Stipendiary Magistrate, Sydney
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45 raises the situation that if immediately upon committal for trial the accused
cannot ﬁnd a surety or sureties, nonetheless if they come forward later they may
enter a recognizance and procure his release then. What is to be noticed is that
the accused must find a surety or sureties.
The second situation noticed above is provided for in section 33 where it is
said that there may be adjournments although not for longer than eight days
without the defendant’s consent. In this situation the defendant may be
remanded (that is, kept in custody) or discharged on entering a recognizance,
with or without sureties.
Division 2 of Part 4 of the Act provides for the trial of summary offences.
Here, in section 68 is conferred a power to adjourn which is not limited as to
duration. Section 69 provides for the disposal of the defendant during the
adjournment. The justices may commit the defendant to custody, discharge him
upon entering into a recognizance or suffer him to go at large. The words “with
or without sureties” do not appear.
I suppose that strictly the word “bail” applies only to release after
committal for trial and not to discharge upon recognizance, but having noticed
this piece of pedantry, it will be convenient to refer to all three releases upon
recognizance as bail. This is the practice of the Courts.
It appears that section 69 applies to all adjournments, whether the
proceedings have been commenced by information/complaint and summons or
whether the defendant has been arrested with or without warrant. Nonetheless it
is not usual to make a formal order Suffering the defendant to go at large during
the adjournment nor is it usual to require him to enter a recognizance where he
appears in answer to a summons. In any event section 76 covers the situation
where he fails to appear and I will consider this section in more detail later.
In considering what the Court does, and, perhaps, what it ought to do
when exercising the discretions conferred upon it in each of the three situations
we have noticed, it is well to observe that different considerations may raise
themselves under each of the headings. Some will be common to all. Generally
speaking, indictable offences are more serious than those triable summarily. This
may beva matter of slight degree. Larceny and kindred offences where the value
of the property stolen does not exceed $100 are, at the election of the
informants, triable summarily. It is possible to suppose that sometimes stealing
$99 maybe, on the facts, 3 graver offence than stealing $101. Some dogs are
worth a great deal of money, some are, to their owners, priceless; yet by section
503 of the Crimes Act, stealing dogs is a summary offence — for the first time
anyhow. The summary penalties provided for in the Poisons Act, the Taxation
Acts, the Companies Act and the Customs Act are very severe indeed and a great
number of convicted felons receive less. Again, whether a person is to be charged
with an offence under section 52A of the Crimes Act (Culpable driving) or under
section 4 of the Motor Trafﬁc Act (Dangerous driving) is attributable rather to
consequence or fortune than gravity.
The development of this theme leads to the obvious conclusion, for which
I claim no originality, that the classification of crime into felony and
 
 Bait and Kindred Matters in Petty Sessions 5°
 
misdemeanour has passed its best utility and requires legislative attention. In the
matter of bail, quite clearly, indictable offences are viewed by the legislature as
being more serious than those triable summarily, if for no other reason than no
power is conferred on justices to allow a person charged under Division 1 to go
at large pending the completion of the examination.
When a person charged with an indictable offence is presented to a justice
on the ﬁrst occasion little or nothing will be known of him except by the police
(or other informant). In many cases the police inform the justice that there is an
objection to the granting of bail, sometimes adding that in their view a surety is
not required. When this happens what inquiry that may follow is usually
confined to asking the defendant how much he can ﬁnd, or if he can find a
surety in the amount which has suggested itself to the court. Matters which are
here considered are whether the defendant has family ties and settled
employment, and as well the value of the property concerned in the charge, and
whether or not it has been recovered. Sometimes the age and health of the
defendant receive consideration.
As the offence charged rises in gravity so this preliminary inquiry becomes
more detailed, although other factors intervene. For instance the granting of bail
at this stage is unlikely if the defendant has taken ﬂight to a distant part of the
Commonwealth and has had to be brought back by virtue of the provisions of
the Service and Execution of Process Act. Similarly if he has already absconded
from bail on this charge, or if he has escaped from custody. Again the
,defendant’s criminal history is often looked at. If he has a long record of serious
crime this may indicate that he stands in danger of a fairly severe sentence and
has some interest in evading trial. It will certainly tell against him if his record
shows that on a previous occasion he has failed to answer bail.
If the crime charged is certain to attract a long sentence such as robbery
while armed, bail will be less likely to be granted.
Often the police will be asked if they can say at this stage whether they
have a strong prima facie case. Often they will seek to give a summary of the
facts as they know them. Many magistrates prefer this be not done for the
reason that if the crime charged has received much attention in the press this
summary of the facts, given unilaterally, is apt to receive rather too sensational
treatment and thus may possibly create some prejudice against the defendant.
If the defendant has tampered with or threatened potential witnesses, this
will be said. If the crime charged is said to have been committed while the
defendant was already on bail for some other offence this also will be
mentioned.
Sometimes the court will be asked not to grant bail unless the defendant
surrenders his passport.
All these matters may again be canvassed when the second situation
(above) is come to, that is when there is found to be either a prima facie case or
a strong and probable presumption of guilt against the accused. At this stage,
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however, the magistrate knows at least the strength of the prosecution’s case;
and he may know as well the strength of the defence case. Clearly these are
factors he will consider when assessing the probability of the accused standing
his trial and answering bail.
If there be a contest about the granting of bail the difficulty is that it is
often, indeed usually, not well done on either side. Defendant’s counsel or
solicitor may say that all the court should consider is whether or not the
defendant is likely to appear to stand his trial (which is sufficiently short of
correct to be misleading) and he will likely support his application by no more
than statements from where he stands. The prosecution have the advantage that
some of their assertions on the point will have been brought out in evidence;
nonetheless it is difficult to convince when only probability is asserted.
Here, as in other areas, experience, modified by wisdom, is most help to
the court. What I have in mind is put by Ayer (“The Problem of Knowledge”,
p.13) in this way: “Certainly, when people possess skills, even intellectual skills,
like the ability to act or teach, they are not always consciously aware of the
procedures which they follow. They use the appropriate means to attain their
ends, but the fact that these means are appropriate may never be made explicit
by them even to themselves. There are a great many things that people
habitually do well without remarking how they do them. In many cases they
could not say how they did them if they tried”.
Or as Morris & Howard (“Studies in Criminal Law” p.195) say of the
experienced and wise judge who builds up understanding to guide him: “Such
‘understanding’ is quite\ different from ‘knowledge’, which is communicable,
which can be acquired otherwise than by osmosis, and which facilitates the
development of ‘understanding’
What you are getting is, nonetheless, no more than an informed guess,
albeit in many cases a fairly well informed guess.
I have no doubt that other speakers will point to instances, unhappily too
many, where accused persons who should have faced trial for serious offences
have absconded from bail. Similarly, it will be said other persons have remained
a long time in prison, either because bail was denied them or because they could
not raise it. Both situations are bad from, in the first case, the interest of society,
and in the second from that and from the personal viewpoint of the citizen
concerned. It may here be noted in passing that an appreciable number of
accused persons do not apply for bail.
Upon the ﬁrst difficulty it may be said that magistrates generally are aware
of what is often the unduly long passage of time between committalfor trial and
the holding of the trial. They are also aware of the sometimes inordinate delays
between arrest and committal proceedings. These two considerations often
operate to persuade the court to grant bail whereas if it were reasonably certain
that nothing other than a reasonable delay were likely bail might in proper cases
be denied. For these delays police and the profession must bear some blame, as
well defendants, who are surprisingly often slothful and careless of their
interests. There appears also to be delay in the organization of prosecutions for
presentation in intermediate and higher courts, perhaps also in preparation of
defences and certainly from time to time a shortage of courts.
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How any why this should happen is not my province to examine. We know
it is so and‘that it ought not to be. Our courts are not perfect but it is unusual
for any kind of case not to have hearing room within three months of first being
presented, if the parties are ready. Delay is bad. Justice, like fish, is sweeter
when fresh.
A matter which often gives rise to debate among magistrates is the
propriety of adding additional conditions to a recognizance whereon a person is
discharged from custody or admitted to bail. Generally these take the form of a
requirement to report to a certain police station at regular intervals of time, a
requirement to .live in a certain place, a circumscription of movement and even a
surrender of a passport. It is clear that there is no warrant for this in the Justices
Act. Nonetheless it has been done for a very long time, and by Superior Courts. I
have not known it objected to by any Etch Court. Mayhap it rests on the
somewhat dubious (in this context) maxim: consuetudo facit 1%:
It is a useful and commonsense kind of thing to do, but the problem it
poses is what is to be done when the accused or defendant does not report or
live where required.
It is clear that his surety or sureties may surrender him in person if they
can take him. Outside Section 352 (1) (b) of the Crimes Act which applies only
to felony there appears to be no statutory power to take him. It is not clear
what exactly this section is directed to. What may be done if a person on bail is
found in an airline ofﬁce buying himself a ticket to Uruguay? What other kind
of situation does the section contemplate. Police generally suppose that once a
defendant or an accused has been admitted to bail they have no power again to
arrest him. If this be so there is a gap which ought to be closed.
Compare also the fairly well recognized procedure whereby a surety
appears before a justice and swears a complaint that he believes his principal is
about to abscond. The justice then issues a warrant for his apprehension and if
he is taken on it the court may, depending on what is said, leave the order
concerning bail unaltered or replace it as the case may seem to require. The
police are usually able to throw some light on the principal’s intentions when
they bring him. It seems clear that the surety is entitled to be quit of his
obligations once his principal is again in custody. The thing is, there is no
statutory foundation for the proceeding.
In dealing with the practice relating to summary offences, at ﬁrst blush
one has the feeling of standing on firmer ground. The ﬁrst thing to note is that
the majority.of persons against whom informations are laid for these offences
are got before the court by summons. It might be said to be an invariable rule
that in these circumstances the court does not require any recognizance to be
entered into upon adjournment. For this there are two good reasons. If a. man
appear and plead not guilty after being summoned it is reasonable to suppose
that he has sufﬁcient interest in that part of his destiny again to appear for trial.
Second, whether he fails to answer the summons or whether he fails to appear
on adjournment, he may be dealt with in his absence —— vide sections 75 and-7.6 of
the Justices Act. If he fail to answer the summons the court need not deal with
him in his absence but may procure his attendance by issuing a warrant for his
arrest ($.75) and this is not unusual where the offence charged is serious.
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In the case where the defendant has been arrested for a summary offence,
as we have seen (5.69 (1)) he may be committed into custody without any
restriction as to duration of time, he may be discharged on entering a
recognizance or he may be suffered to go at large. In former and harder times it
was usual to require all persons who had been arrested to find bail where the
hearing was adjourned. Now it is unusual, if the defendant is of reasonably
settled habits and can be found, to do other than suffer him to go at large or to
allow his discharge upon entering a recognizance without surety. Sometimes, as
an added safeguard, a cash deposit in lieu of surety is required. It is extremely
rare to commit to custody except for the defendant’s own good.
Instances of this last are, for example, persons taken up for drug offences
who are in a disturbed state by reason of the commission of the offence. These
people often present in a pitiful state indicating a need for immediate medical
and psychiatric attention. Commonly the only lock hospital available to the
court is that at the prison. (The hospitals at the Metropolitan Receiving Prison
and the State Reformatory for Women are very good indeed, and as l have seen,
the standard of care and the facilities provided leave little to be desired and are a
credit to those responsible). Likewise the hopeless and helpless drunk has to
receive similar treatment until arrangements can be set in. train for his removal to
an institution under the lnebriates Act.
In the rare event that a relative or other well-disposed person presents
himself and indicates a willingness and capability to undertake the control and
care of such people, the court is happy to permit this. The difficulty is that by
the time they have sunk to this state they have been abandoned by family and
friend alike because of their recalcitrance and objectionable habits. As well they
have dissipated their means by reason of their addictions.
Again, as will be readily understood, many arrests are for offences
committed in public or what are commonly called street offences, including
vagrancy and begging alms. These call for the exercise of the utmost of the
magistrate’s skill and experience. A few very disturbed and violent people
present in this way. Some are merely anti-social and objectionable,a few are
really dangerous. One remembers the man some years ago who went into the
Regent Theatre with a tomahawk and maimed and killed a number of people.
Others have committed unprovoked and violent assaults, sometimes fatal
assaults, upon passers and standers by. (One remembers the professional man a
year or two ago who was leaving a place of entertainment with his wife and who
was stabbed to death upon the street outside the entrance by an unknown and
fleeting assailant). The magistrate, if the circumstances seem to warrant it, may
very well commit some of these to custody for expert examination. Almost
invariably his assessment turns out to be correct. Of course one bears in mind the
caution sounded by Dr Lucas at a recent seminar here that one may not be
justified in attempting the re-adjustment of a man’s whole life merely because he
has mouthed a stream of indecent and obscene language in a public place.
, The appellant in Ex Parte Corbishley; Re Locke and Anor, 86 W.N. Pt.
2.215 appears to have been of this class of offender. It was said in that case that
what there happened appeared to have been an abuse of the discretion to grant
bail. I think, however, that the Court of Appeal had in contemplation rather the
peculiar facts before it than any general principle.
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The vagrant is a problem all on his own. He has got arrested and indeed is a
criminal for being what he is. Mostly it is necessary to hold him in custody for a
short time to see if anything can be done for him. Upon arrest it is most unlikely
that anyone will stand surety for him and it is equally unlikely that he will
voluntarily re-appear if he is let go. Many of these people are mentally ill or have
defective and damaged personalities. They present a problem which requires a
great deal of investigation. Of course they are all poor and often sick and
friendless, but without additional resources and knowledge it is impossible to do
any more for them.
It is sometimes asserted that people in this condition are oppressed by the
system of criminal justice because of their poverty and helplessness — see, e.g.
Spigelman “Poverty and the Law” Aust. and NZ. Journal of Criminology, Vol.2
p.87. My assertion is that an inspection of the proceedings in the courts will
reveal that they receive careful treatment to the limit of the facilities available.
Except for the problems noted, which are mainly ofa social kind, I think
that the operation of the provisions in regard to bail in Division 2 of Part 4 of
the Justices Act operates satisfactorily at present. If any improvement were
required it might be that the legislature could provide for the annexation of
conditions to the recognizance, such as receiving treatment.
By way of conclusion and summary of argument (where Ihave argued) it
appears to me that the requirement of a surety in all cases where there is
committal for trial is unnecessarily rigid. The Act should be amended to permit
of the dispensing with sureties and, as well, the lodging of a cash deposit in lieu
of surety in the courts’ discretion.
To resolve doubt I think there should be amendment to allow the court to
set conditions to a recognizance of bail and to permit the arrest and return to
court of the person bailed if he commit a breach of the condition/s.
Where it is clear that there will be a conflict on whether bail should be
allowed, especially before the examining justices’ inquiry is actually commenced
the police should exert themselves to present a case upon the issue. If necessary
witnesses should be sworn to answer and give an account of what they know
about the defendant as is sometimes done in higher courts when a like question
arises. The defendant, of course, has a right similarly to be heard. If prejudice is
likely to arise by way of sensational publicity I suggest that section 32 extends
to permit the closing of the court if “the ends of justice will be best answered by
so doing”. As in the resolution of most questions of fact here there seems to me
to be a problem of communication and proper pains should be taken over it.
There is no doubt that the extreme pressure experienced by criminal
courts, especially Courts of Petty Sessions, (and by the police) causes both
delays and some work to be less well donethan it should. Likely, training can
serve in part as asubstitutefor experience which is hardly won. Ishould think it
stands as self evident that the procedure in Division 1 of Part 4 of the Act
standing as it does in its present form unaltered materially for 120 years — and
the Act of 1848 was, one must recall, a consolidating Act — calls for revision and
improvement in the light of modern requirements. This is the age of the rocket,
not the horse. '
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I would much have liked to have included some statistics from at least
Central Court of Petty Sessions in this paper. From lack of time and lack of a
research assistant this has not been possible. Nonetheless I remain confident of
the accuracy of my general impressions of my colleagues’ work at that Court.
 
  
POLICE PROBLEMS RELATING TO BAIL
Detective Sergeant F. Krahe*
INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of persons granted bail in this State pose no problems to
police. Almost all answer their bail. In most cases, bail is not opposed by police.
You may well ask why then, are there still problems for police in relation to this
matter.
The problem for police in this State as I‘see it, is with the conﬁrmed and
consistent criminal; the professional criminal if you like; the criminal who makes
his living wholly .and solely from criminal activities. I believe that persons in this
category must be viewed in a different light to the majority of those who are
given bail as of right. I do not believe that the present legal principles governing
bail afford sufficient safeguards to the community when the question of bail is
raised so far as the professional criminal is concerned.
What I am saying is this: in our community today there is a highly skilled,
well educated, dedicated criminal class who have chosen as their way of life the
commission of crime. These people think differently to you andrhe'J’heir ‘moral’
standard is different to ours. The criminal path is their profession, their
occupatiOn, their trade, and they view each ‘job’ as objectively as you
gentlemen view a forthcoming case, a lecture, an assignment. They are as
dedicated as you are, as thorough as you are, as meticulous as you are.
Praiseworthy as these qualities may be when found in a normal law abiding
citizen, they are qualities which ought to be feared when found in the criminal.
The law abiding citizen is the victim and if the law is to be our protection,
then it must place the professional criminal in a category of his own. We must
recognise the existence of the professional criminal and apply a different legal
standard to him. It is all very well to say that we have freedom under the law.
This is a wonderful philosophy, but the law is too lenient to the active criminal
who constantly takes advantage of it.
You may say, “The criminal is not affecting me. There’s not many of them
anyway”. All I can say is that you have been lucky, but don’t forget that the
criminal element is expanding in this State. I can give you many examples where
people have not been so lucky and the victims wonder why such crimes have
been committed upon them. Their wonder often turns to amazement when they
learn that the criminals concerned ARE ON BAIL.
It has been accepted by the Courts for many years now, that “the object
of bail is to ensure that the accused appears to stand his trial”. I submit that this
is no longer the only criterion to consider when the question of bail is raised. In
fact, I don’t think that this question of whether a person will answer his ball or
not is such an important one today. My experience has been that most
professional criminals answer their bail. What I am concerned with here, is
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whether the professional criminal should be given bail as of right, instead of in
the first place having his reason for requiring it thoroughly examined.
The following principles have been laid down and reaffirmed many times
in cases where the question of bail has been raised:
(a) The nature of the crime charged;
(b) The probability of conViction;
(c) The severity of the punishment that may be imposed '.
These principles concern themselves only with the question of the
probability of guilt in respect to the charge preferred at the time when the
question of bail is raised. This is not the problem as I see it. The real question to
be asked is WHAT IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED COMMITTING
FURTHER CRIME WHILST 0N BAIL? I believe that this is the real problem
facing not only the police but the community generally. In other words, can we
afford to allow the professional criminal his freedom whilst awaiting trial, when
his very background strongly suggests that he will continue to commit crime
whilst he is free? This particular problem then, will be the subject of this paper.
THE PRESENT POSITION
A great number of police spend all their time and effort in detecting and
apprehending the professional criminal, who is then granted bail and continues
his criminal activities. The same police are required to again detect and
apprehend him- It has been my experience that whilst on hail, the professional
criminal commits crime at a faster rate than he did before his initial
apprehension. He does this for two reasons:
(a) To obtain sufﬁcient money to brief senior counsel;
(b) To make financial provision for his family in the event of his being
convicted.
When senior counsel appears upon a bail application might the question
not well be asked, ‘How did the accused find sufficient funds to afford counsel
when evidence is available to show that he is not in legitimate employment?’
Let us now consider some of the common practices used by the criminal
to obtain bail:
(a) Changing legal representatives;
(b) Feigned illness;
(c) Committing minor offences.
Changing legal representatives
It is not uncommon for the professional criminal to engage a different
legal representative at each hearing. In fairness to his counsel, for the very
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obvious reason that such counsel has not had a chance to prepare the case, a
further remand is usually granted. This ruse may only succeed once or twice, but
nevertheless does allow considerable extension to the accused’s time on bail.
Feigned illness
Again this is a ruse which is frequently used with varying degrees of
success. It is recognised among criminals as a convenient means of obtaining an
extension of bail. He will even resort to hospitalisation prior to the hearing, to
obtain a further remand on bail.
Committing minor offences
I know of numerous cases where criminals, in their younger days,
committed crime of an aggravated and serious nature such as safebreaking,
armed robbery and the like, which resulted in their‘receiving lengthy periods of
imprisonment. Many of these offenders,however, now realise that it just doesn’t
pay to commit crimes of this type, ﬁrst, because there is not sufficient
remuneration for the risk involved; second, the penalty for this class of offence
is usually severe. Therefore, they either decide or are advised to change their
mode of attack upon society.
As a result, we now have large numbers of professional criminals
exclusively engaged in the so called ‘minor’ crimes of ‘shoplifting’, ‘stealing
from unattended motor vehicles’ and similar offences. Whilst these crimes appear
on the surface to be of a minor or petty nature, they are in reality being
committed by highly organised gangs of criminals both male and female.
Hence, a situation now exists where those, who in the past were engaged
in crime necessitating committal to Quarter Sessions, now engage in organised
crime which if detected, remains in the Petty Sessions jurisdiction. Therefore,
when the question of bail is raised, because the offence is minor, the offender is
usually released on bail.
We are all aware of the enormous loss to the retail trade caused by the
criminals who commit ‘shoplifting’ offences. The manner in which the gangs
operate render their detection extremely difficult and the sum total of property
stolen under these circumstances is incalculable. Retailers budget for this loss
of not less“ than 5‘7 of displayed stock. Thus, more and more criminals are
resorting to the commission of these ‘minor’ offences for the following reasons:
(i) the penalty is comparatively light;
(ii) the ‘risk of detection is slight;
(iii) the opportunity of obtaining bail is greater.
Unless strict notice is taken of the offender’s background, it is extremely
difficult to convince the Court that bail should be refused, particularly when the
article, the subject of the charge, is not of any great value. The truth is however,
that the offender’s gang has stolen some thousands of dollars worth of readily
_ disposable property during the organised operation.
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Further, the criminal in question could well be the leader of a group or an
efficient operator and the gang’s activities would be severely curtailed in the
event of his being refused bail. However, I have found it difficult to impress the
importance of these things on the Courts, and the criminal invariably obtains his
bail.
Question of bail being refused on police suspicion
There is a considerable criticism by defence counsel of the present
procedure at Courts‘ of Petty Sessions. As you are aware, when an offender first
comes before the Court, the police invariably ask for a remand to prepare the
case and at the same time request that bail be refused. It is argued at this stage
that nothing of significance is before the Court, no prima facie case has been
established and‘often no evidence is available at that time to prove the case.
In reality, a person in this category, if bail is refused, remains in custody
because of police suspicion. This is true and it could be an important issue if it
were shown that the police were wrong in their suspicions. However, the facts do
not bear this out. How many cases of wrongful arrest so far as the professional
criminal is concerned, have come to light? Very few I suggest.
Conditions placed upon person bailed
Frequently, counsel in applying to the Court for bail, will state that their
client is quite willing to submit to any condition imposed by the Court. Usually
the conditions are that the offender report to a certain Police Station at certain
times. Police are always reassured when bail is granted, that such conditions be
imposed, as it does give some control of the offender. The professional criminal
is well aware though, that if he fails to report there is little or nothing that the
police can do about it. Often these reporting conditions are circumvented by the
production of a medical certificate by a friend or relative, stating that the
offender is not in a position to report.
The fact is, that even if a criminal agrees to report every 24 hours at a
given point, it does not seriously interfere with his freedom to commit crime. It
is not uncommon for criminals who commit major crime to leave the State by
aircraft within an hour of the commission of the offence. It is not uncommon
for criminals to fly from New South Wales to Victoria, commit crime and return
the same day. I am sorry to say that there is some reverse ‘lend lease’ from
Victoria. In 24 hours, a criminal so minded could be half way to England. It is
true that once conditions are broken the Courts will not generally grant bail
again, but I can give you examples where it has happened.
HOW CAN THIS PROBLEM BE OVERCOME?
So far I have discussed the problem from the police point of view. I have
stated that the major problem lies with the professional criminal, the person who
does not work, will not work, has no intention of working and constantly
commits crime to maintain his standard of living. This standard is quite high: for
some of them. They own their own homes, drive expensive cars, their children
attend private schools and it is not unusual to see them enjoying the services of
night spots and expensive restaurants.
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I now propose to put forward some suggestions which may assist in solving
this problem. I'appreciate the difﬁculties involved and I offer these suggestions
constructively from my point of view:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Each time an offender is arrested, a thorough investigation he made
into his background and this information be made available to the
Court when he ﬁrst appears.
Each time an offender appears at Court, the position regarding'his
bail be thoroughly reviewed.
Construction of Remand Centres with proper facilities for counsel to
interview their clients in privacy.
Statutory provisions setting out principles and requirements for the
granting of bail.
Information regarding the offender’s background to be available to the
Court at his first appearance
I believe that the Court should consider the following information before
granting ball:
a. a brief but accurate summary of the alleged facts;
if a charge involving property — the total value of property involved;
value of property recovered; value of property not recovered;
if a charge involving violence — severity of the attack; condition of
the victim;
occupation of the prisoner — if employed, how long at present
employment; if unemployed, how long unemployed and why;
whether residing at an address; type of premises e.g. boarding house,
motel etc; whether rented premises or otherwise;
marital status — if single, with whom resides; if married, whether or
not living with spouse — number of dependants and ages;
local reputation;
any facts which might tend to show whether or not the prisoner is
likely to appear at the appointed time e.g. health, business
commitments, community or domestic ties, statements as to future
intentions re travel, suicidal tendencies;
any facts which might tend to show whether or not interference may
reasonably be anticipated to witnesses or evidence at the prisoner’s
instigation;
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j. prior record, particularly any occasions where the prisoner has
previously failed to (appear in answer to bail or has escaped or
attempted to escape from custody; whether or not on license or
subject to a current recognizance to be of good behaviour;
k. possibility of the prisoner committing further crime whilst on bail.
It is true that more and more Courts are considering the matters set out
above before granting bail. However, if all Courts insisted on this type of
information from the arresting police, a more uniform approach to the question
of bail would be achieved.
So far as my own Squad is concerned, which consists of 36 men all
engaged on the investigation of crime 00mmitted by professional criminals, I
insist that the above information be obtained by them before the criminal’s first
appearance at Court.
There are many times when it is difficult to obtain an offender’s
background, particularly where an interstate criminal is involved, and in these
circumstances I suggest that the question of bail should not be decided until this
information is forthcoming.
Each time accused appears at Court the position regarding his bail be
thoroughly reviewed '
Once an offender has been successful in obtaining bail and appears on the
next occasion when a remand is again sought, too often do we hear the phrase
‘bail as before’ without any inquiry into the current position. This is also
evidenced when an offender has been committed for sentence to the Quarter
Sessions by virtue of Section 51A of the Crimes Act. When called up for
sentence, it is not uncommon for the accused to change his plea to one of ‘not
guilty’ and he is then remanded back to Petty Sessions. Meanwhile, because he
has established ‘credit’ for answering his bail, he is allowed ‘bail as before’
without any inquiries being made into his current position. It is possible that the
circumstances which existed at the time ball was originally granted have
changed, which could well alter the Court’s attitude to the granting of further
bail. It is therefore suggested that each time the accused appears at Court his
background should again be thoroughly reviewed.
Construction of remand centres with proper facilities for counsel to
interview clientslin privacy.
I feel sure that if rlemand centres were constructed in this State, the Courts
would not be so reluctant to refuse bail. If such a centre was constructed close
to the City, counsel would then have ready access to their clients. I also believe
that the atmosphere of such a centre would make it easier for an accused person
to discuss his defence with his counsel. At the present time the situation is not
satisfactory from the accused’s or Counsel’s point of view, and I feel that this is
one of the reasons that the Courts hesitate to refuse bail.
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Statutory provisions setting out requirements for the granting of bail.
I believe that there is too much divergence of opinion among the various
Courts regarding the granting of bail. I am of the opinion that it should be
possible for some statutory provisions to be introduced which would serve as a
guide to all tribunals who have to consider the question of bail.
CONCLUSION
We as police realise that we have a part to play here. We realise that we
have an important responsibility and that it is our duty to ensure that we are
ready to proceed with the presentation of ourvevidence on the ﬁrst date set
down by the Court for the hearing of the evidence. We realise that it is no use
our objecting to the granting of bail on the one hand, if we ourselves on the
other hand, do not do everything possible to see that the case is dealt with.
expeditiously. '
Finally, Lord Denning once said when considering an application for'bail
where allegations were made about the possibility of the accused committing
offences whilst on bail:
“Contrary to all principles that a man be punished for what he did, he is
punished for what he is likely to do’”. You may well say that this is exactly
what I am advocating: punishing the accused by refusing his bail because he is '
likely to commit further crime whilst on bail. In suggesting that bail be refused
to the professional criminal, I do so because I firmly believe in the principle salus
populi suprema lex. If there is some other way in which professional criminals
would not be denied their freedom whilst'awaiting trial, but nevertheless would
not be in a position to commit further crime whilst on bail, then I would be the
ﬁrst to agree with it. Meanwhile, because I believe in the principle “the safety of
the people is the supreme law” I urge you to view the activities of the
professional criminal with alarm and take appropriate steps to ensure that the
people of this State are protected from such activities.
 
2. 1952—1 All. Eng. Reports at p. 823.
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BAIL FOR PERSONS ON PAROLE
Judge A. Levine *
The admission of persons to bail pending their trial had become
well-established in England by the thirteenth century, and whilst not all offences
were at ﬁrst bailable, by the end of the nineteenth century, (see (1828)9 George
IV, No. 1; (1850) 14 Vict., No. 43), it became law in New South Wales that
most offences were bailable. Generally speaking the present law is that a person
is entitled to bail unless it can be shown that there is some good reason in the
public interest why bail should be refused, the presumption is in favour of
granting bail. As it has sometimes been put, a person charged has a prima facie
right to bail (R. v. Montgomery (1958) 75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 233, at 234) and
ordinarily the onus would be on the Crown to establish that there is a real degree
of risk that the accused, if allowed bail,‘would refuse to answer it.
The general principles applicable to the granting of bail are dealt with in l
other papers, and I have restricted my remarks in this paper to considerations
which may be specially relevant to the granting of bail to parolees.
By parolees I refer to a prisoner in respect of whom the Parole Board has
made “a parole order” pursuant to s.6 (2) of the Parole of Prisoners Act 1966.
He is a prisoner who by the Sentencing Judge was thought ﬁt to be made eligible
for parole and of whom a Parole Board decided that there was a reasonable
probability that he would live and remain at liberty without violation of the law
and whose release upon conditions was thought not to be incompatible with the
welfare of society.
He has been released from prison before the expiration of his sentence
upon conditions which (inter alia) would include the following
(1) The prisOner shall be of good behaviour and refrain from violation of
the law;
(2) The prisoner shall subject himself to the supervision and guidance of
a parole ofﬁcer, carry out his instructions and report as and when
directed;
(3) The prisoner shall report to a Parole Ofﬁcer and make himself
available to be interviewed by such Parole Officer at such times, and
in such places, as the Parole Ofﬁcer shall direct;
(4) The prisoner shall notify the Parole Ofﬁcer of any intended change
of address or employment before the change takes place or within
48 hours thereafter. .
The parolee has been provided with a copy of his parole order and will have been
informed of the consequences of any breach of parole, both from the pamphlet
provided, entitled “What Parole Means”, one paragraph of which reads as
follows:
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“What ifParole is Revoked?
If any of the conditions are broken the Parole Board may cancel
your parole order, and this means you will be returned to prison to
serve the rest ofyour original sentence and NOTE that any time you
had offon parole does NOT count. ”
and of course from his Parole Officer (See s.6 (3) of the Act).
A consideration of the foregoing shows that a parolee who is an applicant
for bail is in a different position from other applicants, (the significance of the
difference is a matter to which I shall later refer) and it is an important and
relevant matter that the fact that an accused person is a parolee be brought to
the attention of the Court considering his application for Bail. In my experience
it has happened that both the Magistrate in a case where he has a discretion to
refuse Bail, and the Quarter Session Chairman have been asked to consider the
matter of Bail without being informed that the applicant was a parolee.
Ordinarily upon the arrest of a parolee, the Central Fingerprint Bureau of
the Criminal Investigation Branch will notify the Secretary of the Parole Board
that the arrest has taken place, giving available details of the offence charged and
the return day of any Court appearance. The notice is given to the Parole Officer
in charge whose duty is then to report to the Parole Board which in turn
considers whether in the particular case parole should be revoked. The Parole
Officer in order to prepare this important report should interview the parolee,
and perhaps the Police Officers connected with the arrest. Accordingly it should
not be a difﬁcult matter where a parolee is the person charged to ensure that the
Court should in every case be informed of that fact, and this should be done.
The fact that the accused person is a parolee should not of itself without
more be a decisive consideration to support a refusal to grant bail; however it is a
material and relevant matter to be taken into account on the question of his
likelihood to answer his bail, and the likelihood that if granted bail he would
commit further offences whilst awaiting trial or sentence.
It is a well established rule, and I believe a first consideration on an
application for bail to determine the likelihood of the accused person failing to
answer the charge. For this purpose consideration must be given (inter alia) to
his past record of behaviour, his declared intentions, and his manner of living
since last release from prison, the nature of the offence and the manner and
circumstances in Which it is alleged to have been committed. A parolee is a
prisoner who knows that a conviction for an offence committed whilst on parole
would almost invariably result in his return to prison to complete his original
sentence. For him there is usually no room or hope of speculating in this regard.
He knows what is the balance of his term awaiting to be served, and he knows
' that it is likely that a sentence in respect of the offence constituting the breach
of parole may be made cumulative upon the balance of the sentence awaiting to
be served, and that his chances of further parole may be slight. These matters
constitute very strong motivation for his absconding and failing to answer bail.
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In 1951 Lord Goddard, L.C.J. stated “Bail ought to be sparingly granted
in cases where persons have long records of conviction, since it very often results
when such persons obtain bail, he commits offences whilst on bail, sometimes
telling the Court afterwards that he did it so as to get money to enable him to be
represented at Quarter Sessions . . .”. (Postmaster-General v. Whitehouse (1951)
35 Cr.App.R. 8; Ref. Reg. v. Clancy (1958) 75 W.N. 142, Ferguson, J. at 143).
My experience at Quarter Sessions would confirm what was said by Lord
Goddard in 1951 (and see Cross, Ch. Q.S. — Reg. v. Wakefield (1969) 89 W.N.
(N.S.W.) 325 at 330). In 1958 Sugarman, J. included likelihood to commit
offence as a matter to be considered on Bail applications (Reg. v. Ladd (1958)
75 W.N. (N.S.W.) 431 at 433).
I quote Ferguson, J. in Reg. v. Montgomery (1958) 75 W.N. 233 at 234):
— “Although I am fully conscious of a person’s prima facie right of freedom
until he has been found guilty of some offence, there are also the rights of the
community to be considered and to be protected. When an applicant is shown to
have criminal propensities the Court is more ready to assume that if given an
opportunity it is likely that he will commit further crimes”.
In Reg. v. Young ((1966) 83 W.N. Pt.1, 391) Isaacs, J. after referring to
the presumption of innocence which exists in favour of all accused persons and
acknowledging the prima facie right to bail, referred to the prevalence in the
community of certain types of crime, robbery, etc., went on to say:
“The public interest requires and demands adequate protection against
these degradations and a curbing, so far as the Courts can, of the opportunity of
those whose evil minds contemplate the commission of these types of offences”.
“The public interest has to be weighed .. . against the inconvenience to the
individual of being temporarily deprived of his liberty, pending his trial . . . ”.
It would seem to me that it is now an important consideration in an
application for Bail for the Court to decide whether if granted Bail the accused is
likely to commit further offences. Statistics support experience that most
criminal offences for dishonesty are committed in this State by persons who
have at least once before committed offences against the law. The parolee of
course falls within such a class and it may well be that consideration of his
record may. indicate something which may never be taken into account at his
trial on the question of guilt or innocence. I refer to a propensity to commit a
particular type of offence. Such a propensity can be a very important matter to
be taken into account on an application for Bail, because an absconding criminal
on the run can be a dangerous man, and in the public interest should not be
afforded an opportunity to pursue criminal activities whilst on bail.
It is clearly important that in contested applications and certainly before
bail is refused to a parolee, the Court should have the advantage of knowing how
the parolee has behaved whilst on parole. The obvious witness for this purpose is
the Parole Officer who can give valuable evidence of the prisoner’s attitude
towards compliance with the parole conditions ordered. In many aspects the
conditions imposed on parole are similar to conditions which would be imposed
on bail, and his former behaviour should be made known. The Parole Officer
may be able to inform a Court of the background of a prisoner which might
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indicate that the offence was committed upon a sudden impulse or out of
character to his behaviour on parole. On the other hand he might be able to
indicate that the prisoner had not been sincere in the keeping of his parole
conditions, and could in a proper case give evidence of his conversations with the
accused himself perhaps with regard to the very offence then before the Court.
I am not unmindful that the disclosure by a Parole Officer of an admission
made to him by a parolee would undermine the very confidence which must
exist between them if the parole is to be a success; nevertheless there is no
question of privilege involved and the Parole Ofﬁcer must perform his duty in
the due administration of Justice.
His valuable work is done by assisting the rehabilitation of those prone to
commit offences. He has a duty to the prisoner, but his primary duty is to help
the prisoner in the public interest. The public interest is dominant and there
must come occasions when the prisoner must be subjected to the public interest
and what'I have referred to on the matters of bail must surely be one of them.
By the foregoing it. is not- my wish to convey an impression that offending
parolees constitute a major or even large proportion of persons applying for bail.
On the contrary the Parole Service in this state has been so successful that of
837 persons who had been granted Parole, up to 3lst December, 1968, only 178
had their parole revoked (21.3%), and only 8.5% had parole revoked because of
further criminal activity. This percentage has continued. (See 1968 Annual
Report Parole Board).
In the foregoing I have been concerned with applications for bail where
the parolees have asserted innocence. It is an entirely different matter where
they have confessed guilt and have been committed to Quarter Sessions for
sentence.
Although it is not for a Court to anticipate or speculate as to whether the
Parole Board is likely to revoke the parole and so put an end to any Bail which
might be granted, it is not unreasonable to assume that a parolee who confesses
his guilt and merely awaits sentence will have his parole revoked at the next
meeting of the Board. The balance of the original sentence would not commence
to run until parole is revoked? and it is in the prisoner’s interest to commence to
serve it as soon as possible.
Accordingly in such cases except in exceptional circumstances and for
special reasons bail I believe should be refused.
SUMMARY
1. The fact that a person is a parolee should not of itself without more
preclude his admission to Bail.
2. The applicant’s performance on parole is always relevant to the question
of whether he will answer his bail.
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3. The behaviour of the parolee whilst on parole can be a very material factor
in determining whether he is likely to commit further offences if admitted
to bail.
4. On a contested application for bail by a parolee, it is essentia
l that the
Court have the advantage of the evidence of the Parole Officer.
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AN ADVOCATE’S LOOK AT THE PROBLEMS OF BAIL
H. F. Purnell*
Most of the comments I intend to make are directed not at the “problems
of bail”, but rather the lack of it.
Advocates with experience in the criminal jurisdiction, must admit to a
“sinking feeling” every time a client is refused bail, whatever be the venue, be'it
Petty or Quarter Sessions, or the Supreme Court and whatever the charge.
Why is it that refusal of bail is frequently a blow?
I believe and perhaps many other advocates may agree with me, that
refusal of bail often marks the first adverse step in a path that ultimately leads to
conviction with all its attendant worries and sorrows.
The fact that a person of previous good character is charged with a ser
ious
offence is bad enough, but the refusal of bail on remand or on commi
ttal for
trial seems to bring home to those closely associated with the person co
ncerned
the deep problems that lie ahead. In a much lighter vein it can be
likened to the
early loss of a valuable wicket in cricket or the capture of 'a
valuable piece in
chess. In other words the advocate and client are faced with a
further handicap.
Why is it that the refusal of bail really worries the advocate? A
fter all it is
not he who is in custody. Perhaps the real answer to that
question is that it
means that someone outside the advocate has made a judgme
nt on the case and
his answer confirms the fears entertained by the advocate that
the road ahead
will be far from easy and the chances of a successful conclusion t
o the matter are
not as bright as one would hope. '
Undoubtedly the most difficult thing to take, be it in the case
of a man of
previous good character or in the case of a man who has a rec
ord, is the reaction
of those near and dear to him, particularly if he is the family br
ead-winner. The
prospect of an impoverished existence for them, coupled with th
e uncertainty of
the future is easily felt by the advocate. It would be more appa
rent to counsel
such. as the Public Defenders than to the general run of practit
ioners,because it
is their function to appear for a great percentage of the “have-nots
”.
Those who appear in the criminal jurisdiction other than for
the defence
are sometimes prone to overlook the real necessity of keeping a
family man on
bail as long as possible. They would do well to ponder more oft
en the hardships
that can flow from the opposition of the Crown’s legal represent
ative to bail.
I suppose it is understandable that a person in my position form
s strong
views about the desirability of representation for all before
Courts if at all
possible. The granting of bail enables a man if he is genuine to ge
t back to work
and thus do something about providing for his legal representation.
'
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One general thing I would like to say about arrangements for bail after it ‘
has been granted, relates to the question of issue of Certificates of Fitness to
sureties. Of course it is known there has been some trouble in the Police Force
on this matter and it is understood that instructions have now been issued that a
Police Officer in charge of a case should not issue a certificate to a potential
surety. Nevértheless, there often seems to be a number of unnecessary obstacles
placed in the way of potential sureties, that are not called for. It appears on a
number of occasions that a surety could be advised that he can fulfil the
necessary qualifications by approaching a Clerk of Petty Sessions and swearing
an Affidavit of Justification, but such advice is not forthcoming.
A good deal has been written on the question of bail in recent years
although not in this country. As my paper will apparently be the last to be
presented in this seminar, it is possible that some of the things I have to say may
cut across the writings of others involved. To properly cover my paper this is
necessary and if it is to a degree repetitious of others I apologise.
Most writers agree that there are seven or more valid reasons why pre-trial
detention should be avoided if possible:
(1) The impact on prospects of acquittal;
'(2) The effect of pre-trial detention on the ultimate disposition of the
case.
(3) The fact. that pre~trial custody produces a higher ratio of pleas of
guilty than liberty whilst awaiting trial.
(4) The effect of detention on the prisoner’s private life.
(5) The presumption of innocence.
(6) The injustice of detaining offenders who on conviction are not
found to require detention.
(7) The undesirability of filling prisons with untried persons.
The seventh reason is not really the concern of the advocate but the others
quoted all permeate the advocate’s sphere and I now propose to deal with them
individually and in more detail.
(1) The Impact on Prospects of Acquittal
I am indebted to Mr Michael Zander* for figures quoted by him in an
excellent article contributed to the Criminal Law Review and appearing in the
editions of that journal in the months of January, February and March of 1967.
These figures of course were not from N.S.W. or Australia, but my experience
supports the proposition that they are a fair summary of our own position. It
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appears that although it cannot be specifically proved that the refusal of, or 1
inability to obtain,bail whilst awaiting trial does adversely affect the accused’s
ultimate prospects of acquittal, the figures are at least suggestive of this. In 1
England in 1956 of those committed for trial 9.4% were acquitted, 7.9% on bail
and 1.5% in custody. Of all those acquitted after trial on indictment, no less
than 84% were on bail. Of those on bail and pleading not guilty, 45.6% were
acquitted. whilst of those in custody pleading not guilty, only 20.6% were
acquitted. 1n the U.S.A. a study of 946 cases from Philadelphia showed that
only 52% of bailed accused were convicted compared with 82% of those in
custody. A New York study showed that 59% of an experimental group released
on recognizance pending trial were found not guilty, but in contrast, only 23%
of the control group (selected because of their equal eligibility for release on
own recognizance but in fact not released), were acquitted. Another separate
study of 3,023 cases showed a 20.2% rate of acquittal in those in detention
pending trial as compared with 31.4% of those on bail. In Toronto, Canada, an
examination of some 6,000 cases dealt with between September 1961 and
February, 1962 showed that both for summary and indictable offences the
accused stood a greater chance of being convicted when he came into court in
custody, than when he was not in custody.
The following reasons may be advanced to explain the type of statistics
quoted. In the first place a person in custody has greater difficulties in securing
legal advice than one on bail. This is a general observation and fortunately is not
such a problem in New South Wales, which happens to have an efficient system
of legal aid in criminal matters through three Public Defenders who are
instructed by the Public Solicitor. In England however the Widgery Committee
said quite clearly in their findings that those in custody are less favourably
placed in the matter of obtaining advice than those at liberty. In fact the
Committee recommended that everyone in custody should at an early stage be
given a leaflet explaining the facilities for legal advice. Such a practice has been
in existence in New South Wales for many years. Incidentally the Committee
also said “prisoners are often so confused or so mentally restricted that they are
quite incapable of looking after their own interests”. Such a comment should be
made known to those who take a hard line on the question of granting bail. In
England, it seems that in regard to legal assistance as provided by solicitors in
general practice, some solicitors, even if adequately paid, do not take work
involving prison visits and that others take it but do not do it properly. In any
event, to those like myself who have to consult witha certain number of clients
in prison, and that includes each year at least one hundred (100) appellants to
the Court of Criminal Appeal as well as people for trial on the most serious
indictable offences such as murder, to the extent of some forty (40) odd per
year, it is readily apparent that the business of consulting with a client in
custody is plainly more difficult than if the client is at liberty. My two
associates, the Metropolitan Public Defender and the Country Public Defender
would see between them and appear for at least 300 clients each year who have
been refused or have been unable to obtain bail.
As counsel thoroughly versed in the problems of appearing for people who
are held in custody we can say without equivocation that a client in custody
presents an added difficulty to the defence and a difficulty which is on a number
of occasions quite unnecessary.
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In addition, even a diligent barrister instructed by an equally diligent
solicitor, may not be able to achieve as much as the client himself in tracing
witnesses and making enquiries about leads on potential evidence and generally
assembling the case for the defence. An accused in custody even though he be
represented is likely to be in a less favourable position than he would be with the
same legal representatives if he was on bail.
It follows that the unrepresented accused in custody who hopes to contest
his case faces almost insuperable difficulties.
(2) The Effect of Pre-trial Detection on the Ultimate Disposition of the Case
It is difficult to say what effect pre-trial detention has, but it is clear it
depends on the circumstances ofthe case.ln England in 1962, 33,979 persons were
convicted after having been kept in custody prior to trial because they were
refused or could not obtain bail. It has been estimated by the authorities that
about half of these were punished otherwise than by imprisonment. In some
cases it is undoubtedly true in N.S.W. that the period spent in custody awaiting
trial becomes an important factor in assisting the Court in its determination of
penalty, and consequently in declining to imprison the accused. The English
statistics suggest that it is less well understood that there is some evidence that in
some cases pre-trial detention may increase, rather than decrease, the chances of
getting a sentence of imprisonment on conviction. Figures from Toronto some
years ago supported this proposition and clearly established that when an
accused was sentenced to imprisonment, he received a longer sentence if he had
been in custody prior to trial than when he had not. Of course, the average
person would tend to say, well the man who was refused bail would be the man
with a bad record and he is just the type you would expect to get a longer
sentence. This however is not the answer it seems. Mr Zander undertook a study
of this aspect of the matter on the basis of examining five factors that might be
expected to influence both detention and disposition and to find out if any of
them accounted for the apparent relationship between the two. The five factors
were prior record, bail amount, type of counsel (private or assigned), family
integration and employment stability. The cases studied were of necessity
divided into two groups, those with and those without a prior record. The results
were striking and confirm the proposition that accused persons in custody are
more likely to receive prison sentences than those on bail, irrespective of prior
convictions. Mr Zander found that figures for England, the United States and
Toronto, Canada, all showed the same pattern of a higher ratio of prison
sentences for those in custody than for those on bail. This is especially
significant as the three jurisdictions have different rules and practices regarding
bail, resulting in different proportions of accused people being kept in pre-trial
custody. In the USA. there is normally a right to bail, though the right is
substantially qualified by the practice of setting high bail for persons whom the
courts wish to see kept in custody. In Toronto, the refusal of bail is rare and
financial considerations seem to play an important part in determining who
secures release from pre-trial custody. In England, as in this country, such
factors as the gravity of the offence and character and antecedents of the
accused determine whether he gets bail.
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The indications to Mr Zander were that the pronounced correlation
between pre-trial custody and less favourable disposition could not be explained
in terms of skilful selection by the courts of the less serious cases for release and
the more serious for detention. The figures were not conclusive, but in all three
‘jurisdictions each with its own methods and different rules, they all pointed in
the same direction and suggested that the reason might be the fact of pre-trial
custody.
It might well be asked, well, what has this to do with the average advocate.
The answer is, a great deal. After all one of the first questions a client askshis
counsel is “what is going to happen to me?” Experienced counsel will not be
drawn out to any extent, although he can make some sort ofa general forecast
with some confidence, but when there is an early refusal of bail, which is usually
associated with a hardening of attitude on the part of the prosecuting
authorities, then it is time to forewarn the client.
Well why is it that pre—trial custody seems pretty clearly to lead to less
favourable disposition. The following reasons may have something to do with it:
(a) It may be the psychological effect on the sentencing court of
knowing (as it would) that the offence had been thought too serious,
or the offender not sufficiently trustworthy, for release on bail.
(b) It must not be forgotten that in some instances a person who has
been in custody makes a less favourable impression in court than one
who has been at liberty. Because he has been in custody he may not
be as well dressed as if he came to court from home.
(c) The person’s general demeanour may show depression due to the
effect detention has had on his employment, his private and family
life.
(d) The general atmosphere of pre-trial detention with its lack of work
for prisoners is not calculated to improve morale, because the
depressing monotony of idleness is particularly demoralising if
prolonged beyond two or three weeks. As a matter of interest this in
fact was the finding of the Streatfield Committee in England.
(e) The morale of a prisoner is often communicated to a jury and on a
plea of not guilty the prisoner may show the discouragement he feels
because detention has hampered his capacity to mobilise and prepare
his defence. On the other hand the person who has been at liberty
will be in better heart because of the support he has received from
his family and friends.
(f) A court can be influenced in those cases where the accused has been
on bail for a considerable period (having in mind gaol cases have to
come on more quickly than bail cases), by the fact that since being
charged and released on bail and up to the time of trial he has been
\
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answering his bail, has been behaving himself and has worked
diligently. A court could be forgiven for thinking such person
seemed a better prospect for a bond and probation than the man
who came to court with low morale and a chip on his shoulder from
pre-trial custody. The mere presence in custody and the influence on
persons in custody exercised by experienced criminals quite.
frequently causes the accused to get silly ideas and want to pursue
stupid courses at trial.
(3)” The Fact that Pre-trial Custody Produces a Higher Ratio of Pleas of Guilty
than Liberty whilst awaiting Trial
There appears to be a causal relationship between pre-trial detention and a
subsequent plea of guilty. An examination of Home Office Reports in England
and once again statistics from Toronto in Canada support this proposition. My
experience in Australia also is to the same effect. Common sense would suggest
that this comes about through discussion with fellow prisoners and even prison
warders and the sense of hopelessness that settles over many prisoners refused
bail.
(4) The Effect of Detention on the Prisoner’s Private Life"
Little imagination is required to envisage the problems that may ﬂow from
pre-trial detention. The prisoner’s dependants, as already suggested, suffer
grieviously in many instances. The person who has had a job he values is more
than likely to lose it because of the disgrace of his offence and naturally because
an employer cannot continue to hold the job open for him. Even in the event of
the prisoner eventually obtaining a bond it may be too late to recover his
position and more than often his own private life has been reduced to a
shambles.
I personally hold strong views with regard to the refusal of bail in what 1
would term “domestic homicides”. We all appreciate the gravity of offences of
homicide and offences involving grievous bodily harm but where the offence
involves the slaying of a spouse and the accused is a person of previous good
character, I cannot see the necessity for the hard-line pursued by the Crown or
.the Courts. I speak of cases of course where there is no mental condition
involving possible danger to other members of the community and no previous
record of'violence.
Let us think of the case of a man who in a fit of anger following
undoubted provocation kills his wife. They have a family of 3 children. The
offence itself has a horrific quality because an axe is used and there is more than
one blow — in other words it is what the Police Prosecutors at Petty Sessions
love to call a frenzied attack. Of course they fail to appreciate that the very
nature of the “frenzied retaliation” may be the best possible evidence of
provocation. The important thing is that the accused realises he must eventually
go to gaol for some years and all he wants is some time to get his personal affairs
into the best possible condition and make the very best arrangements he can for
the future welfare of his children. What happens? The Police Prosecutor opposes
bail on committal, or the Magistrate fixes bail in such a sum that the accused
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cannot possibly raise it. The family unit collapses, the children are whisked away
to a Child Welfare Home where it becomes quickly known that their father
killed their mother. Because of what may be said to them and despite what
merits the father may have in his own way, apart from the offence with which
he is charged, he loses all hope of retaining the respect of his children. In
addition complete chaos ruins his economic future through loss of his home and
car through his inability to make payments or arrange for their most suitable
disposal.
In many instances I have had the feeling that the law has been unfair and
unjust and in the long run the community suffered.
(5) The Presumption of Innocence
Most importantly bail should not be arbitrarily denied, because to deny it
is really to negate the presumption of innocence. Even those who are facing a
case of great strength and are undoubtedly guilty should not be punished before
conviction unless there is some real danger to the community. Those remarks
apply with even more force to those cases where the evidence against the
accused is negligible.-
1 deplore the attitude of those in power, who use bail, or rather the refusal
of it in weak cases where the accused has a record, as a means of ensuring that
the accused at least receives some punishment before being acquitted. I say as
others better qualified than myself have said previously, it is impossible to deny
that imprisonment before conviction has a strong punitive content.
(6) The Injustice of Detaining Offenders Who on Conviction are Not Found to
Require Detention
It seems quite wrong that persons should be detained before trial charged
with offences that on conviction are unlikely to be dealt with by imprisonment.
Pre-trial detention is detention after all, although as indicated previously it may
be under different gaol conditions. It is hard to credit that in England in 1962
about 16,000 persons were detained before trial who on conviction were given
non-custodial sentences. I have seen this sort of thing in New South Wales too. A
young man of 18 who has, or has not been in trouble before, is committed for
trial on an indictable charge of larceny. The odds are strongly in his favour that
he will be given a bond. The Magistrate fixes bail in a sumjust beyond his reach.
Result he spends three (3) months in gaol before coming before the Chairman of
Quarter Sessions and obtaining a bond. If he has a juvenile record he will meet
some in gaol he has struck in institutions with possible unfavourable results. The
other young man without any record at all, during his stay in gaol is thrown into
the company ofjust the sort of people from whom he should be isolated.
SUMMARY
Those Magistrates or Judges asked to consider the question of bail should
not forget the main question they have to resolve is whether the accused is likely
to appear at subsequent proceedings. Too many people are refused bail in
circumstances which have a strong punitive content.
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The refusal of bail, in the light of statistics, may ultimately result in a
prison sentence for the person concerned, although if he had been bailed he
probably wOuld have been released on recognizance.
The refusal of bail has a deep psychological effect on some accused from
which they do not recover and destroys hope of an acquittal. As a result and for
a variety of reasons they plead guilty much more frequently than their
counterparts granted bail.
The refusal of bail is in many cases a negation of the presumption of
innocence.
The ﬁxing of bail in a sum that is quite obviously beyond the capacity of
the accused or his relatives or friends to obtain, is tantamount to a refusal of
bail. It is especially obnoxious in those cases where it is done to ensure a period
of detention, although it seems clear the accused after conviction or on a plea of
guilty will obtain the benefit of a good behaviour recognizance.
There must be a strong case for bail in very serious cases such as murder,
attempted murder or inﬂicting grievous bodily harm arising out of domestic
discord, where the granting of bail will enable an otherwise decent person to put
his affairs in order before facing an obvious sentence.
The refusal of.pre-trial bail can have a deleterious effect on the preparation
of a defence. In the case of an unrepresented accused it may make a defence
impossible and amount to a denial of justice.
Experience indicates that many are refused bail on the minimum of
information and on the basis that the person concerned may commit other
offences. Really more thought should be paid to the principle that the accepted
method of preventing the commission of offences is the threat of trial and
punishment, not prior confinement.
It cannot be denied; that a refusal of bail is justified to protect the
community from serious danger to life or limb.  
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APPENDIX I
BAIL IN FOREIGN CLIMES
r P. G. McGonigal
B.A., LLB. (Sydney), Senior Research Assistant, I
Institute of Criminology,
Sydney University Law School.
Since 1961 no discussion of bail could ignore the procedures and results of
the Manhattan Bail Project and its numerous spiritual progeny scattered
throughout the United States. However any consideration of these projects must
proceed within the context of the bail situation in the US: any other
consideration will certainly be misleading if applied to the situation in New
* South Wales.‘
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“excessive bail shall not be required”, and, in all but seven states, bail is
mandatory in all non-capital crimes and discretionary in capital crimes. The
institution of the bondsman arose as a solution to the problems arising from this
absolute right of bail in a country with a virtually limitless frontier where, in
many instances, personal sureties would not be available. As a consequence, in
the usual practice of the criminal courts the accused’s right to bail results in
pre-trial release only upon his entering into a commercial bail transaction.
However, as the fee for the bond is often paid on his release, the accused has no
further financial stake in complying with the conditions of his release.2 An-
indigent accused is unlikely to procure his release.
Studies in bail administrationl revealed that a large percentage 'of
defendants were unable to post bail, that bail setting practice ignored the
defendant’s social background and stability, that 5 days’ delay in bail hearings
were common4 and chronic overcrowding occurred. An analysis of 1,000 jail
cases in New York revealed that 528 defendants released after trial (180 were
acquitted) had spent an average of 33 days in prison. Those released on bail were
more likely to be acquitted, and if convicted were less likely to be sentenced to
prison 5 The judiciary often set high bail to give defendants “a taste ofjail”, to
coerce them in some aspects of the case, or simply because recommended by the
District Attorney. In a number of jurisdictions a fixed bail schedule is used
which varies according to the offence“ , in other jurisdictions the courts
recognise certain sums as being “appropriate” to particular offences.
The above problems appear trivial when one considers the role of the
professional bondsman. He enjoys considerable power and few restrictions: he
\has the private power to arrest his bailee, and may even surrender him to the
ourt if he suspects that ﬂight is imminent; he is subject to little regulation and
jﬂiat regulation there is, especially regulation of premiums, is easy to
c cumvent. 7 The standard premium rate appears to be 10% of the amount of
the bond. To further reduce their losses, many bondsmen are backed by surety
companies licensed under state insurance laws,“ and many require collateral
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from the defendant or his relatives (one in Columbia took a lap dog as collateral,
another is reputed to have kept the accused’s child). Bondsmen in New York
have gone on strike, resulting in jail overcrowding to protest against tighter
enforcement of forfeitures: automatic forfeiture is rare. The methods used by
bondsmen to return absconding clients are aggressive and often illegal. The
bondsman’s discretion in choosing clients may lead to rejection of members of
minority groups or to favouring criminal syndicates. Allegations of bribery of
court officials, police and lawyers? are common and the system encourages,
may even require,such bribery and association with organised crime.
Finally it should be noted that high bail causes little concern to major
criminals, many of whom appear, although many abscondlo . Racketeers are
usually a good source of income; besides, they may not be safe clients for
bondsmen to refuse.
It was in this climate that the Manhattan Bail Project originated.
Established in 1961 by the Vera Foundation " (now reorganised as the Vera
Institute of Justice) in co-operation with the New York University School of
Law and the Institute of Judicial Administration, the project was founded on
two assumptions: that accused persons with strong community ties may be
relied upon to appear in court with no additional requirement of pecuniary
coercion; and that the Judiciary will release such persons on their personal
recognisance to appear, instead of setting bail, if they are supplied with verified
information about the accused person’s reliability and community roots. The
success of the project and of the many other projects” established in US.
jurisdictions attest to the validity of the assumptions. Other studies” have
demonstrated the relevance of the assumptions to the traditional British bail
procedure.
The procedures adopted in the Manhattan project, though of less relevance
to New South Wales than their theoretical basis, embody certain guidelines that
have value for New South Wales jurisdictions, and for that reason are set out at
some length. Those arrested persons who are not released on summons are taken
to a central arraignment facility operating 24 hours a day where bail interviewers
and Legal Aid lawyers are always available “‘ : a special prearraignment
detention procedure is available for non-English speaking prisoners ‘5 . In
ordinary cases the bail determination takes place without delay and, if
appropriate, the case is disposed of on the spot. A probation officer or law
student checks the defendant’s criminal record and the current charge “ . If he
is eligible for bail and has not been charged with homicide or certain narcotic
offences ‘7 he is informed by the interviewer in a standardized introduction "
that the purpose of the interview is to investigate the possibility of his release on
recognisance: with the defendant’s consent, a two page questionnaire is
completed, usually in five or ten minutes, and is scored on an objective points
system. To be recommended for release on recognisance a defendant needs a
New York area address where he can be reached and a total of five points from
the categories of prior record, family ties, employment record, residence, time in
the area and a positive or negative discretion point. The information is verified
by phone from the referees given by the accused; it is considered that if the
defendant’s answers are verified by persons with whom he has had no contact  
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since his arrest then the answers are probably truthful. The verification process
averages about one hour. If he still appears a good risk a recommendation is
given to the court together with a summary of the information obtained from
the questionnaire: the ﬁnal decision rests with the judge. If sufficient
information is not verified to qualify the accused for a recommendation a
summary of the information and any results of the verification process are
submitted to the court without any recommendation.
When a defendant is released a follow-up technique is employed: as soon
as he is released he is given a printed card indicating the place and date of the
subsequent hearing; a week before he is due in court he is sent a letter containing
the same information. If he is illiterate (indicated by the questionnaire) he is
notified by telephone; often a friend or employer agrees to help get the accused
to court, in which case that other person is also notified. The defendant is also
requested to check in at the project office on the day of the hearing.
The project has been successful: in the period between March 1964 and
August 1965 over 10,900 were interviewed, 9,000 recommended for release
(82% of those interviewed), 6,700 released (74% of those recommended) and
only 79 failed to appear, a default rate of 1.2%. An indication of the present
scope of the project is afforded by the fact that approximately 80,000 cases are
considered each year. In March this year the project considered 7,444 cases,
rated 2,681 favourably and 1,168 were released on recognisance instead of bail.
In 1964 the Vera Institute, the New York City Police Department and the
courts prepared a program for extending the.use of police summons in cases of
simple assault, petit larceny and disorderly conduct '9 . Again, it was presumed
that those released because of strong community ties would appear for trial. The
three year trial program was so successful that in July 1967 the Police
Department assumed control over the project, expanded it to include all police
precincts within the city of New York, and adopted the official policy that
wherever possible summonses were to be issued in lieu of detention. 1° 2‘
The defendant is taken to the local station house, searched and
questioned. He is then, again in a standardized introduction, informed of the
opportunity and purposes of interview. If he consents he is interviewed by the
arresting officer who completes a three page questionnaire almost identical to
that used in the Bail Project.“ In every case a name check is made with the
Indentification Unit, and in some cases information obtained by the
questionnaire is verified by telephone. Verification is usually only carried out
when some substantial doubt exists as to the defendant’s veracity, or
documentary proof of identity or residence is lacking: if verification is carried
out one telephone call is usually sufficient. If the defendant meets the minimum
requirements, assessed on an objective scale, a recommendation is made to the
precinct desk ofﬁcer, with whom the final decision lies, and if approved a desk
summons is issued returnable within 14 days. This procedure usually takes
between 30 minutes and an hour, whereas the usual arrest procedure takes up
to three hours.
A special procedure is adopted in instances of summonsable arrests by
store detectives in certain large department stores. 2’
24407—4
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In the first year of city wide operation there were 48,159 arrest actions for
summonsable offences: in 55% of these actions interviews were waived, of those
eligible for interview 12% failed to qualify, 22% refused interview and 66%
(14,232) were issued with a summons; the rate of absconders was 4.5% “ It
has been calculated that each summons issued saves approximately five man
hours; as an average of sixty summonses are issued each day, this savings is
equivalent to a quota increase of sixty patrolmen.
I do not propose to make detailed comparisons between the numerous
projects, some involving variations on the Manhattan formulae, others involving
procedures developed independently of those projects. However a number of
factors appear both relevant and interesting.
Nature of Interviewers: In summons projects the interviewers are usually police
officers,25 although in several jurisdictions the defendant is released on the
personal guarantee of his appearance given by his attorney.“ Bail projects
reveal more variations, including jailers,27 court ofﬁcers," probation
officers," law students 3° and other investigators, 3‘ often specially
appointed. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, ex—convicts are employed.
Offences: Summons projects are usually limited to misdemeanours, and
violations, and some projects ’1 cover only a limited range of such offences. In
Bail projects which usually cover felonies and misdemeanours, some limitations
are usually imposed on the nature of the felony charges in respect of which
interviews will be made although in the District of Columbia 3’ and in Los
Angeles, California, no restrictions are imposed on the nature of the offences. In
the Californian Legislature a bill has been placed before the Legislature
proposing that release on own recognisance, become mandatory in all
non-capital offences unless good cause for non-release is shown. In most projects
it has been discovered that the project is capable of absorbing most of the
excluded felonies. Most projects do not interview drunks, persons suffering from
narcotic withdrawal symptoms, and persons with a poor prior record of assault
or narcotic offences.
Verification: In the majority of jurisdictions the example of the Manhattan Bail
Project is followed, veriﬁcation is mandatory and the defendant is unable to
obtain a positive recommendation without a sufﬁcient number of verified
points. In several other projects veriﬁcation is only carried out in some of the
cases.“ In Berkeley, California, it is considered that the verification process is
time consuming and non-productive, the time saved on not verifying the
information being better spent on relocating the 4% who abscond, the
information obtained in the interview being used ‘as a starting point. In a Chicago
study it was calculated that most defendants reply truthfully to the interview
questions although there was a tendency to conceal or forget prior convictions. 3‘.
In Oakland professional investigators (probation ofﬁcers) are employed,
and it is believed that they are better able to assess the general veracity of the
defendant and may rely on internal consistency of answers rather than carry out
a complete verification procedure in every instance. Such methods have the
additional advantage of avoiding the situation, common in Manhattan, where a
recommendation is refused because independent veriﬁcation is not possible.
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Criteria: Two out of three projects use objective criteria based on a point system
similar to that used in Manhattan. The remaining projects adopt a subjective
evaluation usually by a probation or parole ofﬁcer. In Oakland it was discovered
that the Municipal Court judges preferred the professional judgment to the
point—derived recommendation.36 Subjective rating is ﬂexible and permits
assessment of potential of harm to the community and can also take into
account exceptional but meritorious cases falling below predetermined criteria;
however, it is more expensive and,due to the routine nature of the job, involves a
greater turnover in staff than an objective system using interviewers less skilled
and professional.
Results: Due to differences in statistical methods it is difficult to compare the
results of the various projects. However, the following table contains details of
fourteen projects for which the available statistics indicate that more than 1,000
defendants have been interviewed; the degree of variation in approach between
projects is well reflected in these figures.
Economic Value of Projects: While it is generally agreed that the projects result
in considerable savings in the jurisdictions in which they operate there appears to
be no generally accepted method of calculating the economic values of the
projects.’7 Most reports refer to considerable savings in jail maintenance costs
and in increased efﬁciency of police who are released by summons projects from
waiting for the court to commence the preliminary hearing. Less calculable
economies are created by reducing welfare payments to accused persons and
their dependants, and maintaining defendants in employment, thereby ensuring
tax revenues.
Follow-up Procedures: The majority of projects do not use follow-up procedures
despite their use in New York, Des Moines, Columbia and San Francisco. In a
number of those projects not using the procedures it has been discovered that
many of the defendants who fail to appear do so because they do not know
when they are expected to appear. '
Social and Legal Aid: It was soon apparent in the Manhattan Bail Projects that
the interview and follow-up process afforded splendid opportunities for assisting
defendants by the use of trained social workers. In addition it enabled an
assessment of the defendant’s need for legal aid to be assessed. In Manhattan,
neighbourhood sponsors such as anti-poverty organisations, unions and churches
are involved positively in the criminal process, as the project brings them into
the courtroom as third party supervisors of the released persons. The
opportunities are being exploited even further in other projects. In San
Francisco, the services of a psychiatric consultant are provided for training staff
members and volunteers and interviewing those defendants requiring special
attention: the project also works in conjunction with a number of family, youth
and probation authorities. In Dane County, Wisconsin, the project. staff
participate in the assignment of private attorneys, the representation of the
accused at preliminary stages by a staff attorney and the representation of
certain accused in all proceedings: the project also provides volunteer social
workers and financial counsellors for use by the project’s clients. In Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, where some ex-Convicts are employed as interview staff, employment
counselling and rehabilitation procedures are used.
  
Comparative Table of Results of Bail and Summons Projects in the United States
      
' - Number % Released
Jurisdiction 8831531331 I ”“4"“ d (RNumber &d%d Released on of those Ab% Ofd
erlo nterv1ewe ecommen e Recognisance Recommended SCO“ ers
Berkeley, Calif. 16. 7.64 — 1,034 — 228 - 3.5
31. 8.65
Los Angeles,Calif 1965—1968 14,128 3,519 (25%) 2,912 83% 4.4
Oakland, Calif. 1964—1966‘ 4,798 1,060 (22%) 579 55% 5.9
San Francisco, '26. 8.64 — 1,480 523 (35%) 487 93% ‘2
allf. 31. 7.65
Sunnyvale 1.11.63 — 2,607 1,286 (49%) 1,286 100% _.
Calif. 31. 8.65
Denver, Colorado 1.. 6.64 — approx. 1,492 (75%) 1,492 100% 1.9
(Municipal Court) 23. 8.65 2,000
.DiSITiC 0f 1. 1.64 — 5,144 2,528 (49%) 2,166 85.5% 3
Co um ia 31. 7.66
Atlanta, Ga. 13.13.2151— 1,200 233 (19%) 233 100% 4.6
Chicago, Ill. 1. 1.65 — 1,403 706 (50%) 706 100% 2.7
31. 8.65
Des Moines, Iowa. 4. 2.23 -— 5,663 4,333 (76%) 3,800 88% 2.4
St. Louis Missouri 15. 2.63 - 1,621 421 (26%) 388 92% 0.8
(Circuit Court) 31. 8.65
New York City, 20. 3.64 — 10,918 9,079 (82%) 6,732 74% 1.25
N.Y. 25. 8.65
Nassau Cty, N.Y. 1963—1967, 2,226 892 (38%) 849 95% 1.8
Milwaukee, Wise. 1966 3,816 577 (15%) 520 90% _  sawnb uagaiod u; “2
73
2'6
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Preventive Detention: In most states in America the only valid reason for
refusing bail or setting high bail is the likelihood of the defendant failing to
appear for trial.33 Undoubtedly judges and magistrates are inﬂuenced by the
possibility of a person released on his own recognisance or on bail committing
further offences, and this is reﬂected in their bail setting practices and, to some
extent, is acknowledged."7 Attempts to formulate criteria to regularise the
practice have foundered, and have been abandoned."0 The American Bar
Association Project on Minimum Standards refused to propose preventive
detention measures and was content to recommend that release be revoked for a
defendant who violates the conditions of his release and is indicted for a
subsequent serious crime.“
All bail projects have been faced with this problem; most have met it by
excluding from consideration either certain offences felt to be too serious to
bear repetition, or defendants with a prior criminal record. The New York Police
Department will not release on summons anyone who might return to the scene
of a disturbance, or continue the criminal conduct for which he was arrested. No
statistics are available on the crime rate amongst those on bail or release on
recognisance. ‘1
Earlier in 1969 the Office of the US. Attorney-General proposed
amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. This bill would authorize
the judicial ofﬁcer to consider danger to another person or the community when
setting non-financial release conditions. He is also authorised to deny such
release for a period of sixty days to categories of defendants found to be
dangerous; all such categories involve violence, threat of violence, or narcotic
offences.“ A detention hearing must be held and the judicial ofﬁcer find that
the person falls within one of the categories, that a substantial probability
exists that the person committed the offence and that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably ensure the safety of the other person
or the community. The defendant will be entitled to an expedited trial and,
unless the trial is in progress or is delayed at the defendant’s request, he will be
released within sixty days.‘
Conditional Release: In 1964 it was proposed to the National Conference on
Bail and Criminal Justice “ that in cases in which it appears that release on
recognisance is not appropriate, the defendant be released on certain conditions,
the breach of which would constitute grounds for revocation of the release
order. The following conditions were suggested: supervised release (including
remaining. at home or within the court’s jurisdiction, surrender of a passport,
periodic reporting to police, probation or the court); third party parole with
sanctions enforceable against the third party; ‘5 and daytime release.“ The
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 authorised the judicial officer to release a
person charged with a- non-capital crime on personal recognisance or an
unsecured appearance bond and, if such measures appeared insufﬁcient, to
impose in lieu of, or in additional to such measures, any of the following
conditions: release in custody of another person or organisation; restrictions on
travel, association or place of abode; the execution of an appearance bond and
the deposit in court of 10% of the bond; the execution of a bail bond with
sureties or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or any other condition reasonably
necessary, including a requirement that the person return to custody after
speciﬁed hours. The American Bar Association Project suggested additional
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conditions where it was considered that the defendant might seek to “interfere
with the orderly administration ofjustice”.‘7
Finally, before considering the situation in several other countries I would
like to mention a by-product of these projects which has received little direct
comment in any of the literature. In place of the earlier bail systems, which were
blatantly commercial, there exist procedures and concepts which indicate a
respect for the personal dignity of the citizen caught up in the criminal process,
and an appreciation of his particular circumstances: he is not considered as being
merely another contribution to criminal statistics. This concern is clearly
apparent in the New York and Milwaukee projects, and is reflected in numerous
other projects. The concern may not result in rehabilitation in all or any of the
cases dealt with, but it can cause no harm and must enhance the public opinion
of the legal process.
SWEDEN
Pre-trial procedures in Sweden have two major features: ﬁrstly, Swedish
administration of criminal justice shows a concern to avoid any discrimination
between rich and poor, and as bail clearly makes such discrimination, it is not
permitted and all defendants have the same opportunity of pre-trial release;
secondly it is inquisitional. The police may hold suspects for questioning for a
period of not more than six hours. If at the end of that time they still consider
him a suspect he may be held for another six hours and then arrested or
released. ‘9 The decision to arrest is made either by the police investigator or
the prosecutor, usually by the latter to whom authority in the matter passes.
Arrest is permissible when the preliminary inquiry either discloses grounds for
detention or does not disclose full grounds but custody is found to be of
particular importance.
The prosecutor must ﬁle a petition for pre-trial detention with the court
not more than ﬁve days after the arrest decision and the court must then hold a
detention hearing within fourteen days unless trial is to take place within seven
days of the ﬁling of the petition: it is rare for the maximum time to be used
before trial.“9 The court may order the continued detention if there is
probable cause to suspect the person of 'a crime punishable by penal servitude
and to fear that he may ﬂee, dispose of evidence, hinder the investigation or
continue with criminal behaviour. 5° If the crime is one for which the
prescribed minimum penalty is two years’ imprisonment, the defendant shall be
detained unless it appears clear that this precaution is unnecessary. The rate of
absconders has been calculated to be less than 1%.“ The court considers
character evidence and, if it refuses release, sets a date for trial, usually within
two weeks. If the proceedings have not been initiated within this period, and the
prosecutor has not petitioned for further detention, the defendant must be
released.
Both the prosecutor (prior to petitioning for detention), and the judge (on
the hearing of the petition), have power to impose conditions on the defendant’s
release, but usually defendants are released on their promise to return to court.
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DENMARK
Denmark has a bail statute, but it is rarely used as the judicial authorities,
like those in Sweden, consider bail permits inequalities in the law.52 Up to two
thirds of all prosecutions are commenced with a summons by telephone or
letter, and it is common for a defendant to be charged,” indicted, tried and
sentenced to prison, all while he is at liberty. In most other respects the
procedure and criteria for pre-trial detention are almost identical to those of
Sweden." Drunken drivers are rarely released, nor are those charged with
homicide, forcible rape, intentional manslaughter, serious forgery and
counterfeiting. If the crime is less serious, those with poor records may be
released, those with good prior records are invariably released.
NORWAY
Usually an accused may only be held when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting him of an offence with a maximum penalty exceeding six months’
imprisonment. It must also be reasonably considered that there are grounds to
fear ﬂight, interference with evidence or witnesses, or repetition or completion
of the offence charged, or the accused must be considered dangerous because of
intoxication, insanity or mental defect, and likely to repeat the offence.
Anyone arrested must be brought before a magistrate as soon as possible,
and the day after arrest at the latest, unless he is released'in the meantime. If the
magistrate orders detention he must place a time limit on the detention; the
limit is usually 3—4 weeks, and if psychiatric examination is to take place the
limit is usually 6—8 weeks. Detention may be extended by a further application
to the court.
Allegations have been made 5’ that the lengthy periods of remand 5° are
caused by the magistrates and judges taking into account considerations of
assisting police investigation (including the obtaining of confessions),
retribution, shock purposes (especially the giving of young persons “a taste of
prison”), and of preventing further offences.
The court has power to release subject to conditions such as periodic
reporting to the police, confiscation of a passport and hail. These forms of
release are rarely employed although the duty to report is used more often than
any other form of conditional release.’7 The usual procedure of the court is to
remand the accused in custody. Remands in custody are used three or four times
as frequently in Norway as in Sweden.
FRANCE
French law distinguishes three categories of offences: petty offences,
correctional offences, and crimes. There are also three corresponding categories
of penalties.
Theoretically, under the new Code of Penal Procedure applicable since
1959, “preventive detention” (pre-trial detention) is an exceptional measure.
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That it is not so exceptional in practice is clear from widespread dissatisfaction
with the working of the system and the overcrowding in prisons.“ It would
appear that it is customary to hold almost all defendants charged with crimes
and most of those charged with correctional offences. As a consequence, the
Minister for Justice recently introduced a draft Bill into Cabinet extending
individual rights and laying down strict rules for the granting of bail.
Provisional release is mandatory for those defendants not liable to
correctional imprisonment 5" or a more serious penalty. It is also mandatory in
a limited number of more serious offences depending on the defendant’s prior
record."0 In all other cases release is at the discretion of the examining judge,
and may also be requested by the accused or his counsel at any stage of the
proceedings. Preventive detention can only be ordered if there are both very
serious indications of guilt together with reasons to fear that he may ﬂee,
interfere with witnesses or evidence, commit further offences or disturb public
order. As soon as one of these conditions ceases to be fulﬁlled he must be
released. Preventive detention may not exceed a period of two months and may
then be renewed for further periods of two months on applications by the
Procurer de la re’publique and orders of the examining judge; if not renewed, the
accused must be released.
Provisional release is always subject to} a personal undertaking to appear
given by the accused and an election of domicile, and sometimes by
requirements of supplying security."
ITALY
The situation regarding bail differs amongst the three courts of criminal
jurisdiction. The Pretura has jurisdiction over crimes with penalties of up to
three years’ imprisonment. Such accused are usually “invited” by police to
respond to a charge: in almost none of these cases is there any pre-trial
detention. If the accused is detained, and this usually only applies to
professional criminals, he must be released within thirty days unless a decree has
been issued ordering him to trial. In practice the trial is usually held within the
thirty day period.
The Court of Assizes hears the most serious charges and for most charges
the defendant must be held until judgment or dismissal of the charge."2
The Tribunal hears all cases not heard by the Pretura or Court of Assizes,
and usually has a discretion whether to issue a warrant of seizure. Within 48
hours of the seizure the police either release the defendant or pass jurisdiction
over him to the District Attorney who must decide whether to release or detain
him: the principal criteria used are the likelihood of interference with witnesses
or evidence, or of the commission of further offences. Also taken into account is
the degree of co-operation afforded the prosecution by the defendant: “full
co-operation” would probably amount to full confession or testimony
implicating a more important defendant. The prosecutor must examine the
defendant within three days and has forty days within which he must complete
the pre-trial investigation. If the investigation is not then complete a preliminary
hearing is conducted by the Investigating Judge who interrogates the accused,
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the witnesses, the victim and any necessary experts: accused’s counsel
is not
present during the interrogation. After further consideration together with t
he
prosecutor and after hearing defence counsel, the judge decides wh
ether to
indict or exonerate the accused and, if he decides to indict, whether
to release
or detain him.
Maximum periods of detention, if issue of the seizure warrant is optional,
are 3 months if the maximum penalty is less than 4 years’ imprisonment and 6
months if longer. If the issue of the warrant is compulsory, the maximum period
of detention is two years if the maximum penalty is not less than twenty years
or life imprisonment, and one year if the maximum penalty is less.
The accused must be released if not indicted within the statutarily
specified period of time or if insufficient indicia of guilt appear in the pre-trial
record. He may be released if the issue of the seizure warrant is discretionary
where his detention is not necessary for the development of the case or because
of his good record, or family or health consideration. Although a provision for
bail exists, it is rarely used as it is considered undemocratic. If release of the
prisoner is mandatory he is at full liberty, if discretionary, he may be subjected
to certain conditions.
Despite the apparent harshness of the system it has been estimated that a
smaller percentage of Italian defendants are held in detention awaiting trial than
were held in most communities in the United States in 1964.“
ENGLAND
Bail studies in England have suggested that many of the difficulties and
inequalities existing in jurisdictions in the United States also appear in
England.“ Figures published by the Home Ofﬁce disclose that in 1962,
35,000 persons were kept in custody awaiting trial, slightly more than 1,000
were acquitted and between 17,000 and 18,000 were convicted but not
sentenced to a term of imprisonment."5 A Liverpool study of 418 alleged
housebreakers disclosed that 85% of those held in custody, and 98% of those
realeased on bail would satisfy the Manhattan release criteria: 50% of those held
in custody scored in the “very good risk” category of seven or more points.
In 1965 Justice prepared a report and set of proposals on bail and remands
in custody for consideration by the British Government which was then
intending to introduce a new Criminal Justice Bill; not all of the proposals were
accepted. The view was taken that the legal principles were fundamentally sound
and the real problem was to ensure appreciation of those principles by the
courts, police lawyers and defendants. The major recommendations ‘were that
statutory powers be given to the courts to impose conditions for the granting of
bail and to fine or imprison for breach of those conditions. It was also
recommended that police be authorised to apply to the court for an arrest
warrant in anticipation of breach of a condition, and that the prosecution be'
given a right of appeal against the grant ofbail to a Judge in Chambers. °° '
There are a few factors apparent, I trust, from the preceding discussion
that 1 wish to make the subjects of my final comments.
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In the European and Scandinavian countries studied, the judiciary and
magistracy play an active role in criminal investigations, and their functions and
objectives may be considered only with difﬁculty, as being independent of
police functions and objectives. In both England and the United States, the
judiciary and magistracy are necessarily considered as separate and distinct
from the police. In both countries it is recognised that each body may have to
consider similar criteria (for example, the likelihood of further offences)
although the weight given the ‘criteria may vary. In both England and the United ‘
States it has been discovered that bail setting practices tend to encourage judicial
abdication of power to the police. ‘7 The result, in England, the United States,
France and Italy, has been excessive conservatism and caution in the releasing of
prisoners, overcrowding in remand facilities and the numerous other ills
attendant on the unproductive captivity of large numbers of defendants.
Release subject to conditions has been an accepted mode of pre-trial
release in'European and Scandinavian countries for many years, with varying
degrees of success. It has been introduced into US. jurisdictions and
recommended for adoption in England. It would appear to be worth
consideration in New South Wales. I
' Sweden and Denmark have incorporated into their systems of pre-trial
detention a system that in practice amounts to automatic review of the need for
detention. This review ensures that the trials of detained persons are expedited
and the detention period kept to a minimum. As the review is automatic, a
defendant is not penalised by his lack of knowledgeof his right to release and
the methods by which he may exercise the right. The proposed amendments to
the US. federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 include the suggestion of a 60 day
limit to the detention period. In New South Wales no defendant may be held
more than eight days without a further hearing, with the exception of those
defendants committed for trial. I would suggest that thought be given to the
provision of a periodical review of such defendants to consider the amount of
bail, if any, and the validity of reasons for the delay in setting the matter down
for trial °°
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FOOTNOTES
“Although there is little doubt that English bail procedures as they operate in Engl
and
are healthier, fairer and more democratic than ours, this does not mean
that they can
be imported in toto to the United States. There are differences of geogra
phy,
tradition, national temperament and the climate of criminal justice whith give
one
pause". Botein, B. and Sturz, H., “Report on Pre—Trial Practices Abroad”. Append
ix I
to the Report of Proceedings of the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice,
May 27—29, 1964.
In some instances however the bondsman may require collateral for the
bond.
Beeley, A. L., The Bail System in Chicago (1927); NationalCommission on
Law
Observance and Enforcement, Surveys Analysis 89(1931); Weintraub,
“Why in Kings
County?” The Pleader 5—6 (March 1938); Foote, C., “Compelling Appearanc
e in
Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia”, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1031
(1954); Foote,
C., “A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City”, 106 U.Pa.L.Rev. 693
(1958). The Bail System of the District of Columbia, 1963; Report of
the
Attorney-General’s Committee on Poverty and the Administration ofFederal Crim
inal
Justice (1963).
Fig. Birmingham, 3 days; Denver, 2—7 days; St Louis, 3—5 days; Jackson, Mississ
ippi,
3—10 days. Other jurisdictions however provide immediate judicial determination,
e.g.
New York, Philadelphia, Illinois and Boston, Mass.
Foote, C., “A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City”. The resul
ts of
this study were conﬁrmed during thefirst year of the Manhattan Bail Project, whe
re a
control group, selected at random, had their recommendation for rel
ease withheld.
Release was granted in 60% of the recommended cases and 14% of the control group,
47% of those released and 27% of those jailed were acquitted, 17% of those bailed
and
64% of those jailed were sentenced to prison. When the factors of prior record, bail
amount, type of counsel, family integration and employment stability were held
constant they failed to account for this relationship; when considered in combina
tion
they accounted for only a small part of the relationship. See Rankin, A., “The Ef
fect
of Pre-Trial Detention" and Wald, P.,5‘Pre-trial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A
Statistical Study”, both in 39 N.Y.Uni.L.Rev. (June 1964).
Oakland, California; Baltimore, Maryland; District of Columbia; Dayton, Ohio;
San
Francisco, California; Atlanta, Georgia; Illinois; New York; and Ramsay Cou
nty,
Minnesota. The advantage of such a system is that the accused may arrange for his
release immediately the “booking” process is completed without the necessityof
awaiting any judicial determination, thus ensuring that the defendant need never
see
the inside of a jail. This practice would probably favour the rich, or the members of an
organised crime ring, and because of the lack of discrimination may facilitate the
release of the socially dangerous criminal.
See Freed, D. J. and Wald, P. M., Bail in the United States: 1964, pages 23—
28.
-Bondsme'n frequently bargain for special rates, add a service charge, threaten to c
ancel
a bond as a lever to collect additional fees just to keep the original bon
d in force, and
charge for subsequent bonds for the various stages of the trial, i.e. arrest, i
ndictment,
trial, verdict and appeal.
Examination of one New York company’s books showed that
from 1956 to 1958 it
wrote bonds for $U.S. 70 million, received $U.S. 1,400,000
in premiums, and suffered
no losses.
In Tulsa, Oklahoma prior to the introduction of a bail project, 80
% of all defendants
released} on a bond were represented by 4 lawyers: after the
introduction of the
project 80% were represented by over 60 attorneys. See Tulsa County
Bar Association
Entry Form for the American Bar Association Award of Meri
t 1965.
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Bonds of $100,000, $75,000, $40,000, $30,000 and $25,000 have been given for
notorious gangsters who have subsequently appeared Others have forfeited bail of
$25,000, $35,000 and $100,000.
Established by Louis Schweitzer, a New York industrialist, who was concerned about
the protracted pre-trial detention of penniless juveniles. Preliminary investigation
disclosed that the adult bail system was mere amenable: to experimentation and the
special problems of the youthful offender have been deferred.
Bail and Summons: 1965, published under the auspices of the National Conference on
Bail and Criminal Justice lists 73 bail projects. At least 45 of these projects are
currently in operation.
See Zander, M.: “Bail: a Re-Appraisal”, Criminal Law Review, January, February and
March, 1967, pages 25—39, 100—109, and 128—142; Davies 0, “Imprisonment
Without Sentence", New Society, March 27, 1969, pages 482—3, and Pre-Trial
Imprisonment (unpublished); Friedland, M. L., “Reforming the Bail System", an
address delivered at Kingston, Ontario, February. 22, 1966. Several studies have been
carried out by members of the Sydney University Law School and one by the law
student organisation, C.L.A.S. (Community Legal Aid Scheme).
Prior to January 1967 defendants were interviewed in the detention pens adjoining
the courts in which their bail application was to be heard. The new procedure allows
the legal aid attorneys more time for adequate pre-court interviews with their clients,
and allows the district attorney to consider the sufﬁciency of legal complaints before
they are filed in court; more time is allowed for dismissals and reductions to be
negotiated.
Prior to the introduction of this procedure a number of suicides occurred amongst this
class and many others alleged police mistreatment. The suicides have now ceased and
the allegations of mistreatment have subsided. The procedure involved is to turn them
over to the Department of Corrections who supervise their care and employ
Spanish-speaking personnel (the majority of such prisoners being Puerto Ricans).
“Public intoxication" cases are not interviewed as the majority of such accused plead
guilty.
Originally the list of excluded offences also include felonious assault _on a police
ofﬁcer, forcible rape, impairing the morals of a minor, carnal abuse, sodomy of a
minor and certain narcotics offences. A defendant was ineligible for consideration by
the project if his previous record included any such offence. These offences were
excluded because of the special problems they raise.
The importance of this measure in the US. context, where the Miranda decision ofthe US. Supreme Court requires all defendants to be advised of their rights, was
demonstrated in the New York Summons project where the numbers refusinginterview dropped from 27% to 19% after the introduction of the measure.
The procedure is now applied to almost all misdemeanours and violations. However
patrol ofﬁcers are authorised to issue summonses for some violations.
Where a large number of defendants are involved, (e.g. following a demonstration) thedesk officer waives all interviews unless the arraignment court is not in session. Where
all defendants are connected with the location of the disturbance (e.g. a school) thedefendants may be released on summons without an investigation, provided they areproperly identified and there is no likelihood of them returning to the location of thedisturbance. This measure has been so successful that no defendant released in suchcircumstances has been rearrested at the disturbance.
The Police Commissioner has directed that ﬁeld inspections of precincts be conductedto determine the degree of compliance with the orders relating to the project and toimprove the efficiency of its operation.
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In the cases of admitted narcotic users and of those charged with disor
derly conduct,
loitering, criminal nuisance and public intoxication, only those w
ho reasonably stand
a chance of meeting the criteria have a full interview: the city
wide average of
interviews waived by the desk ofﬁcer is 35% and 55% of the wai
vers occur in the
Bowery (drunks), Times Square (transients) and Manhat
tan South (disorderly
conduct, loitering, prostitution and related offences).
Certain department stores are authorised to conduct summons investi
gations at their
security ofﬁce. The interviewer then telephones the desk ofﬁce
r at the precinct
stationhouse, identifies the defendant, and informs the des
k ofﬁcer of the charge and
the results of the interview and veriﬁcation process. If satisfied,
the desk officer may
approve the issue of a summons which may be completed a
t the store. If the desk
ofﬁcer is not satisfied, the defendant is taken to the stationho
use and the usual arrest
procedure observed. -
The major cause of the high rate of absconders appears to be in
complete or poorly
prepared investigation reports.
E.g., Glendale, Richmond, Pittsburgh, Contra Costa, and Sunnyvale (Ca
lifornia);
Denver, Colorado; and Prince Georges County, Md.
E.g. Oklahoma County and Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Bar Association furn
ishes the
Courts with a list of approved lawyers who may be called upon by a person not having
an attorney. An attorney is removed from the list if his client fails t
o appear. The
defendant must swear an afﬁdavit containing a promise to appear and
information
regarding the offence, his family and community ties, residence, employ
ment, health,
previous criminal record and references. '
Berkeley, California.
Los Angeles, Califomia.
E.g Oakland, California; Denver, Colorado; Kansas City and St Louis (
Missouri);
Burlington, Hackensack and Newark (New Jersey); New York City, Nassa
u County
and Syracuse, (New York). '
E.g San Francisco, California; New Haven, Connecticut; Des Moines,
Iowa; Boston,
Massachusetts; Madison, Wisconsin
E.g. Connecticut; Chicago, 111.; Cleveland, Ohio; Charleston, W. Virgi
nia; District of
Columbia.
.
E.g, Glendale, California; and Ramsey County, Minnesota.
However defendants are not considered for interview if their pr
ior record discloses
that they had two felony convictions, or one prior conviction
for the offence charged
and those offences involved crimes against the person or narcoti
c violations. They also
excluded most defendants who had records of previous viol
ations of probation or
parole, escape from prison or mental institution, or bailjump
ing.
E.g. New York (Summons Project); Prince Georges County, M
aryland; Contra Costa,
California; Westmoreland County, Pa.; Tulsa, Oklahoma (
where it is left to the
discretion of the attorney).
O’Reilly, C. and Flanagan, 1., “Men in Detention”. Chicago (1967).
Kuykendall, D. L. and Deming, R. W., Pre-Trial Release
in Oakland, Cali omia,
California (1967).
Due to this lack of uniformity little can be gained from a
comparison of assessed
savings. Calculations of savings in several projects are given below
:
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Jurisdiction Period Amount Basis of Calculation
Los An eles, 1968 $920,441 Gross Cu tody Dollar
Calif. g Savings $1,108,496)
less Cost of OR Unit
Operation ($ 188,055)
San Francisco, 1964— $1,092,475 Estimated Cost per
Calif. 1968 prisoner X average no.
of detention days X no.
of defendants released
less Cost of Unit
 
operation
District of 1965 $48,265 Cost per man per? dayColumbia 'X Av. no. of detention
days X no. of defen-
dants released.
   Baltimore, March $129,998 Savings in jail costs.Maryland 1966—-July1967Nassau Cty.,'N.Y. 1966 $150,000 Savings in'jail costs.
(38) Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d (1951); Mastrian v. Hedman 326 F.2d 708,
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
711 (8th Cir) (Cert. denied, 376 US. 965 (1964); Freed, DJ. and Wald, P.M., Bail inthe United States: 1964, pp.2—8: In the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 danger tothe community may be considered in determining pre-trial release in capital cases andrelease pending appeal. 18 U.S.C. 3148. American Bar Association Project onMinimum Standards of Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pre-Trial Release,
(1968), PP. 5-6 and 65-71.
Bail and Summons: 1964, pp.59—63; Standards Relating to Pre—Trial Release (1968),
p.6; National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, pp. 149—220.
In 1968 a Bill was passed by the New York State Legislature, but was vetoed by
Governor Rockefeller because preventive detention was then being studied by several
committees. The proposed Bill excluded from bail all persons who were charged with
assault in the first or second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, rape or
sodomy in the first degree, or kidnapping or robbery in the first degree and who at
time of the offence had been previously charged with any of such offences and
admitted to bail. Recently the preventive detention proposal resulting from the
studies referred to by the Governor was withdrawn as it was concluded to be
inadequate.
Standards Relating to Pre-Trial Release: supralr 5, 6—8, pp.20—21. The Project also
suggested that certain conditions be imposed on a defendant when there is shown to
be a danger that he will commit a serious crime, seek to intimidate witnesses or
otherwise unlawfully interfere with the orderly administration ofjustice. #5.5
The New York Time Magazine (February 14, 1969), p.56 quoted estimates varying
from 8% to 45%. '
There are four broad categories:
(a) If a defendant is charged with a dangerous crime. A “dangerous crime" includes
attempted robbery, breaking and entering a dwelling house or business premises,
arson or attempted arson of such premises, and various sexual and narcotic
offences.
(b) Offenders charged with or having a record of at least two crimes of violence.
“Crime of violence" is more widely defined than “dangerous crime” and
includes mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter,
extortion or blackmail with threats of violence, arson, certain assaults and
certain sexual offences.
(c) Narcotic addicts charged with any crime of violence.
(d) Persons who obstruct justice by threatening witnesses or jurors.
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(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(5 0)
(51)
(5 2)
(5 3)
(54)
(55)
(56)
Freed, D. J. and Wald, P. M., Bail in the United States: 1964 (1964) p.73. The
discussion of conditional release is reported in National Conference on Bail and
Criminal Justice, Washington (1965) p.221.
E.g in' Tulsa, Oklahoma, defendants charged with misdemeanours and violations are
released into the custody of their attorneys. Failure to produce his client in court
when required results in the removal of the attomey’s name from the list of approved
attorneys. Until reinstated to the list, such attorneys are unable to secure the pre-trial
release of their clients into their custody and must observe the bail procedures. A ‘
similar programme is proposed by the Oklahoma County Bar Association. "
In 1964 this form of release was in use in fourteen states for convicted offenders but
in none for persons awaiting trial.
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Pre-trial Release, (1968) # 5.5,‘pp.20 and 65—71. The
conditions suggested are:
(a) restrictions on associations,
(b) prohibitions on going to prescribed areas or premises,
(c) prohibitions on possession of dangerous weapons, engagement in certain
activities or indulgence in certain drugs or intoxicating liquors,
(d) requirement of regular reporting to, and submission to supervision of, a court
ofﬁcer.
If the defendant’s identity and residence in Sweden are known and the offence is a
minor one for which the penalty is a ﬁne or temporary suspension of office he must
be released after twelve hours. The police have a discretion to release any defendant,
after charging him for the reasons of health or age. '
In 1962, 57% of those persons detained in Stockholm were released within 24 hours,
the remainder spending an average of 4—5 days in gaol awaiting formal detention
hearings, and of these the average of those ordered by the court to be detained spent
another 14 days in gaol. '
A non-resident suspected of a lesser crime, but still punishable by a prison sentence,
may be detained if there is reason to suspect flight.
A Report prepared in 1963 by a Special Commission revealed that from 1959 to 1962
approximately 14,000 persons were arrested in Sweden, detention petitions were ﬁled
by the prosecutor in 6,000 cases (45%) and 5,000 petitions (80%) were approved by
the court.
Similarly provisions for provisional release are rarely used. The choice is between
ouu'ight release or detention.
Even persons charged with suchoffences as simple theft, burglary, embezzlement,
forgery and simple assault. First offenders are usually only held in custody prior to
trial if charged with a very serious crime.
In 1961, 6,600 persons were seized by the police and 5,000 released within 24 hours
by the police, under their discretion to release prior to a detention hearing. Of 3,200
detention hearings in Denmark that year 200 persons were released. In Copenhagen
only 50 out of 1,500 were released after detention hearings. The estimated average
detention period is three to four weeks: difﬁcult cases can take months.
Bratholm, A., “Arrest and Detention in Norway”, 108 U.Pa.L.Rev. (1960), p.336, at
pp. 343—7.
A study of prisoners committed to the central prison in 1952 showed that for those
sentenced to short terms, the average period of remand was between 40 and 50 days.
In the cases of those defendants sentenced to more than six months’ imprisonment,
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(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
after excluding the period of pre-conviction custody, the average was 72 days for
stealing and similar offences, 101 days for acts of violence, 175 days for sex offences
and 75 days for other offences.
In a sample of 177 cases brought before the magistrates‘ court of Oslo, 166 were
remanded in custody and, of the eleven released, ten were ordered to report to the
police.
The New York Times, October'1969. Amongst the cases there referred to, is that of
Francois Marcantoni, charged with the murder of the bodyguard of the actor M. Alain
Delon. He has spent nine months in prison awaiting trial, in spite of repeated attempts
to obtain his release on baiL Recently, he was interrogated by the Versailles magistrate
for the twenty-seventh time. '
A term exceeding two months.
If he is domiciled in France and charged with a correctional offence for which the
maximum penalty is less than two years’ imprisonment, he cannot be detained more
than five days after his first appearance before the examining judge unless he has a
prior conviction for a crime, or has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term
exceeding three months.
The security is divided into two parts, the first of which guarantees appearance. The
second part is returned if the defendant is non-suited, or tried and acquitted. If
convicted, it guarantees, in order of priority, the costs of the civil claimant (the
victim), the costs of the state authorities, any fines imposed and the restitution and
reparation ordered. in favour of the victim. The security offered must consist of coin,
banknotes, certified checks or bonds. Sureties are not acceptable.
Defendants must be held if charged with certain crimes against the personality of the
state (treason, espionage, etc.), crimes punishable with a minimum of five years, or a
maximum of ﬁfteen years, or life imprisonment (including wilful homicide, aggravated
robbery and extortion, kidnapping and commerce in adulterated foodstuffs; slavery,
certain narcotic offences; counterfeiting).
Botein, B. and Sturz, H. 1., “Report on Pre-trial Practices in Sweden, Denmark,
England and Italy”, Appendix I to National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice
(1965), p.319 at p.356.
See Gibson, 13., Time Spent Awaiting Trial, Home Office, London (1960); and Zander,
M., “Bail: A Re-Appraisal”. Crim.Law.Rev. (1967), pp.25, 100, 128. The report and
article contain the following statistical information:
In 1964, 26,859 persons were committed for trial, 36,590 being committed in
custody. In 1960 approximately 34% of those remanded for summary trial were held
in custody. In 1956 of those committed for trial 9.4% were acquitted: of these 7.9%
were on bail and 1.5% in custody. In 1956, of those on bail pleading Not Guilty,
45.6% were acquitted, whereas of those in custody pleading Not Guilty 20.6% were
acquitted. A study of cases in 1956 and 1958, showed that whereas only 40% of
persons on bail were detained in custody on conviction, the proportion of those
already in custody, who were sentenced to imprisonment, was 78%.
In 1961 out of a total daily average of 29,600 prisoners 4.2% (1,249) were untried.
Out of a total of 112,284 receptions into prisons, borstals and reception centres,
33,717 (29%) were untried persons. The Home Office Report indicates that the
average period of pre-trial detention is twenty-five days._ The estimated cost of
retaining persons on remand in 1964 was at least£1.3 million: this will be increased if
one takes into account the more complex and burdensome procedures of the
reception stage which would also be the most expensive.
Justice. Interim Report afloint Working Party on Bail and Remands in Custody.
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(66) It was also suggested that:
(67)
(68)
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
(e)
(0
the principles for the grant of bail be restated in a Practice Direction or Ho
me
Office Circular,
in considering bail that Courts be not bound by strict rules of evide
nce,
that it be stressed that the personal circumstances of the accu
sed are very
relevant in determining a bail application,
that power to require sureties be retained,
that legal aid be provided at an early stage, and not postponed u
ntil the
conclusion of committal proceedings, -
that, where it is impracticable to apply to the court for an arrest
warrant, the
police be authorised to arrest a defendant when reasonable grounds e
xist for
believing that the defendant intends to breach the release condition
s.
Time Spent Awaiting Trial, supra p.311 The Report discloses‘tha
t in the sample of
1,742 cases‘the justices accepted the police objection to pre-trial re
lease in 88% of
such cases. See also Zander, M., “Bail: A Reappraisal” s
upra p.109, and Suffet, F.,
“Bail Setting: A Study in Courtroom Interaction”, Cri
me and Delinquency (October
1966).
See Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arr
est, Detention and
Exile, United Nations Publication No. 65. xiv. 2.
. '
 APPENDIX II
A PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A BAIL TRIBUNAL
P. G. McGONIGAL
I propose that consideration be given to the establishment by statute of a
Bail Tribunal along the following lines:
A. CONSTITUTION
Either: (1) A Chairman of Quarter Sessions,
or (2) A Tribunal of three members consisting of
(i) A Chairman of Quarter Sessions,
(ii) A Probation or Parole Ofﬁcer,
(iii) One other person appointed by the Governor.
B. AUTHORITY
To consider the following cases:
1. Cases referred to it from Courts of Petty Sessions. (Note: Provision should
' be made to allow either the Crown or Police Prosecutor or the defendant
to request the Court, before whom he is initially brought, to refer the
question of bail to the Tribunal. It should be mandatory that the
magistrate comply with the request).
2. Cases referred to it from any other courts. (Note: It may be provided that
other courts be given the discretion to avail themselves of theTribunal’s
services. Perhaps in such a case the Tribunal would merely issue a
recommendation).
3. Applications from defendants held on remand for a determination of bail,
when bail has already been set or refused by a Court of Petty Sessions.
(Quaere: whether the right to apply for such a determination, which
would supersede that of the Court, should be given to the prosecuting
authorities).
.. 4. All cases of persons held on remand, whether bail hasbeen set or refused,
on a periodic basis (perhaps weekly).
C. PROCEDURES
1. In all cases to be heard by the Tribunal a report shall be prepared by a
probation or parole ofﬁcer dealing with the following matters:
(a) the occupation record,
(b) the residential history,
(c) the marital status,
(d) details of the family ties, and
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(e) the criminal record of the defendant; and g
(f) any facts which mi ht indicate whether the defendant islikely to fail
to appear for tria, to interfere with witnesses orev1dence or to
commit further crimes whilst on bail.
2. The Tribunal should consider the report, hear submissions from the
prosecution and defendant and examine both the prosecution authorities
and the defendant.
3. The Tribunal should be given the power to hear additional witnesses called
by either the prosecution or defence.
4. ' Hearings should be held in camera to protect, if necessary, the sources of
police information, and to prevent the publication of information about
the defendants’social and criminal record.
5. Police opinion should be admissible as evidence before the tribunal.
D. CRITERIA
The criteria that should be applied by the Tribunal should be enumerated
but the Tribunal should be allowed the discretion to decide the weight to be
, given to the respective criteria. It should be stated that such criteria are not
necessarily exhaustive.
E. POWERS AND SANCTIONS
1. ' The Tribunal might be given the power to require persons to produce
documents or appear and give evidence. Penalties should be provided for
failure to so produce or appear.
It should be declared an offence to make deliberately untrue statements.
The Tribunal should be given the power to require matters to be set down
for trial within a prescribed period. Penalties should be provided for
default.
4. ' The Tribunal should be given the power of censure of officials responsible
for delays in the criminal process, or of prosecution authorities responsible
for referring trivial and unnecessary cases to it.
5. The Tribunal should be given the power to grant bail, with or without
sureties and/or conditions, or refuse bail, to reduce bail or dispense with or
reduce the requirement of sureties when bail has already been set.
F. APPEAL
Possibly the normal rules governing the exercise of quasi judicial functions .
may be sufficient. Otherwise appeal might be by way of application to a Justiceof the Supreme Court and the appeal would be by way of rehearing. If there is
to be an appeal by way of rehearing, police opinion evidence should be
admissible.
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SYDNEY UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY
ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS
ENDED 318T DECEMBER 1969
I have much pleasure in submitting the Annual Report on the activities of
the Institute of Criminology in the Department of Law for the year ended 3lst
December 1969.
Advisory Committee.
In addition to the members whose names appear in the 1969 Handbook
the Committee has been joined by Mr W. C. Langshaw, Under-Secretary to the
Department of Child Welfare and Social Welfare.
Staff.
Dr D. Chappell has been on study leave during 1969 at the School of
Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany, NY.
In September 1969 Dr 0. V. Briscoe, Senior Lecturer in Forensic
Psychiatry, left the staff to take up a position at the Maudsley Hospital in
London.
Mr D. G. Woods has recently joined the staff as a Lecturer in Criminal
Law, and will take up his duties at the beginning of 1970.
Teaching and Extension work.
The teaching programme for the LL.M. and Diploma courses in
Criminology as set out in the Handbook have continued throughout the year.
An extension course of 20 lectures for selected police ofﬁcers has recently
been completed in the Law School.
Two courses of 12 lectures each have been given by Mr G. J. Hawkins and
Mr R. P. Roulston to the Seventh Ofﬁcers’ Course at the Australian Police
College, Manly.
A course of 20 lectures was given by Mr Roulston to the Adult Probation
Ofﬁcers’ Course in the Department of Corrections.
Members of the staff have delivered lectures in the Potential Ofﬁcers’
Course, the Detectives’ Training Course and the Sergeants’ Course at the N.S.W.
Police Academy, Redfern.
A W.E.A. course of 16 lectures on “Crime and Society” was conducted by
Mr P. G. Ward.
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Clinical demonstrations for the judiciary and the magistracy were given by
Dr Briscoe at an Admission Centre throughout the year. Dr Briscoe also took
part each month in a lunch-time discussion at the Parole Service Training Unit at
the Metropolitan Remand Prison.
Other activities
The resources of the Institute have been available to the Attorney General,
the Minister of Justice, the Commissioner of Police and the Comptroller-General
of Prisons.
A Psychiatric Clinic was conducted at the law School by Dr Briscoe
throughout the year to provide for court reports for persons convicted by
Magistrates’ Courts and on bail awaiting sentence. This clinic has worked closely
with the Adult Probation Service.
Dr Briscoe has held regular sessions as Consultant Psychiatrist at a Child
Guidance Clinic for the purpose of preparing court reports for the Children’s
Court.
Professor Shatwell and Mr Weird serve on the Advisory Committee on
Crime Statistics for the N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.
Members of the staff have participated in the work of the Civil
Rehabilitation Committee, the Prisoners’ Aid Association of N.S.W., the Judge
Rainbow Appeal Committee and the Medico-Legal Society of N.S.W.
Seminars.
The 1969 seminar programme was as follows:
The Admissibility 0f Confessional Statements. This seminar, which
commenced in 1965, was held in abeyance this year during the absence overseas
of the Chief Justice, Sir Leslie Herron. On his return some proposals were
circulated for discussion at a ﬁnal meeting to be convened in March 1970.
Judicial Seminar on Sentencing. This second seminar on Sentencing was
convened by Mr Roulston at the request of the Minister of Justice and the Chief
Justice of N.S.W. The seminar was held on February 10th, 1969, and occupied a
full day. Papers were delivered by Mr Justice R. L. Taylor, Mr Justice P. H.
Allen, Judge A. levine, Mr W. J.’ Lewer, S.M., Mr M. F. Farquhar, S.M., Mr G. J.
Hawkins and Mr R. P. Roulston. Judges and magistrates, sitting in syndicates,
then took part'in a sentencing exercise, followed by a comparison of the results
of their deliberations.
Sexual Offences against Females. This seminar was held in two evening
sessions on June 26th and July 2nd, 1969, and was attended by 237 people, all
of whom had a professional interest in the topic. Papers were delivered by Mr D.
G. Woods, Dr W. E. Lucas, Mr H. A. R. Snelling, Q.C.; Dr M. Freeman, Dr P.
Shea, Associate Professor J. Katz, Detective-Sergeant B. Doyle, Mr G. J. Hawkins
and Dr 0. V. Briscoe, Dr W. Thompson, Mr F. D. Hayes, Mr H. F. Purnell and Mr
R. P. Roulston. The seminar was arranged by Dr Briscoe.   
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Bail. A seminar on Bail was arranged by Mr Ward to be held in two evening
sessions on November 14th and 27th, 1969. Papers were prepared by Mr R. P.
Roulston, Mr P. G. Ward, Miss S. Armstrong, Mr Justice J.H., McClemens, Mr J.
K. Ford, Mr W. J. Lewer, S.M., Detective-Sergeant F. Krahe, Judge A. Levine
and Mr H. F. Purnell. The membership of approximately 100 persons comprised
members of the judiciary, the magistracy, the legal profession and the various
law enforcement agencies.
Publication of Proceedings.
With the assistance of the Department of Justice arrangements have been
made for the publication of Reports of Proceedings of the Institute, including
reports of seminars. .The ﬁrst four volumes are in the hands of the Government
Printer and will be on sale at the Law School as soon as they are available. These
comprise: (l) 1967 Judicial Seminar on Sentencing and seminar on Fitness to
Plead; (2) 1968 seminar on Computers and the Lawyer; (3) 1968 seminar on
Drug Abuse in N.S.W.; (4) 1969 Second Judicial Seminar on Sentencing and
Progress Report on the Sydney Sentencing Project.
Research in progress in 1969.
l. Treatise on the N.S.W. Parole of Prisoners Act. (R. P. Roulston.)
2. Outline of Criminal Law in N.S.W. (R. P. Roulston.)
3. The Operation of Breathalyser Legislation in N.S.W. (R. P.
Roulston.)
4. The Sydney Project on Sentencing: a continuing project on
sentencing in the Higher Courts of N.S.W., sponsored bythe Walter
E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, New York. (P. G. Ward and R.
P. Roulston.)
’ 5. Research on Response of Young Offenders to Education Program.
(P. C. Ward.)
6. 'Evaluation of Work Release Program. (P. G. Ward.)
7. Police Firearms Policy in the Australian States. (G. J. Hawkins.)
8. Deterrence and the Criminal Law. (G. J. Hawkins in association with
~ the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago.)
9. A Study of Imprisoned Male Motoring Offenders. (Dr 0. V. Briscoe
with Mr L. H. Evers.)
10. A study of Appeals to Quarter Sessions from Decisions of Special
Magistrates in respect of Children and Young Persons. (Dr 0. V.
Briscoe with P. G. McGonigal.)
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11. A Study of “Fitness to Plead”: an examination of the use of this
plea in Sydney 1967/68. (Dr 0. V. Briscoe with Dr G. Palmai and P.
G. McGonigal.)
12. A Study of Indecent Behaviour by Males in Sydney. (Dr 0. V.
Briscoe with P. G. McGonigal.)
Publications.
During 1969 the following writings by members of the Institute have been
published or accepted for publication:
P. G. WARD & R. P. ROULSTON “A Demographic Survey of 3700
Pre-Sentence Reports”. Proceedings of the Institute of Oiminology, 1969,
No. l. (in press).
G. J. HAWKINS & P. G. WARD “Armed and Disarmed Police”. Journal of
Research in crime and Delinquency. (in press).
G. J. HAWKINS_& O. V. BRISCOE “The Treatment of Sexual Offenders”.
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1969).
0. V. BRISCOE “Some Observations on Personality Disorder in a Forensic
Setting”.A.N.Z. Journal of Oiminology. (in press).
0. V. BRISCOE “ “. . . For the Devil does not know Man’s Intention" ”. A.L.J.
(in press).
0. V. BRISCOE “The Rehabilitation of Prisoners”. , Journal of the Medico-Legal
Society ofMS. W. (in press).
0. V. BRISCOE “On the Contribution of Psychiatry to Law”. Australian
Journal ofForensic Sciences. (in press). .
O. V. BRISCOE “The Problem of Indecent Behaviour in Male Public
Conveniences in Sydney”. The Stipendiary Magistrates’Bulletin, No. 173,
September 1969.
O. V. BRISCOE “Red Cell Survival in Patients treated with Phenothiazine
Drugs”. The Medical Journal of Australia, 1969 2:24. (with H.
Kronenberg).
O. V. BRISCOE “Some Problems of Transplantation, Part II”. (with H. M.
Thompson). Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1969).
G. J. HAWKINS The Honest Politician’s Guide to Oime Control. (with Norval
Morris). The University of Chicago Press (1970).
G. J. HAWKINS “Censorship in Practice”, a chapter in Australian Censorship
Crisis, ed. Geoffrey Dutton (Sun Books 1970).  
 .
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G. J. HAWKINS “Humanism and the Crime Problem”, alchapter inA Humanist
View, edited by Dr I. Edwards (Angus & Robertson 1969). '
G. J. HAWKINS “Thomas Mott Osborne: Pioneer in Penology”, a chapter in
Festschn‘ft for Sir John Barry. (in press).
G. J. HAWKINS “The Death Penalty and the Problem of Punishment”
Quadrant, No. 57, Vol. xiv, No. 1 (1969).
G. J. HAWKINS “God and the Maﬁa”. The Public Interest. No. 14 (1969).
G. J. HAWKINS “The Overreach of the Criminal Law” (with Norval Morris).
Midway, Vol.9, No. 3 (1969).
G. J. HAWKINS “From Murder and from Violence, Good Lord, Deliver Us”.
Midway, Vol. 10, No. l (1969).
G. J , HAWKINS “Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moraiizing and
Habituative Effects”. Wisconsin Law Review, 1969, No. 2.
G. J. HAWKINS “Deterrence: The Problematic Postulate”. A.N.Z. Journal of
Criminology, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1969).
D. CHAPPELL Preventive Detention and the Habitual Offender”. A.N.Z.
Journal of Criminology, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1969).
Overseas Visitor.
Professor 1. Drapkin, Director of the Institute of Criminology in the
Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, on a visit to Australia
under the auspices of the Australian Crime Prevention, Correction and
After-Care Council, visited the Institute in September 1969 and delivered two
lectures, one to LL.M. and Dip. Crim. students in Criminology and the other to
the Police Officers’ course in the Law School.
K. O. SHATWELL
Dean of the Faculty ofLaw and
Director of the Institute of Criminology
 
V. C: N. Blight, Government Primer, New South Wales — 1970
